EAP Update Bernard Aboba Microsoft Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Original Goals for RFC 2284bis • Advancing EAP to IETF Draft Standard • EAP Implementation Survey • Documenting features of EAP implementations • Interoperability testing • Documenting interoperation of each feature by at least 2 independent implementations • Clarifying interoperability issues within the specification • Recognizing support for multiple media • PPP, IEEE 802, PIC (EAP over UDP) Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Non-Goals • Re-writing EAP from scratch • This is not EAPng! • Making non-backward compatible changes to EAP • Revising RADIUS • RFC2869bis is needed, but not part of this effort • Revising IEEE 802.1X • IEEE 802.1X revision PAR (aa) in progress Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Interoperability Testing Opportunities • CIUG • Results of past EAP interoperability tests? • Plans for additional tests? • Interop Las Vegas, May 2002 • Will be testing IEEE 802.1X on the “Interop net” Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
EAP Survey Results • Survey requests sent out to PPPEXT, IEEE 802.1X mailing lists in early June 2001 • Implementations covered in responses: • 2 PPP • 2 IEEE 802.3 • 1 IEEE 802.11 • Many “implementations in progress” not ready to fill out survey yet • IEEE 802: 802.3, 802.11 implementations • Other: PIC • Other potential uses of EAP: Hiperlan2, Bluetooth • Will resend survey request • Features not implemented: • EAP OTP, Generic Token card • Default retransmission timer of 6 seconds • Allowing for loss of EAP Success and Failure packets via alternative indications • Display of Notification to user and use to indicate invalid authentication attempt Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Implications for RFC 2284bis • Generic token card, OTP EAP methods now documented in separate draft • Draft-ietf-pppext-otp-01.txt • Given no implementations, will remain at proposed standard, while RFC2284bis advances • RFC 2284bis may need to cut additional features • We’ll cross that bridge once we come to it Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Areas for Clarification • IANA considerations • Lower layer assumptions • Method negotiation • Transport assumptions • Duplicate detection • Identifier clarifications • “Novel” uses of EAP messages • Security issues • Cryptographic protection of EAP Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Allocated EAP Type#’s Type Description Reference Implemented? Spec Available? ---- ----------- --------- ------------ --------------- 1 Identity [RFC2284] Yes RFC 2284 2 Notification [RFC2284] Yes RFC 2284 3 NAK (Response only) [RFC2284] Yes RFC 2284 4 MD5-Challenge [RFC2284] Yes RFC 2284 5 One Time Password (OTP) [RFC2284] No RFC 2284 6 Generic Token Card [RFC2284] No RFC 2284 7 No No 8 No No 9 RSA Public Key Authentication [Whelan] No Expired 10 DSS Unilateral [Nace] Yes I-D? 11 KEA [Nace] Yes I-D? 12 KEA-Validate [Nace] Yes I-D? 13 EAP-TLS [Aboba] Yes RFC 2716 14 Defender Token (AXENT) [Roselli] Yes No 15 Windows 2000 EAP [Asnes] ? No 16 Arcot Systems EAP [Jerdonek] ? No 17 EAP-Cisco Wireless [Norman] Yes No 18 Nokia IP smart card auth [Haverinen] ? No 19 SRP-SHA1 Part 1 [Carlson] Yes I-D 20 SRP-SHA1 Part 2 [Carlson] No I-D 21 EAP-TTLS [Funk] Yes I-D 22 Remote Access Service [Fields] ? No 23 UMTS Auth and Key agreement [Haverinen] ? ? 24 EAP-3Com Wireless [Young] Yes No 25 PEAP [Palekar] Yes I-D 26 MS-EAP-Authentication [Palekar] Yes No 27 Mutual auth w/key exchange (MAKE) [Berrendonner] ? No 28 CRYPTOCard [Webb] Yes No 29 EAP-MSCHAP-V2 [Potter] ? I-D 30 DynamID [Merlin] ? No 31 Rob EAP [Ullah] ? No Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Some Observations • Rate of Method Type allocation is increasing • 31 Type values allocated since March 1998 • 4 Type values allocated in the last month • Two Method Type values allocated to the same Method • EAP SRP-SHA1 Parts 1 and 2 • Most allocations are for vendor-specific use with no specification • Not all allocated Method Types are used • At least 5 of the allocated types have not been implemented (~15 percent!) • Conclusion • At present rate of allocation, EAP Type space could be exhausted within a few years • EAP Method Type space is a finite resource (255) - could probably be managed more effectively • IANA considerations needed! Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Proposed IANA Considerations • draft-aboba-pppext-eap-iana-01.txt • Packet Codes • Codes 1-4 described in RFC 2284 • Codes 5-255 allocated by Standards Action • Method Types • Method Types 1-31 already allocated by IANA • Method Types 32-191 allocated via “Expert Review” with specification required • Method Types 192-254 reserved; allocation requires Standards Action Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Vendor-Specific Support • Draft-aboba-pppext-vendor-01.txt • Method Type 255 reserved for (optional) Vendor-Specific use and Type expansion • Goal is to push exhaustion of EAP Type space out several years • Expanded Type space (256+) allocated after Types 32-191 are exhausted • May require inclusion in a separate document, so RFC 2284bis can advance to Draft Standard Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Method Negotiation • NAK allows only one alternate method to be returned • If client supports several methods (some of which server doesn’t support), can result in a long negotiation • Example • Client supports MD5, SRP, AKA, TTLS • Server supports MD5, SIM, LEAP • S: SIM; C: NAK-SRP; S: LEAP, C: NAK-AKA; S: MD5 • Can we allow multiple methods to be included in a NAK? • Would this break existing implementations? • Initial investigation: probably backward compatible Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
EAP Lower Layer Assumptions • One to one conversation • PPP (only two parties) • IEEE 802 (not supported on shared media w/o cryptographic protection) • Non-forwardable multicast destination can be used to locate endpoints, after which unicast is used • Known MTU • EAP does not support fragmentation, but individual methods do • Framed-MTU attribute provided by NAS to AAA server to prevent fragmentation • Unreliable lower layer • EAP handles retransmission • Default retransmission timer of 6 seconds (typically set lower) • No retransmission strategy specified (RTO not a function of RTT) • Unordered delivery • EAP is a “lockstep” protocol – only one packet in flight at a given time • Identifier field often incremented • Misordering can occur, but is detectable • Limited non-duplication of packets • EAP-Responses are not retransmitted • Duplicate EAP-Responses are possible • Implies that peers, authenticators must be capable of duplicate detection • Implies that lower layer should provide a non-duplicated stream of packets (e.g. EAP over PIC) Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
“Alternate Indications” • The most infamous lower layer assumption of RFC 2284 • Success and Failure messages are not ACK’d: “Implementation Note: Because the Success and Failure packets are not acknowledged, they may be potentially lost. A peer MUST allow for this circumstance. The peer can use a Network Protocol packet as an alternative indication of Success. Likewise, the receipt of a LCP Terminate-Request can be taken as a Failure.” • Problems • PPP specific – but not supported in existing PPP implementations! • Will have to be deleted unless two interoperable implementations can be found (seems unlikely) • Other lower layers do not have “alternate indications” • IEEE 802 • Carrier sense an alternate indication of Failure? • No alternate indication of Success • IEEE 802.11 • Disassociate an alternate indication of Failure? • No alternate indication of Success • Result: If Success or Failure are lost: Timeout or worse! Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Possible Approaches • Don’t worry, be happy • Assume EAP always implemented over highly reliable media, can live with occasional timeout • IEEE 802: wired media with very low packet loss • IP: TCP or UDP w/retransmission • Document “alternate indications” such as they exist for various media • “Remove” • “Alternate indications” is not a useful concept for many media • It isn’t implemented anyway, so it needs to be removed from RFC 2284bis • Not necessary to ACK Success or Failure messages, so don’t need fix Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Possible Approaches (cont’d) • “Remove and Fix” • UnACK’d Success and Failure messages will eventually bite us • Wireless networks w/fading • Cryptographic protection of EAP • Remove “alternate indications” text • Add support for ACK’d Success and Failure messages • Can be implemented as new EAP Types • EAP-Request/Success, EAP-Response/Success • EAP-Request/Failure, EAP-Response/Failiure • Used where support is likely • Within EAP types known to support it • Within media known to support it • Can be NAK’d by implementations that don’t support it • Would require documentation in separate draft if RFC 2284bis goes to Draft standard Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Transport Assumptions • EAP is an ACK/NAK protocol • Only one packet in flight at a time • But