A Comparison of Presidential & Parliamentary Systems

1. A Comparison of Presidential & Parliamentary Systems • The role of institutions in a Democracy • Basic question: Do presidential systems work better/worse than parliamentary systems? • Separation of powers • Wilson (1885) & Bagehot (1873) argue that separation of powers produces fragmentation, ineffectiveness and parochialism.

2. A Comparison • On the other hand they are perhaps more stable, more democratic, more protective of minority interests. • Parliamentary system may share some of the problems with separation of powers systems since they require coalitions.

3. A Comparison • These arguments insufficient because they don’t say a lot about government in a larger perspective • Institutions are endogenous – they are chosen by politicians (usually) • Once separation of powers or parliamentary system is picked it affect the choice of other institutions – here the type of bureaucracy

4. Separation of Powers • Democracy involves some form of coercion • Major players: • Formally President and Legislators • Ultimately interests groups • What kind of institutions do interests groups want?

5. Effective Organization • As a winner a group would like an effective agency • High Performance • Discretion • Accountable through oversight => Basically, an agency would ideally operate like a profit maximizing firm

6. The Risks of Creating an Effective Agency • Political Uncertainty • Today’s winner may be tomorrow’s loser • Need to insure against future rulers • Calls for restrictions on agencies activities: decision criteria, timetables, etc. => Reduces efficiency • Political compromise • The separation of power structure requires political compromises to be made • Institution/bureaucracy is created by compromise

7. The Risks of Creating an Effective Agency • Fear of the State • Groups don’t control directly • Elected officials must be controlled => In sum, if interest groups were in charge they would create an inefficient bureaucracy that isolates them from democratic control

8. What institutions emerge ? • Presidents and legislators make choices about institutions • What are their incentives? • Legislators want to get elected • Responsive to organized interests • Presidents want to get elected • Rely on national constituency

9. What institutions emerge ? • Winning group therefore seek protection against presidential control • President’s response => The result is an incoherent bureaucracy that is built piece by piece in which the president is the only advocate of efficient organization

10. Separation of Powers • Creates multiple ‘veto-points’ • Making law is difficult • Laws are ‘sticky’ • Makes commitment easy – it is difficult to go back on your agreement

11. Parliamentary System • M & C focus on the classic Westminster system: • Two strong parties • The winning party controls both legislature and executive w/out substantial influence of the courts • Formal structure does not provide good insurance against future power shifts

12. Parliamentary System • Executive and legislators share interests (Strong leadership) => The executive calls the shots • Motives of legislators – relationship of accountability – expectations of voters • Consequences for bureaucracy: • Less imposed rules • Controlled by political leaders

13. Parliamentary System • Commitment problem – groups reluctant to cooperate • Monopoly of political authority – extreme fear of state • Groups have a strong incentive to protect themselves • Political leaders have strong incentive to overcome commitment problem

14. Parliamentary System • Commitment problem can be solved – adopted separation of powers • Other ways: • Repeated play - Reputation • Design of new agencies: Frontloading & reach of programs (post-war UK) • Cooptation – interest groups given role in bureaucracy & decision making - consulting

15. Parliamentary System • M&C: Despite these options we would still expect fairly high efficiency • Other parliamentary systems: Somewhere in between

16. Comparing the UK and the US • Regulatory Bureaucracy • British regulation should be more informal, cooperative and effective • Environmental regulations [Vogel 1986] • Similar objectives at similar times • U.S. rigid & rule orientated, little flexibility => Little flexibility • U.K. bureaucratic discretion • The U.K.: Lower cost, less conflict & more coherent.

17. Comparing the UK and the US • Emission abatement [O’Riordan 1979] • US: Fixed Formal Standards • UK: Economic principles & equity • Same story in regulation of hazardous materials, pollution control, emission trading, safety & health regulation • Note: Not necessarily inconsistent with theories emphasizing culture, norms, etc.

18. Structure of Executive Control • Executives like control -> calls for subservient bureaucrats, i.e., careerists rather than political. • Expect to find this in Westminster systems but not in separation of power systems • Why? Bureaucracy in SPS in part to isolate legislators(groups) from presidential influence

19. Structure of Executive Control • SPS will also lack neutrality (careerism) • Complex structure – competition for bureaucrats loyalty • Legislators unwilling to impose neutrality on bureaucracy – increases president’s power. • Legislators want influence in bureaucracy to serve their constituencies

20. Structure of Executive Control • UK – built around the Cabinet Office and the Treasure. Controls bureaucracy. No automatic political appointees. • Treasury – prepares budget w/out influence from other cabinet members and legislature • US – function of the UK Treasury split between many agencies • Budget: OMB (primarily), Congressional Budget Office, General Accounting Office, budget committees, etc.

21. US Presidents • Presidents respond to fragmentation by • Centralizing: Move planning and issues to the White House. Also OMB. • Politicization: White House staffed by political appointments. High level OMB as well.

22. Conclusion • What are the implications of M&C’s argument? • US President stronger than Prime Minister? • Political appointments • According to M&C this is not the case • Development of Political Appointments due to lack of power

23. Conclusion • Basic argument: Choice of institutional structure will have pervasive influence. • These factors must be taken into account in evaluating forms of government.