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Social Dialogue and Collective Bargaining for Decent Work & Key Priorities for the ITUC

Social Dialogue and Collective Bargaining for Decent Work & Key Priorities for the ITUC. Carolin Vollmann Economic Advisor & Research Officer International Trade Union Confederation. Structure . ILO Conventions National Institutions The Long and Short-term Development The Economic Impact

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Social Dialogue and Collective Bargaining for Decent Work & Key Priorities for the ITUC

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  1. Social Dialogue and Collective Bargaining for Decent Work & Key Priorities for the ITUC Carolin Vollmann Economic Advisor & Research Officer International Trade Union Confederation

  2. Structure • ILO Conventions • National Institutions • The Long and Short-term Development • The Economic Impact • Group work

  3. 1 ILO Conventions • C-87 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to OrganiseConvention, 1949 • C-98 Right to Organiseand Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 • C-29 Forced Labour Convention, 1930 • C-105 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 • C-100 Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 • C-111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 • C-138 Minimum Age Convention, 1973 • C-182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999

  4. 1 ILO Conventions Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (Convention 87, 1948) Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention(Convention 98, 1949) • The freedoms to associate and to bargain collectively are fundamental rights. • They are rooted in the ILO Constitution and the Declaration of Philadelphia of 1944 annexed to the ILO Constitution. • Their core value has been reaffirmed by the international community, notably at the 1995 World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen and in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. • These enabling rights make it possible to promote and realize decent conditions at work and are important for the attainment of all ILO strategic objectives.

  5. 1 ILO Conventions Convention 87: Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (1948) Article 2: Workers have the right to establish and join a union Article 3: Unions have to be able to establish their own framework of rules and their own action plans Article 4: Governments are prohibited to dissolve or suspend unions Article 5: Unions have the right to establish and join federations and confederations Article 6: The same rights(2, 3 and 4) apply to confederations and federations Article 7: The conditions for public recognition of a union shall not violate Art 2, 3 and 4

  6. 1 ILO Conventions Convention 98: Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (1949) Article 1: Workers shall be protected from any anti-union discrimination Article 2:Workers’ and employers’ unions shall be protected from any interference by each other Article 3: National Institutions shall ensure the right to organise Article 4: National Institutions shall encourage and promote the use of collective bargaining procedures

  7. 2 National Institutions Ideally the relationship between Government, trade unions and worker’s association is organised in a way that… • The government provides a national framework that gives both parties (employers and workers) a similar empowerment • …so that employers and workers bargain independently from the Government and independently from each other

  8. 2 National Institutions Membership of trade unions and employer’s association The Government can provide incentives to join a union and hamper their representative power: • Handing over responsibility(Ghent system as it is in place in Sweden and Belgium; trade unions are entitled to administer the unemployment insurance which creates a high incentive to join a union) • Making the membership for firms obligational (This is the case in Austria, where all employers have to join; as a consequence they are all covered by the national collective bargaining agreement) • Regulations of representation (Germany and Austria are characterized by work councils which compete with trade unions; in Romania unions have to comprehend at least 15 employees accounting for at least 50%+1 of the employees within the same company to be able to bargain)

  9. 2 Latest Data Available for Trade Union Membership (2008-2011) Source: OECD Database, 2013.

  10. 2 National Institutions The Role of Collective Bargaining Agreements • Thresholds for bargaining (like in Romania: The negotiation of a collective agreement is only mandatory when a company has more than 21 employees)

  11. 2 National Institutions The Role of Collective Bargaining Agreements • Thresholds for bargaining (like in Romania: The negotiation of a collective agreement is only mandatory when a company has more than 21 employees) • Extensions (the application of a collective agreement beyond the actual bargaining partners;this can refer to the extension to non-union workers in the same enterprise; to a region or all firms of a specific sector)

  12. 2 Extension Mechanisms of Collective Agreements

  13. 2 Extension Mechanisms of Collective Agreements

  14. 2 National Institutions The Role of Collective Bargaining Agreements • Thresholds for bargaining (like in Romania: The negotiation of a collective agreement is only mandatory when a company has more than 21 employees) • Extensions(the application of a collective agreement beyond the actual bargaining partners; this can refer to the extension to non-union workers in the same enterprise; to a region or all firms of a specific sector) • Opt-out clauses (regulations that permit an employer to deviate from a collective agreement in a negative way) and legal statusof the collective agreement; opt-out can be linked to economic conditions or certain firm characteristics like the size.

