Gorbachev's Policies: Perestroika, Glasnost, and Democratization

1. POLI 314: U.S. Foreign Policy Dr. Kevin Lasher

2. Gorbachev’s Policies • From 1985-91 Mikhail Gorbachev launches a series of reforms which eventually lead to the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War • USSR collapse was NOT his goal • End of the Cold War ???

3. Gorbachev’s Policies • Perestroika • Glasnost • Democratization • New thinking in foreign policy

4. Perestroika • Economic restructuring • Introduce partial market reforms to a modernized socialist economy • Reform of a variety of ills of Soviet society beyond economic problems • Problems: military spending, overcentralization, inefficiency and waste, output indicators, anti-innovation, poor work force (alcoholism), lack of quality consumer goods and consumer pressure, not ready for technological/information revolution

5. Perestroika • Soviet economy was NOT collapsing • Had very serious problems which had been building since 1960s • Entire Soviet system was “deteriorating” • Fundamental economic reforms needed to remain a world superpower

6. Perestroika: Three Stages • 1) 1985-86 “Acceleration” • 2) 1987-89 Build hybrid socialist-capitalist economy • 3) 1990-91 Adoption of Soviet-style capitalism

7. Perestroika: 1987-89 • Introduction of small-scale private businesses • Reduce role of planning in economy – create half plan, half market economy • Encourage Soviet state-owned enterprises to produce for state and free market • Reduce role of CPSU control over economy

8. Perestroika: 1987-89 • Considerable success in dismantling command economy • Not enough time to construct new market mechanisms • Disruption of perestroika led to weakening of Soviet economy • Things got worse instead of getting better • Was reform of socialist economy even possible?

9. Perestroika, 1990-91 • Gorbachev considers adoption of full-blown market reforms with free prices, privatization, free trade, convertible currency • 500-day Shatalin Plan • Gorbachev rejects as conservatives oppose and economy continues to deteriorate • Perestroika overtaken by disintegration of USSR • Perestroika fails

10. Glasnost • Openness, truth-telling • Started out as a relaxation of censorship, ended up being close to freedom of speech and press • Gorbachev wanted to control the pace of glasnost, eventually lost control of it

11. Why Glasnost? • Perestroika/progress demands “truth” about Soviet past and present • Appeal to intelligentsia and educated population • Strengthen Gorbachev (the good tsar) • Public opinion to pressure party and bureaucrats who were opposing perestroika • Information for new information society

12. Glasnost • A “tool” to be used by Gorbachev to further his goals, especially perestroika • Openness not beyond certain limits, as defined by Gorbachev and CPSU • Eventually Gorbachev could not or did not enforce these limits • Approaching freedom of speech and press by 1989/90

13. Glasnost • A “back and forth” process where editors and TV producers pushed against the limits (and sometimes were pushed back) • Gorbachev encouraged press to be more assertive but then tried to “crack down” when stories went to far • Especially when media began to voice criticism of Gorbachev

14. Glasnost: New Media • Old publications are transformed with new editors and journalists • Brand-new publications appear • Eventually there are publications spanning the ideological spectrum, including conservative and neo-Stalinist ones • Slow process at first • Glasnost went further in print than television • Television was much more of a “two steps forward, one step back” process

15. “Destructive” Glasnost? • Glasnost allows media in republics to raise questions of nationalism and sovereignty/independence

16. Glasnost and the Soviet Collapse • Gorbachev took away the fear of speaking out • Took it away so much that people began to challenge (and eventually reject) the socialist system • Free speech and press helped to destroy USSR

17. Democratization • Gorbachev wants to create a reformist, liberal CPSU which will follow and support his policies • Slowly (1987, 1988?) he begins to realize that perestroika cannot proceed without fundamental changes in the structure of the CPSU • He views semi-competitive elections with a real legislature as the means to reform or replace the CPSU • Two-track policy: reform the party and go beyond the party (never quite chooses between them)

18. Democratization • Seems to be laying the groundwork for a multiparty system with Gorbachev heading a majority social democratic party (with some opposition parties) • That is Gorbachev’s explanation today • Difficult to see exactly how he was going to get there as long as he remained GenSec of CPSU • Democratization is considerable improvisation

19. Democratization • Last of Gorbachev’s major reforms • Most damaging, democratization and decentralization lead to disintegration of USSR • Democratization brings impressive changes for a while, then political system begins to collapse • Gorbachev had truly unleashed forces he could not control

20. Democratization • 1989 Congress of People’s Deputies is a new legislature with real powers with delegates to be chosen in semi-competitive elections (replaces old rubber-stamp Supreme Soviet)

21. Congress of People’s Deputies • 1500/2250 seats chosen in semi-competitive elections • 88% of delegates are CPSU members (conservative, moderate, liberal) • 12% of delegates are NOT CPSU members • Functioning legislature based on partially democratic elections

22. Congress of People’s Deputies • First session of CPD in May 1989 is electrifying with 100 million citizens watching two week event • Gorbachev “the improviser and juggler” • Gorbachev is elected Chairman of CPD without opposition

23. Republic Legislatures • Congress of People’s Deputies are elected in each of fifteen republics in 1990 • More democratic in certain republics • Nationalists do very well in Baltic republics, Georgia and elsewhere • In time Republic Legislatures will “do battle” with Moscow with declarations of sovereignty and movements toward independence

24. Republic Legislatures • Boris Yeltsin is elected chairman of Russian Congress of People’s Deputies in 1990 • Gorbachev tries to prevent Yeltsin’s election • Yeltsin will use his leadership of Russia as a means to challenge Gorbachev and the continuation of USSR • Yeltsin embraces sovereignty for Russia and market reforms

