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The wider European neighbourhood as a region Conceptualisation and Operationalisation

The wider European neighbourhood as a region Conceptualisation and Operationalisation. Michael Emerson. CEPS, 1 Place du Congrès, 1000 Brussels, +32 2 229 3911, www.ceps.be. What is Europeanisation?.

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The wider European neighbourhood as a region Conceptualisation and Operationalisation

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  1. The wider European neighbourhood as a regionConceptualisationand Operationalisation Michael Emerson CEPS, 1 Place du Congrès, 1000 Brussels, +32 2 229 3911, www.ceps.be

  2. What is Europeanisation? • Transformation of national politics and policy making in line with modern European values & standards through: • Legal & institutional obligations flowing from the norms and rules of EU & Council of Europe • Objective changes in economic structures and interests of individuals as a result of integration • Subjective changes in beliefs, expectations and identity

  3. Objectives of European Neighbourhood Policy • Mitigation of negative enlargement impacts on border regions • Rhetorical, low cost diplomacy to try and placate the excluded • Transformation of neighbouring states by Europeanisation, but without EU membership soon (for many years, or ever?)

  4. What is the method? Follow the accession model of normative and regulatory harmonisation, … but without obligation … and without incentive of membership This is a hazardous proposition, and has to rely on strong gravitational forces (economic and political), which have to compete with Russian realpolitik to the North and political Islam to the South

  5. Central issues: 1/ Should East and South be taken together as a single huge region? 2/ Can Europeanisation in East Europe work against Russian geo-political competition, and without EU membership perspective? 3/ Can Europeanisation in the South/Med work in the presence of autocracies fighting political Islam?

  6. Evaluation after two years:- strategy or placebo? a glass half full or half empty?Consensus:- needs to be strengthened - Commission made useful proposals in December 2007; the German Presidency concluded in June in supportBut:- German Presidency wanted a new Ostpolitik- Now Sarkozy wants an Union of the Med- Neither East nor South like each other’s company CEPS, 1 Place du Congrès, 1000 Brussels, +32 2 229 3911, www.ceps.be

  7. Why strengthen ENP? Changes in strategic context. European values under threat from all sides: • From East, global terrorism and conflict • From South, uncontrolled immigration • From North, aggressive Russian ‘near abroad’ policy • From West, unintended effects of US Middle East policies in motivating radical Islam • From Within, crisis of multi-culturalism Therefore to neighbourhood policy becomes a strategic imperative

  8. States with agreed ENP Action Plans ‘Willing partners’- East: Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia – European identity, all ‘want more’ from EU- South: Morocco, Tunisia, Palestine, Israel, Jordan - mixed motives‘Passive partners’- East: Azerbaijan – oil rich, no pressing needs- South: Lebanon, Egypt CEPS, 1 Place du Congrès, 1000 Brussels, +32 2 229 3911, www.ceps.be

  9. Neighbours, without Action Plans‘Reluctant partners’- East : Russia – oil rich, ‘great power’ syndrome, formally outside ENP, but in ENPI, and 4 common spaces = action plans- South: Algeria - oil rich, no need‘Excluded partners’- East: Belarus – political outcast, but in ENPI - South: Syria in ENPI & Barcelona (role in Lebanon); Libya (Bulgarian nurses) ‘Excluded entities’- East: Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh - South: Western Sahara CEPS, 1 Place du Congrès, 1000 Brussels, +32 2 229 3911, www.ceps.be

  10. Evaluating the seven policy domains CEPS, 1 Place du Congrès, 1000 Brussels, +32 2 229 3911, www.ceps.be

  11. 1. Democracy promotionEast- in theory no problems of political ideology with Council of Europe members - getting efficient democracy & correct economic governance (UKR)South- no will to confront authoritarian regimes. - ‘Muslim democrat’ parties on rise & strongly criticise EU (& US) of ‘double standards’, especially over Hamas CEPS, 1 Place du Congrès, 1000 Brussels, +32 2 229 3911, www.ceps.be

  12. 2. Education and people • Advances now in scheme for 1,000 scholarships • Visa facilitation negotiations (led by Russian pressure!) • New discourse over migration policy (more open for legal immigration, tougher on illegals)

  13. 3.a ‘Deep free trade’, bilateral- beyond cutting tariffs = + European product standards, opening of service sectors & selective regulatory convergence on EU laws, corporate governance standards, infrastructure investments & regulation- a template worked out with Ukraine study by CEPS- Commission & Council agree to generalise the concept for ENP- But, Commission needs to prepare a ‘deep free trade handbook’ in detail: e.g. why/how go for complete compliance with EU acquis for civil aviation, but less for financial services. i.e. quid optimal acquis compliance? CEPS, 1 Place du Congrès, 1000 Brussels, +32 2 229 3911, www.ceps.be