some methods assume that additional Requests can be sent without a Response • EAP is driven by the authenticator • Responses cannot be retransmitted, only Requests • Success/Failure not ACK’d nor retransmitted • RADIUS server does not retransmit (NAS responsibility) • But some methods assume RADIUS server retransmission, ACK’ing of Success/Failure • EAP transport characteristics not defined in RFC 2284 • RTO default = 6 seconds (for human interaction) • No exponential backoff • No defined retransmission strategy • When running over IP, EAP retransmission can conflict with transport retransmissions Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Duplicate Detection • EAP retransmission behavior • NAS retransmits EAP-Requests • Client never re-transmits EAP-Responses on its own • NAS retransmission doesn’t take RTT into account • Result • NAS can retransmit before it is assured that EAP-Request has been lost • Client can send duplicate EAP-Responses • Interactions with AAA • In RADIUS, NAS is responsible for retransmissions • No AAA server-initiated messages • AAA server does not retransmit • If NAS doesn’t detect and discard duplicates, can send duplicate Access-Requests to AAA server • If done in the middle of EAP conversation, can cause problems on AAA server Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Identifier Clarifications • Identifier is unique per port, not per NAS • Ongoing authentications per NAS not limited to 256 • Guidelines for Identifier selection • Start from 1 or random selection? • Can identifier wrap within a session? • Is Identifier monotonically increasing or just unique within the maximum time to live? • Example issue • AAA server sends Accept with Reply-Message and EAP-Message attributes • If Reply-Message translated to EAP-Notification, EAP authenticator needs to “create” an Identifier for it • Assumption is that EAP-Request/EAP-Notification is sent, followed by receipt of EAP-Response/EAP-Notification, then EAP-Message attribute is decapsulated and sent • But EAP-Message attribute already contains an Identifier! Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Novel Uses of EAP Messages • Proposed EAP methods use NAK and Notification in “novel” ways • NAK used for version negotiation within the EAP method • Notification used for Nonce exchange • Some proposed methods have placed data in EAP Success/Failure • Success/Failure are not ACK’d, so data may never arrive • 802.1X “manufactures success/failure, so data, if present will be thrown away • Not explicitly prohibited by RFC 2284, but unlikely to interoperate either • Might work in a monolithic EAP implementation, but not in a layered one • No description of EAP type multiplexing in RFC 2284 Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
EAP Type Multiplexing Method Layer Foo EAP APIs Type= Identity, Notification Code =Success, Failure EAP Layer Type= Bar Type= Foo Type= NAK Driver APIs Media Layer PPP 802.3 802.5 802.11 Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Security Issues • Should mutual authentication be mandatory in some situations? • Wireless • Use over the Internet • Mandatory to implement method (EAP-MD5) is one-way • What happens if EAP Success is sent prior to completion of server authentication? • In RFC 2716 client terminates the conversation if server fails authentication • Client MUST NOT accept this message! • Should IEEE 802.1X change the state machine to not always accept the Success? • Denial of service attacks • EAPOL-Logoff: needed in 802.11? • EAPOL-Start: needed in 802.11? • Identifier exhaustion: Identifier is per port, not per NAS • Spoofing of EAP Failure or Success: solution is cryptographic protection • Modification attacks • EAP header modification: solution is cryptographic protection • Modification of NAK or Notification: solution is cryptographic protection Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Cryptographic Protection • EAP originally created for use with wired link layers • But now being applied to wireless, use over the Internet • EAP vulnerable to attackers with media access • Individual methods protect their exchanges, but… • Some methods vulnerable to dictionary attack • Basic EAP messages sent unprotected and in the clear: • Identity exchange (Identity) • Method negotiation (NAK) • Error messages (Notification) • Success/Failure indication • Should cryptographic protection of EAP be mandated in some (many) situations? Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Key Management Issues • Draft-aboba-pppext-key-problem-01.txt • Questionable key management in proposed EAP methods • Unproven techniques proposed for key management • No description of key hierarchy • Insufficient entropy for key generation • Ciphersuite-specific key handling specified within EAP methods • Lesson: Secure key management is hard to do correctly • Solutions: • Guidelines for key generation in EAP methods • Just say no: EAP methods should not generate their own keys, should reuse well reviewed key generation techniques instead Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Cryptographic Protection Approach • Create a secure channel within which EAP conversation can be transported • Provides encryption, integrity protection of EAP messages • Makes it harder to spoof or modify EAP conversation • Lessens dictionary attack vulnerability • Support for identity protection • Provide a single, well reviewed method for key management • Allows EAP methods to focus on authentication • Support for “fast reconnect” • Ability to re-authenticate without public key operations (no PFS) • Support for fragmentation and reassembly • No need for EAP method to handle this itself • Can be backward compatible with 802.1X and EAP • Implemented as a new EAP method • Client can NAK if not supported • Examples • PIC (EAP protected in ISAKMP) • EAP TTLS (EAP protected in TLS) • PEAP (EAP protected in TLS) Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Cryptographic Protection Issues • Goal of cryptographic protection is to protect the entire EAP exchange • Identity, method negotiation (NAK), Notification, Success/Failure messages • Messages within the individual EAP Methods, too • Last message sent by AAA server is typically encrypted EAP Success encapsulated in Access Accept • 802.1X Authenticators implementing “manufactured Success” will replace encrypted Success with cleartext Success • Possible solutions • Add ACK’d Success/Failure messages as new Types • Send EAP-Request/Success within the encrypted channel • Receive EAP-Response/Success • Send cleartext EAP-Success as last message • Adds a round-trip on every authentication (even fast reconnect!) • Enables removal of requirement for “alternative indications” • Require Authenticator to “pass through” final message • Would save a round-trip per authentication, but would not allow removal of “alternative indications” • Would require changes in 802.1X Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Questions to Ponder • How do these cryptographic protection methods differ? • What problems do they solve? • Should the IETF standardize: • None of them? • One of them? • More than one? • Should some (many?) EAP methods be required to run over a “protection layer”? • If so, which ones? • When is this required? Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
EAP Architecture? AKA/SIM GSS Protection Layer TLS SRP Protection Layer EAP APIs EAP Layer Driver APIs Media Layer PPP 802.3 802.5 802.11 Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Next Steps • Solicit additional implementation surveys • Document bakeoff results • Revisit goals for RFC 2284bis • Still aimed at Draft Standard? • If so, no room for feature addition • Interoperability verification likely to take 18-24 months • Clarifications may be needed sooner • Candidates for separate draft (or inclusion in a recycled Proposed Standard) • Vendor-Specific, Type Expansion • ACK’d Success/Failure • Method negotiation • EAP State Machine Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Proposed EAP WG Charter • The EAP working group will restrict itself to the following short-term work items in order to fully document and improve the interoperability of the existing EAP protocol: • 1. IANA considerations. • 2. Threat model and security considerations. • 3. EAP state machine. • 4. Clarification and documentation of EAP keying issues • 5. Documentation of interaction between EAP and other layers. • 6. Resolution of interoperability issues. • 7. Interaction of EAP and AAA • 8. Type space extension to support an expanded Type space. • 9. EAP applicability statement Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Goals and Milestones • Jun 02 IANA considerations draft to RFC Editor. • Jun 02 EAP type extension section for RFC 2284bis. • Jun 02 EAP Security considerations section for RFC 2284bis. • Jun 02 EAP state machine section for RFC 2284bis. • Sep 02 RFC 2869bis published as Proposed Standard RFC. • Sep 02 RFC 2284bis published as Proposed Standard RFC. • Sep 02 EAP applicability statement published as Informational RFC. • Sep 02 EAP keying issues doc published as Informational RFC. Bernard Aboba, Microsoft
Feedback? Bernard Aboba, Microsoft