Crowd behaviour in emergencies: Research findings and implications for emergency planners

1. Crowd behaviour in emergencies:Research findings and implications for emergency planners Presentation for the EPC 10/7/2007 Dr Chris Cocking University of Sussex cpc20@sussex.ac.uk

2. Outline of Presentation • 1) Background and aims of research • 2) Examples of how behaviour in emergencies support our theories • 3) Implications for emergency planners

3. Context of research • Crowd behaviour theories have developed over time • 19th Century- Le Bon irrationalist approach • 1960s - 70s more rationalist approach- ENT • From 1980s to present- The Social Identity Model

4. Poll Tax riot London March 1990

5. Portugal, Euro 2004

6. The ‘Panic’ model • Part of the irrationalist tradition in crowd psychology • a) Threat causesemotion to overwhelm reason • b) Collective identity breaks down • c) Selfish behaviours- pushing trampling • d) Contagion-these behaviours spread to crowd as a whole

7. Problems with the panic model • Mass panic is rare in emergencies and disasters London ‘Blitz’, and atomic bombing of Japan during World War II Kings Cross underground fire (1987) World Trade Centre evacuation, Sept 11th, 2001: ‘classic panic action or people behaving in an irrational manner was noted in [just] 1/124 (0.8%) cases’ (Blake et al. 2004)

8. Social attachment model • Developed by Mawson (2005) • Derives from Bowlby’s attachment theories • In times of stress, people seek out attachment figures- known as affiliative behaviour • Social norms rarely break down • But these ties can have fatal consequences- people tend to leave or die as a group

9. Social attachment model • Improvement on panic model, and supported by evidence from disasters, (Cornwell, 2001) but problems remain • a) Implies that panic in a crowd of strangers is more likely • b) Neglects possibility that previous strangers may co-operate with each other

10. The self-categorisation approach • Disasters can create a common identity or sense of ‘we-ness’- Clarke (2002) • This common identity can result in orderly, altruistic behaviour as people escape common threat • Increased threat can enhance common identity • Evidence so far supports this

11. Scope of research project • Project funded by ESRC that ended in April 2007 • Can existing psychological models of crowd behaviour can be applied to emergencies? • 3 different areas of research; interviews, room evacuations, and VR simulations

12. Interviewing disaster survivors Sinking of the Jupiter, 1988 & Oceana, 1991 Hillsborough football stadium disaster, 1989 Ghana football stadium ‘stampede’, 2001 Bradford (UK) football stadium fire, 1985 Fatboy Slim beach party, 2002 Harrods bomb, 1983 Canary Wharf (UK) evacuation, 2001

13. Results from interviews • Common identity quickly emerges • Co-operative rather than selfish behaviour predominates • If selfish behaviour happens, it is usually isolated and rarely spreads

14. Hillsborough 1989

15. I don’t think people did lose control of their emotions [ ] they were clearly in control of their own emotions and their own physical insecurity, I mean [] you’re being crushed, you’re beginning to fear for your own personal safety, and yet they were [ ] controlling or tempering their emotions to help try and remedy the situation and help others who were clearly struggling

16. ‘Fat Boy Slim’ Brighton 2002

17. People were helping people up and helping people down it was it was a very different atmosphere from any other gig that I’d ever worked before. • It was like a massive rave party where everybody felt they knew each other where they could go up to each other hug total strangers and they were in such close proximity to each other and all you could see was people sticking their arms round each other and grinning and you know it was oh god it’s a bit packed isn’t it that sort of…those conversations were going on but not complaints about it

18. Room evacuation studies Simulated role-plays of room evacuations with smoke and time pressures Some evidence of common identity emerging in response to shared fate But study suffered from lack of realism

19. VR evacuation programme • Joint project with computing scientists at Universities of Nottingham & RMIT (Australia) • Many simulations of crowd flow, but ours was first to consider psychological theories of crowd behaviour • Evidence for link between sense of groupness and helping • Discussions with potential users (e.g. Home Office/SciTech) to market it as a training tool

21. Research into 7th July • Gathering data from Press reports and web-logs • Web- based questionnaire study for eye-witnesses of bombings; www.sussex.ac.uk/affiliates/panic/ • Interview study of survivors • Results so far support our theories

