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Self-Protecting Mobile Agents

Tom Van Vleck Lee Badger Larry D’Anna Brian Matt Andrew Reisse. Self-Protecting Mobile Agents. Funded by both OASIS and Active Networks Programs August 2002. Status Report. 2000. 2001. 2002. 2003. March 14, 2000 Start Date. March 15, 2003 End Date. April 30, 2001

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Self-Protecting Mobile Agents

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  1. Tom Van Vleck Lee Badger Larry D’Anna Brian Matt Andrew Reisse Self-Protecting Mobile Agents Funded by both OASIS and Active Networks Programs August 2002

  2. Status Report 2000 2001 2002 2003 March 14, 2000 Start Date March 15, 2003 End Date April 30, 2001 Prototype Distributed Agent Generation Tool a a Nov. 15, 2001 Obfuscation Techniques Evaluation Report Jan. 15, 2003 Final Report a Feb. 28, 2001 Policy Specification and Architecture Report a March 15, 2002 Obfuscated Agentlet Prototype Dec. 15, 2002 Distributed, Self-Healing Obfuscated Agentlet Prototype

  3. What We Were Trying To Do • Show that mobile agents can be protected by • Breaking agent into distributed group of agents • Obfuscating the agentlets • Detecting tampering and subversion • Periodic re-obfuscation

  4. Accomplishments • Demonstrated breaking mobile agents into teams of “agentlets” • Built Java binary editing tool (JBET) and obfuscation modules • JBET being adapted to other research

  5. Changes to Approach • How often should we re-obfuscate? • Nobody could say • Estimates of resistance to attack • All informal • Focus on strength of obfuscation

  6. Plans • Now studying de-obfuscation and strength of obfuscation • Report on obfuscation

  7. Work by Others • UVA work: Wang, Knight, et al (+) • Commercial obfuscation vendors • Cloakware (+) • AHPAH Software (-) • InterTrust (+) • Paper by Barak et al: “On the (Im-)Possibility of Obfuscating Software” (-) • Hacker sites (-) • Content Restrictions Management and attacks on it ()

  8. De-Obfuscation Experiments • Wrote JBET module to analyze a “switchified” program • Wasn’t that hard • Used knowledge of obfuscation patterns: we think all obfuscators will have patterns • Static with hints from dynamic • Dynamic versus static • Some static problems may be NP hard in general • Dynamic analysis is easy but may not give general results

  9. Obfuscation Report • “Should I obfuscate my program?” • Yes, using method X • No, doesn’t work • Depends, on factors Y and Z • Reasoning to support this • Theory • Experiment

  10. The End!

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