STUDY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTER-RECs’ FREE TRADE AREAS IN AFRICA DRAWING ON LESSONS FROM THE COMESA-SADC-EAC FTA EXPERIENCE . RITD UNECA, ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA May 31 2011. Background. AU creation of RECs as pillars for integration and development in Africa
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STUDY ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTER-RECs’ FREE TRADE AREAS IN AFRICA DRAWING ON LESSONS FROM THE COMESA-SADC-EAC FTA EXPERIENCE
RITD UNECA, ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA
May 31 2011
Figure 1. Hypothetical Structure of Proposed FTAs
Annex Table 1. Tripartite Agreement Annexes
Annex 1. Illustrative List of Non Tariff Barriers
Annex 2. Rules of Origin
Annex 3. Customs Cooperation
Annex 4. Transit Trade and Transit Facilities
Annex 5. Trade Remedies
Annex 6. Competition Policy and Law
Annex 7. Standardization, Metrology, Accreditation and Conformity Assessment
Annex 8. Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Measures
Annex 9. Movement of Business Persons
Annex 10.Intellectual Property Rights
Annex 11.Guidelines for Services Negotiations
Annex 12.Trade Development and Competitiveness Measures
Annex 13. Dispute Settlement
Annex 14.Institutional Arrangements
Sao Tome and Principe
Cameroon, Chad, CAR, Congo Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea
Burundi, DRC, Rwanda
Figure 3. Member States of ECCAS, CEMAC and ECCAS
CAR, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia
Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Cape Verde Nigeria, Sierra Leone
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo
Figure 4. Member States of CEN-SAD, UMA, ECOWAS and UEMOA
Role of the Customs (See Figures 7a and 7b
Figure 7a: Completing Customs Certificates
Figure 7a: Completing Customs Certificates
Trade Facilitation – The Partner RECs have agreed to:
Evaluation/Assessment and Comments
Figure 8. Trend in the share of intra-Africa trade in COMESA, EAC and SADC
Source Data: UNCTA. 2010
8. While the financial support from overseas partners, especially in the infrastructural development is appreciated, the danger of Africa ceding much authority to and becoming over dependent on these foreign agencies cannot be overlooked. It is therefore expedient for Africa to start looking inwards in raising funds for its projects. They can do this through a well organized and coordinated tax system on governments and through the involvement of the private sector.
9. A thorough situation analysis should always precede the launching of a programme to determine the feasibility and viability of the programme and should include the assessment of quantum of resources available for the execution and the time frame over which to execute the programme. Allowance should be made about contingencies so that programmes do not face delays or the dangers of running out of funds or time midstream.
10. Partners in the FTA should ensure that the negotiations result in a win-win situation for Member States and the participating RECs. Otherwise unfair treatment leading to inequitable distribution of losses or gains will lead to disenfranchisement and unwillingness to cooperate.
11. Compensation and budgetary support as a result of revenue loss occasioned by the inter-RECs’ FTA agreements should be a once-off exercise and time bound to avoid the creation of indolence and over indulgence of states, which could breed inefficiency and uncompetitive trading regimes.
12. Trade agreements in an FTA should prescribe discriminatory interventions in investments and infrastructural development with the aim of supporting highly disadvantaged states and regions as a way to boost their confidence and guarantee fairness.
13. A bottom-up rather than top-down approach should be adopted to ensure that all stakeholders especially those at the grassroots are involved in the planning and conceptualization stage of the programme. This will also correct the disruptive effects encountered in using ministers as programme implementation whose frequent turnovers cause projects built around them to be abandoned or delayed.