22. Rough chronology of events on the tube on 7/7 • 1) Blast followed by darkness and silence • 2) Screams of fear and distress- passengers try to find out what’s going on • 3) Smoke & soot clear- attempts to help/ comfort others, & escape- some delay because of fear that tracks are live • 4) Passengers wait approx 30 mins. for rescue, and walk in orderly fashion along tracks when directed

23. Response to 7/7 • Individual fear and distress, but no mass panic • Evacuations characterised by orderly, calm behaviour • Many reports of altruism, co-operation, and collective spirit of Londoners/ UK as a whole

24. The myth of Panic • Many accounts of ‘panic’ • But what actually is panic, and what is logical flight behaviour? • Need to look at what people actually do, and decide if it is indeed ‘panic’ • More than just semantics, as it could affect emergency evacuation planning

25. Panic? • ‘There was no real panic - just an overwhelming sense to get out of the station quickly’ • ‘almost straight away our packed carriage started to fill with smoke, and people panicked immediately. Thankfully there were some level-headed people on the carriage who managed to calm everyone down’

26. Unity • ‘I felt there was a real sense of unity. We were all trying our best to find a way out of there and reassure each other’. • ‘One of the things which struck me about this experience is that one minute you are standing around strangers and the next minute they become the closest and most important people in your life. That feeling was quite extraordinary’

27. Co-operative behaviour • ‘Many people kept calm and tried to help one another to see if anyone was injured’ • ‘I was very aware of people helping each other out and I was being helped myself’ • ‘Passengers with medical experience were found, I found a tool box and we smashed a window, allowing the medical guys to enter the other train’

28. Orderly evacuation

29. Lasting benefits of shared identity?

30. Panic in New York on 9/11?

31. New Orleans Sept 2005

32. Recent terrorist attacks:Panic or habituation?

33. Research on emergency evacuations: General conclusions • The image of the panicking crowd is overdone • The ‘panic’ model should not be used in designing emergency procedures • The evidence is that people exit quicker when kept informed • When people don’t help each other it is often due to physical constraints rather than ‘selfishness’.

34. Possible applications of the research

35. More information rather than less • Very little evidence supports idea that people will panic if they know severity of the situation and some shows exact opposite (e.g. Proulx & Sime 1991) • If information is given in clear ways that people can safely act upon to escape threat, they usually do • Consequently, deliberately withholding info could cause problems in any future emergencies, as people may not trust accuracy of messages

37. How information isrelayed and by whom affects whether it is acted upon • Information needs to be clear and unambiguous, delivered confidently, and come from believable source that crowd identifies with • This could depend on type of crowd; e.g. commuters, football fans • Representative leader figures may also emerge from crowd that are influential, and can be useful rather than a hindrance!

38. Spontaneous leaders emerge on July 7th

39. Appeal to the crowds’ collective identity/ common humanity Having a common fate can encourage co-operative behaviour- ‘we’re all in this together’ Both PA and physical presence should be used Don’t appeal to commuters as atomised ‘customers’

40. Practice emergency evacuations • Don’t say ‘don’t panic’! • Practice makes less imperfect • Train all stewards in knowledge of each venue, and how to relay information effectively in emergencies • Different rates of evacuation of WTC in 1993 and 2001 • Owners/managers need to take the possibility of emergency seriously- don’t think ‘it couldn’t happen to me!’

41. Summary • 1) Crowds in emergencies behave in ways that are consistent with their social identities and governed by the social norms of the situation • 2) The ‘panic model’ is largely a myth • 3) Evidence gathered from many different emergencies supports our theories

42. References: • Blake et al (2004). Proceedings of Third International Symposium on Human Behaviour in Fire. • Clarke, L. (2002). Contexts, 1, 21-26 • Cornwell, B. (2001). The Sociological Quarterly, 44, 617-638. • Jones et al (2006) Journal of Risk Research 9 (1) 57-73 • Le Bon, G. (1968)The crowd: A study of the popular mind. (Originally published 1895) • Mawson, A.R. (2005) Psychiatry, 68, (2) 95-113. • Proulx, G. & Sime, J.D. (1991). Fire Safety Science: Proceedings of the Third International Symposium, 843-852.