  14. 3b. Basic free trade, multilateral • With generalisation of bilateral free trade between EU and all neighbours, strategic option emerges for a Pan-Euro-Med multilateral free trade area with common rules of origin, for ….. • ….. EU, EFTA/EEA, Balkans, Turkey, ENP East and South; and maybe then Russia too • Commission just hints at this • But it would have to be ‘basic free trade’, leaving ‘deep free trade’ to bilateral agreements

  15. 4. Monetary and macroeconomics • Some tendency for euro-pegging of exchange rates, but no enthusiasm from EU for expansion of euro-zone • Some macroeconomic conditional loans, but secondary to role of IMF

  16. 5. Energy and transport networksEnergy: - extend Energy Community Treaty (EU & South East Europe); Ukraine says it is interested- diversify oil and gas pipelines and LNG networks through to Caspian and Middle EastTransport: - Pan-European corridors/axes + IFI funding- Single European Sky CEPS, 1 Place du Congrès, 1000 Brussels, +32 2 229 3911, www.ceps.be

  17. 6. Justice and home affairs- Border controls for illegal migration (Boat people)- Terrorism cooperation- Security trumps democracy CEPS, 1 Place du Congrès, 1000 Brussels, +32 2 229 3911, www.ceps.be

  18. 7. Foreign and security policy- Declaratory support for common EU positions-Crisis management (Transnistria, Gaza-Rafah …) beginnings- ‘Special Representatives’ (Caucasus, Moldova, Middle East)- Reconsideration of semi-pariah states (Belarus, Syria, Libya) and non-recognised secessionist entities (frozen conflicts) CEPS, 1 Place du Congrès, 1000 Brussels, +32 2 229 3911, www.ceps.be

  19. Seven overarching issues

  20. A. Membership perspectivesLong-term open door policy forEuropean partners?Absorptive capacity problem to be sorted out before 2020?B. Advanced association agreementse.g. ‘enhanced agreement’ as now for Ukraine, comprehensive multi-pillar treaties, replacing PCAs C. Institutional issuesParticipation in EU agencies and programmesObserver members of European Parliament (e.g. for UKR)?? CEPS, 1 Place du Congrès, 1000 Brussels, +32 2 229 3911, www.ceps.be

  21. D. Budget resources • Conversion of Tacis and Meda into European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) • Useful diversification of types of spending: budget support, Neighbourhood Investment Fund (NIF) and Governance Facility, education programme expansion E. Coordination with the IFIs • Underdeveloped potential synergies between Commission ENPI, EIB, EBRD, World Bank and US Millenium Fund • Existing dialogue could be upgraded into strongly coordinated policy conditionality system?

  22. F. The bilateral-regional/multilateral balance • Initially anomalies in bringing East and South together: • - To the South the10-year old Barcelona process has been largely multilateral. • - To the East the ENP has been entirely bilateral, • A better synthesis emerges: • - To the South ENP adds lacking bilateral dimension • To the East regional/multilateral initiatives now develop • (Black Sea, energy and transport networks). • For trade policy, long-term potential for multilateral Pan-Euro-Med basic free trade CEPS, 1 Place du Congrès, 1000 Brussels, +32 2 229 3911, www.ceps.be

  23. G. Black Sea and beyond • With Bulgaria & Romania, EU now ‘in’ Black Sea • Commission advocates ‘Black Sea Synergy’ • EU to be ‘observer’ of BSEC • Energy, transport, environment, soft security priorities • ‘Neighbours of neighbours’ idea, leads into Central Asia initiative • Kazakhstan interest in ENP, Council of Europe, OSCE: to be encouraged

  24. Conclusions • EU is testing the outer limits of its sphere of influence or soft empire • These limits become clearer – assertive Russia’s realpolitik, Muslim world torn between corrupt autocracies and rising Islamism, EU’s own ‘enlargement fatigue’ & ‘absorptive capacity’ • East Europe shares a sense of European identity with EU, but this is frustrated by lack of EU membership perspective • Med countries share a sense of identity with Med as region, and with their diasporas in EU; but the values gap with the Arab autocracies is huge • But East Europe and Med share nothing. Single ENP a mistake, which Germany (Ostpolitik interest) and France (Sarkhozy – Union of the Med.) seem now to recognize. But stuck with institutional inertia. • EU has moved from being ‘zero’ to a complex but ‘weak’ foreign policy actor. ENP is still its best chance to become a ‘strong’ actor

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