25. Repeal of Article VI • Guiding role of CPSU is struck from Soviet Constitution by CPD in March 1990 • Makes way for multi-party system in future • Multiple parties are forming as USSR is disintegrating • Gorbachev says that he was afraid what conservatives would try to do if he left his post as General Secretary

26. Executive Presidency • Spring 1990 Gorbachev is elected as President by CPD (500 negatives) • Trying to construct a powerful, executive presidency – free from CPSU control • Trying to create presidential institutions to replace Politburo • Still remains General Secretary of CPSU • Unwilling to leave CPSU but creating a non-CPSU presidency • Elected by CPD not by a vote of the Soviet people • Gorbachev probably could have won such an election, but perhaps not

27. Executive Presidency • Continues as General Secretary where he is subject to more and more criticism and opposition • Also trying to construct an Executive Presidency free of party control • One foot in “both camps” • Cannot make the final break with CPSU

28. Summer 1990 • All fifteen republics have issued “declarations of sovereignty” • First step toward full-blown independence • War of Laws between Moscow/Federal Government and Russia and many other republics

29. Fall 1990 • Under pressure, Gorbachev rejects Shatalin economic plan and brings more conservatives into leadership positions • Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze resigns while warning of “a coming dictatorship” • Gorbachev “turns to the right” under pressure from conservatives amid growing chaos (and possible threats to oust him)

30. Spring/Summer 1991 • Gorbachev returns to the left and begins negotiations with Yeltsin and other republic leaders for new union treaty • New union treaty between nine republics will give considerable power to republics and retain a central government in charge of defense, foreign policy and little else • Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics • Economic reforms are frozen and economy is imploding • Gorbachev prepares to sign new union treaty on August 20 when …….

31. Conservative Coup • Conservatives within CPSU launch coup to remove Gorbachev and roll-back reforms • Following defeat of coup, USSR has four more months of life

32. New Thinking in Foreign Policy • Gorbachev needed to reduce Soviet military expenditures but went far beyond those limited goals • Gorbachev transformed Soviet relations with world

33. Why New Thinking? • Cold War “breathing space” for domestic reforms • --- reduce massive military spending • --- counter opposition with tangible results • --- perestroika would enable USSR to retain superpower status • Gorbachev’s views • --- Brezhnev foreign policy at dead end • --- US will not attack USSR • --- fears of nuclear war • --- USSR join “modern world”

34. Why New Thinking? • Exposure to West • --- realistic view of pros and cons of West • --- eventually aims for Soviet “social democracy” • --- adopting Western/humanistic values • Liberal foreign policy advisors • --- much new thinking discussed since 1960s • Cooperative US • --- Reagan/Bush work with Gorbachev • --- Gorbachev giving US much of what it wanted

35. New Thinking: Additional Points • Gorbachev controls foreign policy • Gorbachev has success in foreign policy • Gorbachev enjoys international fame • (Gorbachev probably spent too much time on foreign policy)

36. New Thinking • Ending the Cold War was NOT part of Gorbachev’s original plan • YET that is the logical conclusion of his reforms and his new thinking

37. What was New Thinking? • Fundamental re-orientation of the Soviet approach to international relations • Abandoning of the inevitable conflict of socialism and capitalism • Adoption of human values, no resort to force, freedom of choice for nations, globalization and interdependence, anti-nuclear war, reasonable sufficiency and defensive defense, cooperation over conflict

38. What was New Thinking? • Ending the war in Afghanistan • Reducing aid to “allies” in the world • Better relations with China and Japan • Closer ties with Western Europe • New relationship with Eastern Europe • Arms control and new détente (and beyond) with USA

39. Afghanistan • Soviet troops leave Afghanistan in 1989 • Gorbachev ends this “bleeding wound”

40. Eastern Europe • Gorbachev encourages EE leaders to create their own reforms • EE perestroika could help Soviet version • Gorbachev tells EE leaders that he will not militarily intervene to save them

41. Eastern Europe • Gorbachev totally miscalculates, thinks EE will remain loyal to USSR • EE countries do not want to reform communism; they want to kill it • As democratic movements build, Gorbachev must crack down or allow EE empire to crumble

42. Eastern Europe • Poland and Czechoslovakia form non-communist governments in 1989 • Berlin Wall comes down in 1989 • Germany reunified in 1990 • Other EE countries remove communist governments in 1990 • Soviet troops withdraw in 1990-94

43. Eastern Europe • Gorbachev gets “nothing” for allowing EE empire to crumble • Gorbachev criticized at home for letting EE go free (especially unified Germany) • Soviet Republics begin to think that they might break free from Moscow’s control

44. Eastern Europe • Division of Europe is at heart of Cold War • Freedom for EE signals the beginning of the end of the Cold War • Gorbachev would not use force to preserve Soviet control

45. US-Soviet Relations • Nine summits between Gorbachev and Reagan/Bush • Gorbachev eventually dismisses danger of SDI • Reagan and Gorbachev both eager to “eliminate” nuclear weapons

46. US-Soviet Relations • INF agreement (1987) eliminates all medium-range missiles for both sides

47. US-Soviet Relations • START I (1991) reduces strategic warheads to 6000 • START II (1993) reduces strategic warheads to 3500 • US aid to help dismantle Soviet/Russian warheads

48. US-Soviet Relations • USSR supports American intervention in Gulf War of 1991

49. Reagan in Moscow 1988 • USSR is no longer “an evil empire” • Bush and Gorbachev declare “no longer enemies” in 1989

50. Post-Cold War Foreign Policy • What would post-Cold War Soviet foreign policy look like if USSR had survived in some form? • Would superpower US have some “conflict” with great power USSR? • Gorbachev’s foreign policy views were almost utopian • Great for ending Cold War, unclear for future relations