1 / 17

Andrew Minister, Project Manager Soviet-Designed Reactor Safety Program

U.S. Department of Energy International Nuclear Safety Program. Andrew Minister, Project Manager Soviet-Designed Reactor Safety Program “Fire Safety Analysis Methods at Russian Nuclear Power Plants” December 2000. Soviet-Designed Reactor Safety Program. Problems:

luisf
Download Presentation

Andrew Minister, Project Manager Soviet-Designed Reactor Safety Program

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. U.S. Department of Energy International Nuclear Safety Program Andrew Minister, Project Manager Soviet-Designed Reactor Safety Program “Fire Safety Analysis Methods at Russian Nuclear Power Plants” December 2000

  2. Soviet-Designed Reactor Safety Program Problems: • Inadequate operating procedures and training • Design deficiencies • Lack of infrastructure to sustain safe operation • Weak regulatory authority Percent of Electricity from Nuclear Power (1999) 73 80 60 47 47 44 38 36 40 21 20 14 0.15 0 Armenia Russia Czech Republic Hungary Bulgaria Slovakia Ukraine Lithuania Kazakhstan

  3. Soviet-Designed-Reactor Safety • Approach • Provide training, technology, and physical improvements at selected lead plants • Conduct projects in a fashion that enables host countries to extend improvements independently • Seek to establish a strong, indigenous nuclear safety culture in each host country by example and by exposure to International nuclear safety practices • To help develop strong, independent regulatory bodies with the capabilities to regulate nuclear activities.

  4. Engineering and Technology • Reduce risks by physically upgrading the safety systems of nuclear power plants • Projects organized into • Safety parameter display systems • Safety system equipment • Fire safety

  5. Engineering and Technology • Fire Safety • Transfer tools, equipment, and training to reduce fire risks • Equipment provided includes • Fire rated doors and frames • Fire Barrier penetration seals • Non-flammable floor coating and sealant • Fire detection and alarm systems • Protective gear for fire fighters • Hose nozzles • Projects under way in Armenia, Ukraine, Russia, and Bulgaria Desnagorsk Fire Station fireman

  6. Engineering and Technology Fire-retardant material "Promatec" coats cables and seals floor penetration Fire door manufactured at the Atomremmash plant

  7. Engineering and Technology Fire-resistant floors in the reactor building

  8. Fire Safety – Fire Hazards Analysis Identify the most dangerous fire risks that could damage safety systems needed to safely shut down the reactor Safe-shutdown analysis methodology meeting international standards developed for Soviet-designed reactors. Reactor Core Protection Evaluation Methodology for Fires at RBMK and VVER Nuclear Power Plants Russian and Ukrainian specialists trained on safe-shutdown analysis methods Safe-shutdown analyses in progress Smolensk Unit 3, Russia Zaporizhzhya Unit 5, Ukraine Engineering and Technology

  9. Fire Hazards Analysis Methodology • Objectives • Systematically Evaluate the Safety Significance of Fires • Identify and prioritize the areas for Safety Upgrades • Identify and Evaluate Alternative Fixes

  10. Fire Hazards Analysis Methodology • Screening Evaluation • Based on “Reactor Core Protection Evaluation Methodology” RCPEM (DOE/NE-0113 Rev-1) • Detailed Evaluation • Based on Room Specific Fire Impact Evaluation on Safe Shutdown Systems

  11. Deterministic Evaluation (RCPEM) • Define Safe Shutdown Systems • Identify Safety Related Equipment/Cables • Identify Fire Compartment/Cells and Fire Protection Features • Collect Cable Routing and Equipment Location Data • Develop Computerized Data Base (Access) • Identify Fire Compartment/Cells Impacting More Than One Shutdown Path

  12. Determine Fire-Caused Initiating Events • Determine Fire Caused Initiating Events • Determine Impact of Fire Compartment/Cell on Individual Safe Shutdown Equipment • Develop Dependency Matrices Illustrating System Dependencies • Develop/Modify the System models to account for Fire Impact including the related Human Actions • Identify the Success paths to Safe Shutdown and the associated Success Probabilities

  13. Smolensk Unit-3 • RBMK-1000 • VNIIAES - Primary Contractor • Fire Hazards Analysis Completed – December 2000 • Potential Vulnerabilities Identified • Corrective Action Plans Being Developed

  14. Zaporizhzhya Unit-5 • VVER-1000 • Ukraine: Kiev-ENERGOPROJECT • Have finished Data Collection, Cable Routing, and Fire Compartment/Cell Evaluation • Currently entering plant data into computerized database (ACCESS) • Deterministic Analysis will be Completed by June 2001

  15. U.S. Participants in SmolenskSafe Shutdown Analysis • Grigory Trosman (DOE) • Rich Denning (PNNL) • Andy Minister (PNNL) • Ali Azarm (BNL) • Bob Kalantari (EPM) • Mike Archdeacon (Bechtel)

  16. Conclusions • Where do we go from here? • Implement improvements identified by the fire hazards analysis • Apply fire hazards analysis techniques to other RBMK and VVER reactors • How can you work to improve the safety of your reactors? • Openly interact with the workshop participants to discuss fire safety issues at your NPPs • Identify fire safety issues to your management and regulators to get them addressed

More Related