  15. 2 Opt-out Regulations from Industry Level Collective Bargaining Agreements

  16. 2 National Institutions The Role of Collective Bargaining Agreements • Thresholds for bargaining (like in Romania: The negotiation of a collective agreement is only mandatory when a company has more than 21 employees) • Extensions(the application of a collective agreement beyond the actual bargaining partners; this can refer to the extension to non-union workers in the same enterprise; to a region or all firms of a specific sector) • Opt-out clauses (regulations that permit an employer to deviate from a collective agreement in a negative way) andlegal status of the collective agreement; opt-out can be linked to economic conditions or certain firm characteristics like the size. • Landscape of institutions and level of collective bargaining (most European countries have a national Economic and Social Council at which bargaining takes place) It normally consists of representatives from trade unions, employers, and sometimes also the government, academics, farmers association or further civil societies organisations.

  17. 2 Latest Data Available for Collective Bargaining Coverage (2007-2010)

  18. 2 Extension Mechanisms of Collective Agreements

  19. 2 National Institutions Further aspects that impact indirectly on the bargaining position of trade unions: • The economic position of the country or within a specific sector (height of the total unemployment rate, growth prospects, export situation) • The legal system: Protection by the labour code and its enforceability (employment protection, sick leave, inclusion of disabled persons, maternity leave, occupational safety and health) • The social security system and its coverage: amount and conditions of social programs (old age and disability pension, social assurance, child allowance, etc…) • Coordinationand the ‘quality of relationship’ across different trade unions and within different levels (co-operation on different topics or in different areas of work, exchange of experience and information, joint lobbying of government and campaigning)

  20. 3 The Long-Term Trends in Industrialised Countries • Trade union membership and collective bargaining coverage have decreased considerably since the late 1970s. • The highest decrease in both figures appeared in Australia, the UK, and New Zealand after severe reforms during the 1980s. • A decline of the role of collective bargaining occurred also in many other central European countries. • The crisis renewed the attacks on these institutions.

  21. 3 Social Dialogue and Collective Bargaining during the Crisis Changes to Collective Bargaining Systems since the crisis started

  22. 4 The Economic Impact Looking at data on collective bargaining institutions and economic variables the following can be revealed: • Trade union membership gives very mixed results regarding unemployment and employment but has a very strong impact on the vulnerable employment, exports and wage distribution.

  23. 4 The Economic Impact Trade Union Membership (x-axis) Unemployment rate Employment rate

  24. 4 The Economic Impact Trade Union Membership (x-axis) Exports D9/D1 Gross Earnings Ratio

  25. 4 The Economic Impact Looking at data on collective bargaining institutions and economic variables the following can be revealed: • Trade union membership gives very mixed results regarding unemployment and employment but has a very strong impact on the vulnerable employment, exports and wage distribution. • Collective bargaining coverage reveal similarly unclear correlations with employment variables but very strong correlation with exports and wage differentiation.

  26. 4 The Economic Impact Collective Bargaining Coverage (x-axis) Unemployment rate Employment rate

  27. 4 The Economic Impact Collective Bargaining Coverage (x-axis) Exports D9/D1 Gross Earnings Ratio

  28. 4 The Economic Impact Looking at data on collective bargaining institutions and economic variables the following can be revealed: • Trade union membership gives very mixed results regarding unemployment and employment but has a very strong impact on the vulnerable employment, exports and wage distribution. • Collective bargaining coverage reveal similarly unclear correlations with employment variables but very strong correlation with exports and wage differentiation. • The Coordination and centralisation of trade union activities

  29. 4 The Economic Impact Coordination and Centralisation (x-axis) Unemployment rate Employment rate

  30. 4 The Economic Impact Coordination and Centralisation (x-axis) Investment Exports

  31. 4 The Economic Impact Coordination and Centralisation (x-axis) D9/D1 Gross Earnings Ratio

  32. 4 Break?

  33. 5 Group Work • What do collective bargaining institutions look like in your home country? • On which level does bargaining take place? • Are trade unions respected adequately? • Are collective agreements respected adequately? What are the conditions to reach a collective agreement in terms of minimum thresholds for representation? • Are they enforceable? • Is there the possibility of extensions? • Is there a National Council?

  34. 5 Group Work • Where do youseeproblems? • What do youthinkcouldbechangedandwhowouldbe in chargeofthesechanges? • What would be a helpful tool or institution to have in place to improve collective bargaining? • What could be your contribution in your positon and from your trade union?

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