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G. Dondossola, F. Garrone, J. Szanto RSE Research context Test bed architecture Attack model

Experimental evaluation of cyber intrusions into Highly Critical Power Control Systems. G. Dondossola, F. Garrone, J. Szanto RSE Research context Test bed architecture Attack model Attack experiments Cyber-power risk evaluation. DONDOSSOLA – IT – S3 – 0440. Context.

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G. Dondossola, F. Garrone, J. Szanto RSE Research context Test bed architecture Attack model

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  1. Experimental evaluation of cyber intrusions into Highly Critical Power Control Systems G. Dondossola, F. Garrone, J. Szanto RSE • Research context • Test bed architecture • Attack model • Attack experiments • Cyber-power risk evaluation DONDOSSOLA – IT – S3 – 0440

  2. Context • Cyber-power risk assessment • Critical communication and control systems in the power grid operation • Cyber threats are increasing with the deployment of technologies relying on standard units and protocols • Sample attack experiments produce inputs to the calculation of the cyber-power risk index • Complex intrusion scenarios involving inter-operator communications DONDOSSOLA – IT – S3 – 0440

  3. Test bed architecture • Interconnected HV/MV distribution networks • Substation automation networks • Control centre networks • ICT management networks • Technical security measures • Experiments of cyber threats to critical assets of the grid control network DONDOSSOLA – IT – S3 – 0440

  4. Attack model (I) • Possible attack scenarios vary depending on the compromised nodes of the network topology • A full set of compromise paths may be derived from the topological analysis of the grid control network • An attack process is composed of intrusion steps along a given compromise path • Transition times from one step to the next one vary on a step and technique base • The malware development may last several months depending on the difficulty degree of the attack DONDOSSOLA – IT – S3 – 0440

  5. Attack model (II) DONDOSSOLA – IT – S3 – 0440

  6. Attack experiments (I) • Target  information exchanged by an emergency control procedure for automatic load shedding  Italian grid code • The procedure is based on • standard IEC 60870-5-104/TCP communications for the arming requests between the TSO/DSO centres • UDP multicast for the trip commands between the TSO/DSO substations • Attacked networks • DSO substations networks • DSO centre networks • TSO centre/substation networks DONDOSSOLA – IT – S3 – 0440

  7. Attack experiments (II) • A malicious insider in the ICT management network identifies the process networks, their interconnection gateways, nodes and services • s/he compromises a workstation for gaining unauthorised remote access to the substation gateway • s/he accesses the process nodes and decides to compromise the substation gateway • s/he develops a malware code interfering with the IEC 6070-5-104 TCP/IP communications • causing the arbitrary trip of the power substation DONDOSSOLA – IT – S3 – 0440

  8. DONDOSSOLA – IT – S3 – 0440

  9. Operator’s Interface - warnings Performance measures

  10. Conclusions • Topological analysis of the grid control network  possible compromise paths • ICT management and remote accesses • Serious attacks • Network access controls and user authentication mechanisms • Advanced security architectures • Results from experiments feed the calculation of the cyber-power risk • Analysis tools increasing the security capabilities in the operation of the power grid DONDOSSOLA – IT – S3 – 0440

  11. Power Grid Security  Flexible/Integrated Multiple-Operated Defence Plans Power Grid Operation  Risk Management thank you Contact Point: Giovanna.Dondossola@rse-web.it Stratified Defence Lines  In-depth Security ICT Protections Do not miss the Poster Session Wednesday, 8 June 2011 DONDOSSOLA – IT – S3 – 0440

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