“A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations” Walton and McKersie. Advanced the proposition that the process of labor-management negotiation comprises four different subprocesses: Distributive Bargaining Integrative Bargaining Attitudinal Structuring Intraorganizational Bargaining.
Advanced the proposition that the process of labor-management negotiation comprises four different subprocesses:
The parties bargain over division of a particular pie, and one party’s gain is a direct loss for the opponent.
It is a fixed-sum game, or distributive bargaining.
Both sides search for solutions that would increase the size of the pie.
In game theory models, this approach is referred to as a variable-sum game.
This subprocess defines the quality and type of relationship between labor and management.
Encompasses the parties’ efforts, intended and unintended, to shape their opponents’ behaviors.
Takes place largely away from the bargaining table and refers to the internal negotiations that occur within the respective organizations.
Each side must resolve some of these internal conflicts before it can reach a settlement with its bargaining opponent.
Its outer limits are determined by the bargaining parties. For example, in the case of a potential automobile transaction, there is a price at which the buyer would rather walk than drive, and there is a price at which the seller would rather keep than sell the automobile.
Within each contract zone, the parties have opening offers, target positions, and resistance points.
A resistance point within the range of potential solutions indicates the minimum settlement level that the party would be willing to accept.
In the case of a positive contract zone the union and management resistance points overlap. This means that there is a range of possible settlement.
A negative contract zone is said to exist whenever the resistance points do not overlap suggesting that impasse is likely.