CNC’s Contribution to an Integrated Approach to Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards

1. CNC’s Contribution to an Integrated ApproachtoNuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Mike Griffiths CBE Chief Constable Civil Nuclear Constabulary 1

2. Scope • Historical Context • Strategic Context • Mission and Concept of Operations • Integration 2

3. Where have we come from ? 3

4. Powers of the CNC set out in the Energy Act 2004 • Any place when escorting nuclear materials in transit. • Any place when pursuing or detaining subjects who have unlawfully removed or interfered with materials guarded by the CNC, or have been reasonably suspected of being guilty of doing so. • Civil nuclear sites. • Land around such sites up to 5 km from the boundary. • Transhipment points when safeguarding such nuclear materials. 4

5. What Do We Do? The CNC's primary function is to: • Provide armed protection to licensed nuclear sites not used wholly or mainly for defence purposes. • Safeguard the transportation of nuclear materials in the UK and in transit worldwide. 5

6. What We Don’t Do • Routine reporting of crime • Respond to general duty Police incidents • Public Order However if on counter terrorist patrol within our jurisdiction CNC Officers encounter an incident ,the Officers will deal with it until the host force has the ability to take control 6

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8. The Strategic Context • Central Government, the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR), site operators and the CNC continually monitor threats to nuclear sites and wider UK security. • The CNC, is under the strategic direction of the DECC; it assigns dedicated teams of armed response officers to the UK's civil nuclear power plants and storage sites. 8

9. The Environment • Operating environment is the public space • Risk – Political, Reputational and Catastrophic • DECC Sec of State owns the Risk • Regulator – both safety and security • An integrated approach? • Who pays and for what? • Overarching Governance. 9

10. Environmentand Influences • National Security Risk Assessment and high priority risks • CONTEST – Protect and Prepare • Industry issues, e.g. New Build and decommissioning, NISR 2003, NORMS, NSSPs, security enhancement programmes • Altering policing landscape

11. External and Independent Audit • HMIC • ONR • IPCC • KPMG • NAO • DECC 11

12. Mission • In partnership with the civil nuclear industry, national security agencies and regulatory bodies, the CNC will DETER any attacker whose intent is the theft or sabotage of nuclear material, whether static or in transit, or the sabotage of high consequence facilities…..

13. Mission (cont.) • …If an attack occurs, the CNC will DEFEND that material and those facilities and DENYaccess to them. If material is seized or high consequence facilities are compromised, the CNC will RECOVER control of those facilities and regain custody of the material.

14. The Onion Principle 14

15. Where do we fit In ? 15

16. CNC Core Role • Armed Response at those site to which it is deployed: • Prevent unauthorised access to nuclear material and counter the threat of theft of material or sabotage to facilities. • Denial of access, find and fix, pro-active engagement. • Rapid armed response and recovery if necessary. • Concept of Operations

17. Generic Gold Strategy • Maintain the security of NM • Maximise the safety of site workforce • Maximise the safety of police officers • Minimise the risk to site intruders • Develop intelligence • Arrest suspected offenders • Secure & preserve evidence • Return to normality

18. What We Provide 18

19. What We Provide 19

20. Integration • Threat to Industry • C2 Structures • Safety on Site • The Changing Environment • Security Incident Overlapping to Safety Incident • Safety to Security • Impact on Operations • Build in Security from the Start

21. Integration 21

22. CNC’s Contribution to an Integrated ApproachtoNuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards Mike Griffiths CBE Chief Constable Civil Nuclear Constabulary 22