Two additions to the programme

1. 1 Two additions to the programme Today (late afternoon)Brainstorming Session on how to develop the TED programme over next three years Saturday (afternoon)Every student to present 1-2 slides on what how their own research might integrate with TED objectives

2. Risk Communication and Risk Management Simon French Manchester Business School simon.french@mbs.ac.uk Acknowledgements Many co-workers: especially Peter Bennett, Jacques Lochard, Neale Kelly, John Maule, Gabe Mythen, David Rios Insua, Kari Sinkko, Jim Smith, and Corinne Wales – and the speakers today. The EU Framework 3, 4 and 5 R&D programmes and the Food Standards Agency for funding. But all that follows is a personal opinion.Acknowledgements Many co-workers: especially Peter Bennett, Jacques Lochard, Neale Kelly, John Maule, Gabe Mythen, David Rios Insua, Kari Sinkko, Jim Smith, and Corinne Wales – and the speakers today. The EU Framework 3, 4 and 5 R&D programmes and the Food Standards Agency for funding. But all that follows is a personal opinion.

3. 3 A personal journey … Until 1990: theoretical Bayesian statistical, risk and decision analyst some business experience (£, market share) International Chernobyl Project Study of factors driving decision making not radiological but stress and public acceptability 1996: morbidity in excess of 70% found in some affected regions of Byelorus Poor information management and communication increased stress … and stress related illness. The International Chernobyl Project: a personal experience Until about 1990 I had no professional involvement in the field of environmental and health risk. I was simply a statistician and decision analyst with rather too much grounding in mathematics and too much confidence in rational scientific analysis. Then I was invited to join the International Chernobyl Project to identify the factors driving decision making on countermeasures in the affected regions (IAEA, 1991; French et al, 1992). On April 26th, 1986 the worst nuclear accident in history occurred at Chernobyl. To the majority of onlooking world it was – and is – a technological catastrophe with horrific radiological effects on vast tracts of land and numbers of people. That assessment is only partially correct. The medical effects directly arising from the radiation, cancers and genetic effects, are severe, but not nearly severe enough to explain the morbidity among the affected populations. Morbidity in excess of 70% was found in regions of Byelorus in early 1996 (Karaglou et al, 1996). This morbidity is most likely related to the very high levels of stress among those who continue to live in the affected regions. While the accident itself and the presence of radioactive contamination are clearly causes of the stress, there are other causes related to poor information management and communication of the risks. This is not due to some irrational radiophobia on the part of the population, who, if only they understood Science, would appreciate that there were little risk from the moderate increases over background radiation arising from the contamination. Rather their concerns and perspectives had and, to a large extent, have not been addressed. There is evidence that when the issues arising from the radiological contamination are discussed in terms of their worldviews that a much more constructive dialogue emerges and, more importantly, there are concomitant improvements in health, well-being and lifestyle (ETHOS reference: www.cepn.asso.fr). A key lesson from post-Chernobyl studies is that it is possible for populations to suffer as result of a decision making process and its communication, in addition to – and perhaps in excess of – the physical and biological risks of the situation.The International Chernobyl Project: a personal experience Until about 1990 I had no professional involvement in the field of environmental and health risk. I was simply a statistician and decision analyst with rather too much grounding in mathematics and too much confidence in rational scientific analysis. Then I was invited to join the International Chernobyl Project to identify the factors driving decision making on countermeasures in the affected regions (IAEA, 1991; French et al, 1992). On April 26th, 1986 the worst nuclear accident in history occurred at Chernobyl. To the majority of onlooking world it was – and is – a technological catastrophe with horrific radiological effects on vast tracts of land and numbers of people. That assessment is only partially correct. The medical effects directly arising from the radiation, cancers and genetic effects, are severe, but not nearly severe enough to explain the morbidity among the affected populations. Morbidity in excess of 70% was found in regions of Byelorus in early 1996 (Karaglou et al, 1996). This morbidity is most likely related to the very high levels of stress among those who continue to live in the affected regions. While the accident itself and the presence of radioactive contamination are clearly causes of the stress, there are other causes related to poor information management and communication of the risks. This is not due to some irrational radiophobia on the part of the population, who, if only they understood Science, would appreciate that there were little risk from the moderate increases over background radiation arising from the contamination. Rather their concerns and perspectives had and, to a large extent, have not been addressed. There is evidence that when the issues arising from the radiological contamination are discussed in terms of their worldviews that a much more constructive dialogue emerges and, more importantly, there are concomitant improvements in health, well-being and lifestyle (ETHOS reference: www.cepn.asso.fr). A key lesson from post-Chernobyl studies is that it is possible for populations to suffer as result of a decision making process and its communication, in addition to – and perhaps in excess of – the physical and biological risks of the situation.

4. 4 To communicate risks… we need to understand how other people understand risks and how we understand them ourselves

5. 5 Framing Issues Imagine that you are a public health official and that an influenza epidemic is expected. Without any action it is expected to lead to 600 deaths. However, there are two vaccination programmes that you may implement: