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Secure Localization Algorithms for Wireless Sensor Networks proposed by A. Boukerche, H. Oliveira, E. Nakamura, and A. Loureiro (2008) Maria Berenice Carrasco. Outline. Motivation (from two perspectives) Secure Localization Overview Known attacks Solutions Location Verification
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Secure Localization Algorithms for Wireless Sensor Networksproposed by A. Boukerche, H. Oliveira, E. Nakamura, and A. Loureiro (2008)Maria Berenice Carrasco
Outline • Motivation (from two perspectives) • Secure Localization • Overview • Known attacks • Solutions • Location Verification • Design considerations • Conclusions
Motivation • Applications : Data fusion • Locations and timestamps • Other communication protocols • Routing, location-based authentication.etc. • Why is Localization important? • Popularity of wireless sensor networks (WSN) • Hostile environments • Monitoring & control applications • Military fields, monitoring of structures, etc. • The knowledge of sensor’s locations is required by
Motivation • Why is Security important? • Vulnerability of WSN • Remote environments • Broadcast nature of the channel • What an attacker can potentially do? • Physical manipulation • Jamming • Injecting code • As a result… • Wrong results: wrong decisions GOAL: Make the node think it is somewhere different from actual location
Secure Localization • Goal: To guarantee correctness despite of the presence of intruders • Network model: • Beacons: GPS or manual configuration • Common nodes: requesting • Classification: • Range-based localization: Distance • Range-free localization: No connectivity information • Node-centric • Infrastructure-centric: BS, CA Relative Localization
Secure Localization • General Process has two phases: • Information Collection: distance/angle measure • # of hops, RSSI, ToA, AoA Range-free ignores this phase • Location Computation: include reference points Triangulation Trilateration
Secure Localization • Known Attacks • Consider an insider Vs. an outsider • Reply attack • Jams the transmission • Waits (extra delay) • Replays the same packet pretending to be the sender • Inaccurate location estimation
Secure Localization • Known Attacks • Range-change attack • Special case of the Replay attack • Increase/decrease range measurements • Impersonation • Victims: mostly beacon nodes • Sybil attack • Claims multiple identities
Secure Localization • Known Attacks • Wormhole attack • Tunnel • Jams packets • Replays packets through this tunnel
Secure Localization • Solutions • Cryptography • Against impersonation and data corruption • Use of : • Authentication • Verify the sender • Data integrity • Data is unchanged • Example: distance bounding (based on SEAD)
Secure Localization • Solutions • Cryptography (continued) • Symmetric cryptography • Common private key • WSN are resource-constrained • Pre-deployed keys • Functions to derive keys: Storage Complexity • Compromised nodes defeat this mechanism
Secure Localization • Solutions • Misbehavior Detection and Block • Against compromised nodes • Observe behavior of nodes • Detect and revoke misbehaving nodes • Some techniques • RTT observation between two neighbors • Assumption: extra delay of a replay attack • Reputation-based mechanism • Beacon monitors its neighborhood -> table
Secure Localization • Solutions • Robust Position Computation • Filter erroneous information during computation • Assumption: Good nodes > Malicious nodes • Statistical techniques • Least Squares Method
Location Verification • BS also learn sensors’ locations • Data Aggregation • Must verify the location claimed is correct • Did the event really happened there? • An approach: The Echo Protocol • Check if the node is inside the claimed region • Two types of nodes: p (prover) and v (verifier) • Consider c (speed of light) and s (speed of sound)
Location Verification • An approach: The Echo Protocol(continued) • Intuition (Simple Case) • v only verifies provers inside R • If p is able to return the packet in sufficient time, then v is sure that p is within d(v,l) meters of v • Otherwise: p is further away or processing delay
Design Considerations • No system is totally safe • Network model & adversary model • Level of security Vs. Available resources • Particular application • Range-based : • Distance bounding: HW with nanosecond precision • Asymmetric cryptography • More robust but energy consuming
Design Considerations • Who initiates the secure localization process? • On-demand • Periodic process • Useful domain for an intruder • Use only beacon nodes • Use beacon nodes and also nodes with known positions as reference points
Conclusions • It is not feasible to use tamper-resistant hardware • Low cost of sensor nodes • Massive deployment • Trade-off required • Accuracy demanded by the application • Available resources • Environment • Combination of techniques is desirable