Relocating the Problem of Free Will

1. Relocating the Problem of Free Will Eddy Nahmias Georgia State University enahmias@gsu.edu 2006 Inland Northwest Philosophy Conference

2. The Traditional Problem • “Free Will vs. Determinism” • Main positions defined (and named) in terms of their response to this problem

3. The Traditional Positions (The Possibility Question) Is free will compatible with determinism? YES = Compatibilists NO = Incompatibilists (The Actuality Question) Do we YES have free will? NO Compatibilist Skeptic?

4. Why Other Threats to Free Will Matter • More global—other theses may threaten compatibilist conditions for free will and moral responsibility (e.g., reasons-responsiveness, identification), hence … • Threaten not only compatibilist theories, but also … • Threaten necessary conditions for most libertarian theories (and a type of freedom most libertarians admit is valuable) • Threaten fall-back position of “metaphysical flip-floppers” like Peter van Inwagen

5. Why Other Threats Tend to Get Ignored • Philosophers focus on “possibility question” and arguments for and against compatibility of free will and DETERMINISM (and sometimes indeterminism). • Consequence argument, Frankfurt cases, Mind argument, and now manipulation arguments. • Then, turning to the “actuality question,” libertarians focus on indeterminism (e.g., Kane) or agent causation (e.g., O’Conner, Clarke) • while compatibilists build up stringent sufficient conditions meant to be compatible with determinism, usually without considering whether we humans in fact satisfy them …

6. Other Potential Threats (Flank Attacks) to Free Will and Moral Responsibility • Eliminativism about agents (selves) • Eliminativism about (conscious) mental states • (Metaphysical) Epiphenomenalism regarding (conscious) mental states (e.g., Exclusion argument) • (Scientific) Epiphenomenalism about role of conscious deliberation, reasoning and reasons (e.g., Libet, Wegner) • Lack of self-knowledge, rationalization (e.g., Social Psychology, Haidt, etc.)

7. “Like so many … he might do almost anything on impulse, feeling nothing much. The logical explanations for his actions, invented at leisure, always came afterwards.” --Kurt Vonnegut, Galapagos Roger Shank: “When people try to rationally analyze potential options, their unconscious, emotional thoughts take over and make the choice for them…. We do not know how we decide things… Decisions are made for us by our unconscious [mind], consciousness is in charge of making up reasons for those decisions that sound rational.”

9. Other Potential Threats (Flank Attacks) to Free Will and Moral Responsibility • Eliminativism about agents (selves) • Eliminativism about (conscious) mental states • (Metaphysical) Epiphenomenalism regarding (conscious) mental states (e.g., Exclusion argument) • (Scientific) Epiphenomenalism about role of conscious deliberation, reasoning and reasons (e.g., Libet, Wegner) • Lack of self-knowledge, rationalization (e.g., Social Psychology, Haidt, etc.) • “Bypassing” threats (theses that suggest our choices and actions are caused by forces that bypass our conscious mental life). • Degrees of freedom (Compatibilist Worrier?)

10. Outline of Talk • Incompatibilist arguments gain intuitive force by conflating determinism with bypassing threats • Determinism ≠ Bypassing • Pre-philosophical intuitions do not “respond” to determinism as a threat to free will or moral responsibility, but do respond to bypassing threats. • So, it’s time to relocate the (central) problem of free will. • OK, or at least to divert some attention to other potential problems …

11. Pumping Incompatibilist Intuitions • An agent would not be morally responsible at all if he was caused necessarily, predetermined, to try to do what he did, by his brain state, and that in turn by some prior state, until we come to causes outside the agent’s body and ultimately to causes long before his birth. (Richard Swinburne) • What am I but a helpless product of nature, destined by her to do whatever I do and to become whatever I become? (Richard Taylor) • [Determinism means that our] self-monitoring and self-critical capacities, so essential to human nature, might as well dry up and wither; they would no longer have any function. (Joel Feinberg) • In those rides that amusement parks sometimes provide, in which one sits in a car that follows a track through some darkened room of illuminated objects, the car sometimes has a steering wheel. If one turns the wheel in the directions suggested by the environment—directions in which the car is actually going—one can easily get the feeling that one is steering the car—even though one knows all along that he is not. A child might think he actually was steering the car. (Carl Ginet)

12. Bypassing Threats • Fatalism (certain events happen regardless of your choices) • Coercion (choices made despite your own reasons and preferences … except in Frankfurt cases) • Epiphenomenalism (choices not caused by your mental states) • Weak threat: choices nevertheless correspond with your reasons and preferences • Strong threat: your reasons and preferences are unknowingly shaped by forces you would not accept (confabulation, rationalization)

