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The United Kingdom Perspective

The United Kingdom Perspective. Morning Section. Challenges and Execution. The classification of these slides is UNCLASSIFIED. This briefing is from a personal perspective and does not represent MOD policy. Op ALLIED FORCE. A personal perspective. Provenance.

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The United Kingdom Perspective

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  1. The United Kingdom Perspective

  2. Morning Section Challenges and Execution

  3. The classification of these slides is UNCLASSIFIED. This briefing is from a personal perspective and does not represent MOD policy.

  4. Op ALLIED FORCE A personal perspective.

  5. Provenance Staff Officer J 3 Ops PJHQ BALKANS Team. May 96 - Mar 99. Staff Officer Info Ops - Policy, Plans & Ops MODUK. Mar 99 - date

  6. National C2 The easy alternative.

  7. GRAND STRATEGIC MILITARY STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL TACTICAL RESPONSIBILITIES CABINET (DOP) MOD HQ UK THEATRE PJHQ Jt/MNTFHQ COMPONENTS

  8. MOD HQ CDS DCMO UK Theatre MAR LAND AIR LOG SF COMPONENT HEADQUARTERS UK’S HIGHER LEVEL OP C2 CHAIN PJHQ PJHQ CJO/JT COMD JFHQ JFC

  9. NATO Allies UN OGDs WEU MOD Grand Strategic Politically Aware Military Advice Strategic Direction Military Strategic PJHQ Operational DCMO FLEET LAND STRIKE Allied Operational HQs & Planning Teams JFHQ

  10. NATIONAL OPS Co-ordination Body/ Feedback DIRECTION MOD CDS Dir to Jt Comd News Release Group/ CCT PJHQ Jt Comd Dir to JFC CPT/OT JFHQ POPT/ POST Campaign Plan JFC/ Approval Board Orders Maritime Land Air SF LOG POST

  11. C2W is deliverable in this context as it can be included in the theatre commander’s campaign plan. This model is neither reactive nor dynamic.This is a linear solution to a dynamic problem.

  12. The road to war. Kosovo Verification Force Kosovo Extraction Force NATO Planning.

  13. Context Alliance directed operations.

  14. Direction Op Plans, Directives and orders had already been issued.

  15. NATO OPERATIONS HQ NATO CABINET OFFICE MILREP/MC Clearance CONOPS/OPLAN incl PSYOPS Annex SHAPE MOD CDS to Jt Comd Directive CONOPS/OPLAN incl PSYOPS Annex NATO CJTFC PJHQ PYSOPS Planning Team CONOPS/OPLAN incl PSYOPS Annex Jt Comd to COMBRITFOR Directive OPCOM MARITIME AIR LOG LAND SF UK CJTFC/ COMBRITFOR Land Component Command (ARRC) OPCON OPCON UK BDE UK BDE POST

  16. No Directive was received by COMMARC prior to the entry into Kosovo

  17. Strategic Dilemma The air campaign did not bring about immediate strategic success or the resolution of the problem - it presented a “unique opportunity” for the application of a new capability “Info Ops”. The “Silver Bullet”.

  18. Confusion between strategy and actions at the strategic level.

  19. The Challenge Introduction of a new activity - at the Grand Strategic Level and in a crisis! Little consensus as to what Info Ops was - messages, a technical capability or a strategy.

  20. INFORMATION OPERATIONS ‘ACTIONS TAKEN TO INFLUENCE DECISION MAKERS IN SUPPORT OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES BY AFFECTING OTHERS’ INFORMATION, INFORMATION BASED PROCESSES, C2 SYSTEMS AND CIS WHILE EXPLOITING AND PROTECTING ONE’S OWN INFORMATION AND/OR INFORMATION SYSTEMS.’

  21. Influencing Decision Makers

  22. DECEPTION OPSEC NON-KINETIC ATTACK KINETIC ATTACK PSYOPS ELECTRONIC WARFARE

  23. INFORMATION OPERATIONS POLITICAL & BUSINESS CONTACTS INTELLIGENCE SERVICES MILITARY COMMANDERS DIPLOMATIC REPORTS PERSONAL THREAT MEDIA & PUBLIC OPINION Every action a message

  24. Target Identification The role of families - Kosovo. The role of the masses - Serbia.

  25. Kosovo Experience - 19 Inf Bde “The utility of information operations cannot be overstated, especially in an environment in which the majority of information mediums are dislocated. The ability to plan, produce and disseminate material was a key capability, and enabled MNB(C) to prosecute an effective campaign on behalf of HQ KFOR, before the indigenous agencies were functioning.”

