HIGH LEVEL EUROPEAN ACTION GROUP FOR ATM SAFETY (AGAS)

1. HIGH LEVEL EUROPEAN ACTION GROUP FOR ATM SAFETY (AGAS) Peter Stastny Head of Safety Regulation Unit EUROCONTROL

4. AGAS Process • A Strategic Safety Action Plan developed from: • A study to provide an overview of European ATM safety; • Four Working Groups: • Implementation of EUROCONTROL Regulations; • Incident reporting & data sharing; • ACAS; • Ground-based safety nets. • Internal EUROCONTROL Action on Oversight, Airports & Human Factors. • A European Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions.

5. Objective of Safety Overview Study • To deliver a short term, initial, overview of safety related issues of European ATM • Two central questions were examined: • Does the current achieved level of safety across ECAC meet the expectations? • In the light of existing and planned safety efforts, is it likely that the future level of safety across ECAC will meet expectations based on forecast traffic growth?

6. Methodology • Involve all 41 ECAC States plus MUAC • Regulators • Service Providers • Stakeholders • 16 Separate Study Areas • Questionnaire • Provides comparative data on current position which can be analysed statistically • Telephone Interviews • Provides comments that identify and qualify key issues

7. Maturity of States

8. Categorisation of States With respect to the management of safety in ATM, States can be broadly categorised as follows: • Confident Adopters They introduced SMS more than five years ago, are confident risk assessors and understand their safety requirements. • Willing Developers They introduced SMS within the last five years, they have made progress in many areas but recognise they have some way to go. • Uncertain Starters These are often smaller organisations with an uncertain regulator and limited resources, many are only now introducing ICAO procedures. They have problems understanding what needs to be done and how.

9. Maturity of States

10. Effect of Traffic Volume and Growth

11. Observations – the Downside • Two Major Concerns – key inhibitors • Leadership & Commitment • Resources • Other Issues • Data reporting and sharing: Yes, but…… • Needs of Individual States are different • Access to training in safety management is lacking • Technical Safety Issues confuse even the experts • ESARR Compliance: local solutions Yes, local interpretation: No • Effectiveness & Appropriateness: small organisations struggle with one size fits all approach

12. Observations – the Upside • The following features appear to have helped progress • Starting early. At least 5 years are required for a mature SMS • An organisational culture that embraces proactive leadership of Safety/Quality • The discipline of an ISO9000 certified organisation. • Regional or peer groups that share information and provide mutual assistance. • Being close to EUROCONTROL

13. No information has emerged with respect to the management of safety in either the questionnaires returned or the interviews conducted that the European ATM System is not as safe as reasonably practicable. Overall Conclusion

14. But ………….. Not all States have comparable Safety Systems and there is some evidence to suggest that the less developed States are also the smaller States and likely to experience the highest growth

15. So ……….. If there is a correlation between traffic volume and safety, the risk will increase in those less developed States and since they already lag behind in the implementation of formal safety systems they will require more and special attention in order to catch up

16. There is no evidence that European ATM System is currently not as safe as reasonably practicable BUT Progress on establishing mature SMS’s is not universal Less developed States tend to also be the smaller (volume of IFR traffic) Less developed States are also predicted to have highest growth Where smaller units operate independently from State ANSPs, progress appears to be slow (TMA, Airport) Overall Conclusions Rephrased

17. So Action is Needed • To develop leadership and commitment for the proactive management of safety • To develop suitably qualified resources to lead the change

18. ONE SAFE SKY FOR EUROPE • A Strategic Safety Action Plan (SSAP) for Enhanced ATM Safety in a Single Pan-European Sky • High Priority Areas: • *Safety related human resources in ATM; • *Incident reporting and data sharing; • *ACAS; • Ground-based safety nets; • *Runway safety; • *Enforcement of ESARRs and the monitoring of their implementation; • Awareness of safety matters; • Safety and human factors research & development (R&D).

19. Observations – the Upside PRIORITY AREAS • Safety-related human resources • States to provide adequate resources in safety management and regulation • EUROCONTROL to facilitate training in safety • Incident reporting and Data sharing • Implement a “Just Culture” • Sharing of safety information and lessons learned • Enhance voluntary reporting

20. Observations – the Upside PRIORITY AREAS • ACAS • Review documented ACAS provisions (CAA/JAA) • Requirements for flight-crew training (CAA/JAA) • ACAS Trainingfor controllers (EUROCONTROL) • Maintain/expand ACAS monitoring (EUROCONTROL) • Ground-based Safety Nets • Mandate STCA, MSAW, APW • “Last-resort” voice communications

21. Observations – the Upside PRIORITY AREAS • Runway Safety • Endorsement of the Action Plan for the Prevention of Runway Incursions • Enforcement of ESARRs/Monitoring • Develop a strong oversight programme for ESARR implementation • Investigate whether CIP-based or not • Alignment with ICAO USOAP

22. Observations – the Upside PRIORITY AREAS • Awareness • Improve awareness on safety issues • Identify regulatory issues addressing cross- border regulation and EASA • Raise priority of safety at national and regional levels • Safety and HF R&D • Improve the relevance and “strategic” fit of R&D activities in these areas.

23. EUROPEAN ACTION PLAN FOR THE PREVENTION OF RUNWAY INCURSIONS • Core to the recommendations in the European Action Plan for Runway Incursion Prevention is the uniform application of ICAO provisions at those aerodromes that come under the auspices of ICAO; • The National Aviation Safety Authority will decide upon the strategy for implementation at applicable aerodromes within its own state; • The recommendations are mainly generic and it will be for the responsible organisations to decide specific details, after taking local conditions into account; • An annual progress report will be made to the Provisional Council.

24. But…... • Current proposals require to be further elaborated in terms of • specific actions • responsibilities • timescales/milestones and these need to be effectively monitored • Current proposals do not take into consideration the report of the BFU into the Uberlingen accident

25. Observations – the Upside SUMMARY AGAS has concluded that: • the development of safety regulation and management frameworks is uneven across the ECAC area; • sustained delivery of capacity depends on sustained investment in ATM safety and actions need to be continued over future years; • there are 8 High Priority areas that need to be addressed, 5 of which need immediate focus; • an implementation programme together with an appropriate implementation monitoring mechanism should be established to ensure that safety enhancements are put in place and to keep the PCand stakeholders advised of progress; • AGAS has completed its task and should now be dissolved.

27. HIGH LEVEL EUROPEAN ACTION GROUP FOR ATM SAFETY (AGAS) Peter Stastny Head of Safety Regulation Unit EUROCONTROL