13. Determinism ≠ Bypassing • Bypassing without determinism (e.g., Indeterministic Epiphenomenalism) • Determinism: a complete description of the universe at one time and the laws of nature entail a complete description of the universe at any other (later?) time. • Determinism without bypassing (conscious mental states, deliberation, as causally efficacious in choice and action) • Dualist determinism

14. No Psychological Laws? • Determinism: a complete description of the universe at one time (Po) and the laws of nature (L) entail a complete description of the universe at any other time (P).  [(Po & L)  P] • van Inwagen uses “the state of the entire physical world at an instant” for Po • and stipulates that “psychological laws” not be included in the conception of laws of nature (L) to be used in the argument: “the laws of nature would be just as they are even if there had never been any human beings or other rational animals”. • As such, NL has much more intuitive force (e.g., contra David Lewis’ view).

15. Determinism and the Exclusion Argument • Both suggest there are sufficient conditions for our choices other than our mental states so that our mental states appear to be unnecessary overdetermining causes. • Determinism as a type of supervenience: Present states supervene on past states & laws • □ [(Po & L)  P] has same logical structure as □ [PhysicalMental] • Mistake in both cases is to think mental states are pre-empted—relationship between mental states and subvening physical states (or long-past states) is not a case of coincidental overdetermination or pre-emption. Strong metaphysical relationship between the relevant states (strongest in case of identity—notice backwards determinism parallels identity theory: present states and laws entail past states).

16. Experimental Philosophy • Regardless of whether incompatibilists have wittingly or unwittingly pumped intuitions by conflating determinism with bypassing threats, I think ordinary intuitions are pumped in this way. • But what do I know? • This is a testable claim that should be tested—not from the philosopher’s armchair but by surveying the relevant intuitions of non-philosophers. • Folk intuitions cannot tell us which theory of free will is correct, but they can help: • Situate burden of proof (especially on metaphysically demanding incompatibilist conceptions of free will) • Determine if revision of our ordinary concepts or folk theories is called for • Explain psychological sources of our conflicting intuitions (and hence the philosophical debates themselves?)

17. Compatibilist Intuitions? • Describe deterministic scenario (without suggesting bypassing) and ask if agents in such scenarios act of own free will and are morally responsible. • Scenario: Imagine there is a universe that is re-created over and over again, starting from the exact same initial conditions and with all the same laws of nature. In this universe the same conditions and the same laws of nature produce the exact same outcomes, so that every single time the universe is re-created, everything must happen the exact same way. For instance, in this universe a person named Jill decides to steal a necklace at a particular time, and every time the universe is re-created, Jill decides to steal the necklace at that time. • One of three scenarios in Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner (forthcoming in PPR). • Across scenarios and types of actions, 2/3 to 3/4 of non-philosophers say agents (e.g., Jill) are free and responsible. • Caveats…

18. Folk Psychological Determinism? • “It appears, not only that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature; but also that this regular conjunction has been universally acknowledged among mankind, and has never been the subject of dispute, either in philosophy or common life.” --David Hume • Shaun Nichols used two scenarios that describe similar planets with psychological (though not exact physical) duplicates. Almost all subjects responded that, given the same mental states (thoughts, desires, perceptions) and circumstances, the psychological duplicates would make the same decision. • Nichols concludes, “This provides some rudimentary support for Hume’s claim that people really accept psychological determinism.”

19. A New Experiment • Folk psychology (“mindreading”) is deterministic but non-reductionistic, requiring role for conscious beliefs, desires, reasons, plans, and deliberations to cause choices and actions. • So, not threatened by non-reductionistic determinism but may be threatened by neuro-reductionistic picture of the mind. • Some scientists present their research as posing a threat to free will (not because deterministic but because reductionistic). • Crick: “‘You,’ your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules” • Dawkins: “But doesn’t a truly scientific, mechanistic view of the nervous system make nonsense of the very idea of responsibility, whether diminished or not?”

20. Neurobiological Reductionism vs. Scenario: Imagine there is another universe similar to ours, in which there is a planet, named Erta, similar to ours in many ways. The landscape and life there look much like Earth, and there are advanced life forms (Ertans) who look, talk, and behave much like we do. However, the Ertans’ science has advanced far beyond ours. Specifically, the Ertan neuroscientists have discovered exactly how Ertans’ brains work. The neuroscientists have discovered that every single decision and action Ertans perform is completely caused by the particular chemical reactions and neurological processes occurring in their brain at the time, and that these chemical reactions and neurological processes in the brain are completely caused by earlier events involving their particular genetic makeup and physical environment. So, whenever Ertans act, their action is completely caused by the particular chemical reactions and neurological processes occurring in their brain at the time, and these brain processes are completely caused by earlier events that trace back to their particular genetic makeup and physical environment.