  26. 19 Inf Bde LL • “The window of opportunity for maximum impact in this field is at the outset of an operation, to corner the market and to shape local attitudes and perceptions from the start” • “Harnessing media and psychological operations under a single G3 staff focus is essential, if … (they) are not to become a fringe activity” • “Crucial to this was the rapid deployment of a professionally managed radio station and a print capability”

  27. 19 Inf Bde LL • There is still a tendency to regard this spectrum of operations as the preserve of the TA/Reservist …….. not well understood….., leading to an under-utilisation of this key force multiplier. • More education and training in this field is required”

  28. Strategic Failure Tactical success.

  29. The Way Ahead.

  30. Actions: Revision of national policy. Engagement in revision of NATO Info Ops policy. Total review of policy relating to capabilities.

  31. INFORMATION OPERATIONS STRATEGIC INFO OPS OPERATIONAL INFO OPS STRATEGIC TACTICAL INFO OPS POST CONFLICT CONFLICT PREVENTION CONFLICT GUIDANCE INTELLIGENCE EFFORT MEDIA OPERATIONS

  32. The How • FCO – Diplomatic Contacts, Info Dept • DTI – Business Contacts • DFID – Development projects. • Other Government Departments – In-country Contacts. • MOD – Military Contacts, Force Posture, Media Ops and PSYOPS.

  33. Information Operations • Raises activity to the political level • Involves Other Government Departments • Integrating Strategy • Subsumes and replaces C2W • DOES NOT OWN CAPABILITIES

  34. GOVT POLICY GOVT STRATEGY FCO DTI MOD DFID ETC NATL ACTIVITY INFORMATION CAMPAIGN NRG INFO OPS MILITARY OPERATIONS MEDIA OPS INFO OPS

  35. Information Operations • Two facets • The Information Campaign • Support to Offensive Operations

  36. OGDS OGD ACTIVITY CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CGIG MIL ACTIVITY MOD CROSS-GOVERNMENT CO-ORDINATION OF INFO OPS CABINET OFFICE

  37. Government & Ministry of Defence Information Campaign Outputs KEY OGD Cabinet Office Strategic Communication Unit Assessment of Impact Very Significant News Dept Significant FCO Effective Marginal Info Dept (1) Target (2) DGCC News Dept International MOD Domestic Internet Publishing Theatre Coord of Media Ops & PSYOPS by Staff within OT PJHQ POPT/POST JFHQ Media Ops Notes: (1) Outputs a. London Foreign Correspondence Service b. British Satellite News c. London Radio d. FCO/MoD Websites e. BBC World Service (Limited) (2) Dependant upon ‘up take’ by the indigenous media. Land Air SF LOG Maritime POST & Media Ops POST & Media Ops POST & Media Ops

  38. OGDS OGDS OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CABINET OFFICE CGIG CGIG CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MOD MOD Equivalent BILATERAL CO-ORDINATION OF INFO OPS

  39. OGDS OGDS OGDS OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CABINET OFFICE COUNTRY A CGIG CGIG CGIG MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MOD MOD MOD COALITION CO-ORDINATION OF INFO OPS COUNTRY B

  40. OGDS OGDS OGDS OGDS OGDS OGDS OGDS OGDS OGDS OGDS OGDS OGDS OGDS OGDS OGDS OGDS OGDS OGDS OGDS OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY OGD ACTIVITY CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CO-ORDINATED MESSAGE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CABINET OFFICE CGIG CGIG CGIG CGIG CGIG CGIG CGIG CGIG CGIG CGIG CGIG CGIG CGIG CGIG CGIG CGIG CGIG CGIG CGIG MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MIL ACTIVITY MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD MOD NATO CO-ORDINATION OF INFO OPS NOT ENOUGH ARROWS!!

  41. These bodies commission lots of work. Who monitors the progress - what is the hypothesis and what the null-hypothesis?

  42. The Biggest Problem MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

  43. Challenges Security - capability and vulnerability.

  44. QUESTIONS ?

  45. Contact Telephone: **44 207 218 8846 Cronos: UK DCMC Info Ops Gp E Mail: c2w@dera.gov.uk trimbleak@fsmail.net

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