21. Psychological Determinism Scenario: Imagine there is another universe similar to ours, in which there is a planet, named Erta, similar to ours in many ways. The landscape and life there look much like Earth, and there are advanced life forms (Ertans) who look, talk, and behave much like we do. However, the Ertans’ science has advanced far beyond ours. Specifically, the Ertan psychologists have discovered exactly how Ertans’ minds work. The psychologists have discovered that every single decision and action Ertans perform is completely caused by the particular thoughts, desires, and plans they have at the time, and that these thoughts, desires, and plans are completely caused by earlier events involving their particular genetic makeup and upbringing. So, whenever Ertans act, their action is completely caused by the particular thoughts, desires, and plans they have at the time, and these thoughts, desires, and plans are completely caused by earlier events that trace back to their particular genetic makeup and upbringing.

22. Experimental Questions • Participants then circled either “Yes,” “No” or “I don’t know” to two experimental questions: (1) Now pretend that the scenario above is true and it accurately describes the Ertans. Assuming that is the case: Do you think that when the Ertans act, they can act of their own free will? (2) Do you think that Ertans deserve to be given credit or blame for their actions?

24. Conclusions • Libertarian interpretation of these results • Compatibilist interpretation: the folk are “compatibilist worriers” • Impetus to shift debate (relocate the central problem of free will) away from determinism towards bypassing threats—epiphenomenalism (exclusion argument), eliminativism, mental causation and … • Scientific threats to free will • Relocating the problem of free will

26. Background: For all of these questions, you are to imagine that the earth is only one of 10,000 planets that are very similar. All of these planets are governed by the very same laws of nature (e.g., laws of physics, biology, psychology) as on earth. They are also part of very similar solar systems. And many of the individuals on earth have very similar parallel individuals on these other planets. But none of the planets is exactly the same as earth or as any of the other 10,000 planets. Question 1. On each of the 10,000 planets, there is a person named Jerry Grames. There are some physical differences between all these different Jerrys, but the physical differences are not readily detectible, and everything they have experienced throughout their lives has looked and sounded exactly the same. Indeed, at the psychological level, all of these different Jerrys have been exactly the same up until now. That is, they have all had the same beliefs, desires, thoughts, perceptions, and intentions. Each of them has wanted to learn a new skill, and each of them has just been considering the idea of learning to walk a tightrope. At this moment, the Jerry on earth decides to learn to walk a tightrope. How many of the other Jerrys do you think decided the same thing?

27. Scenario: Imagine that in the next century we discover all the laws of nature, and we build a supercomputer which can deduce from these laws of nature and from the current state of everything in the world exactly what will be happening in the world at any future time. It can look at everything about the way the world is and predict everything about how it will be with 100% accuracy. Suppose that such a supercomputer existed, and it looks at the state of the universe at a certain time on March 25th, 2150 A.D., twenty years before Jeremy Hall is born. The computer then deduces from this information and the laws of nature that Jeremy will definitely rob Fidelity Bank at 6:00 PM on January 26th, 2195. As always, the supercomputer’s prediction is correct; Jeremy robs Fidelity Bank at 6:00 PM on January 26th, 2195. 2150 2170 2195 Computer Jeremy Jeremy makes is born robs bank prediction

28. Scenario: Imagine there is a world where the beliefs and values of every person are caused completely by the combination of one’s genes and one’s environment. For instance, one day in this world, two identical twins, named Fred and Barney, are born to a mother who puts them up for adoption. Fred is adopted by the Jerksons and Barney is adopted by the Kindersons. In Fred’s case, his genes and his upbringing by the selfish Jerkson family have caused him to value money above all else and to believe it is OK to acquire money however you can. In Barney’s case, his (identical) genes and his upbringing by the kindly Kinderson family have caused him to value honesty above all else and to believe one should always respect others’ property. Both Fred and Barney are intelligent individuals who are capable of deliberating about what they do. One day Fred and Barney each happen to find a wallet containing $1000 and the identification of the owner (neither man knows the owner). Each man is sure there is nobody else around. After deliberation, Fred Jerkson, because of his beliefs and values, keeps the money. After deliberation, Barney Kinderson, because of his beliefs and values, returns the wallet to its owner. Given that, in this world, one’s genes and environment completely cause one’s beliefs and values, it is true that if Fred had been adopted by the Kindersons, he would have had the beliefs and values that would have caused him to return the wallet; and if Barney had been adopted by the Jerksons, he would have had the beliefs and values that would have caused him to keep the wallet.