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OWASP Periodic Table of Vulnerabilities

OWASP Periodic Table of Vulnerabilities. James Landis james.landis@owasp.org. The AppSec Profession ~1980-????. Project Goal. GOAL. Existing ‘Taxonomies’. Failed Approaches. Developer Training “Enumerating Badness”, “Penetrate and Patch” (h/t Marcus Ranum )

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OWASP Periodic Table of Vulnerabilities

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  1. OWASP Periodic Table of Vulnerabilities James Landis james.landis@owasp.org

  2. The AppSec Profession ~1980-????

  3. Project Goal GOAL

  4. Existing ‘Taxonomies’

  5. Failed Approaches • Developer Training • “Enumerating Badness”, “Penetrate and Patch” (h/t Marcus Ranum) • Some vulnerability classes, automated tests – Yes! • Other classes (e.g. Logic flaws), manual tests – No! • Firewalls • Root cause analysis (XSS == SQLi, XSS != SQLi) • Everything else we’ve been doing

  6. Solutions? • Accepting Reality • HTTP not stateless • People might try to hurt us • Platform Security Continuum • Make it impossible to make mistakes • Economies of Scale Vulnerable by Default Secure by Design

  7. Divide and Conquer

  8. Economies of Scale WebDev Mistakes Code Changes Impact

  9. Scope • Avoid reproducing existing documentation • Describe just enough of the solution to show how it’s distributed between targets • References, references, references! • Minimize original research • Most solutions enforce old ideas in frameworks • Browser/standards require some new thought • Mobile, thick client vulnerabilities excluded

  10. Metaphor

  11. Results!

  12. Selected Examples

  13. Case Study - XSS • Decouple presentation and data – easy with AJAX, not with Web 1.0 • What if content IS markup? • Secure framework might have steep learning curve / difficult adoption path • Browser sandboxing • CSP, Caja, IFRAME seamless/sandbox

  14. Developer Training BEFORE AFTER XSS SQLi CSRF HTTPRS Clickjacking Application DDoS Improper Input Handling Redirector Abuse Logical Flaws Remote File Include OS Commanding XML External Entities Logical Flaws Function Abuse Input Validation Secure Framework

  15. Drawbacks and Benefits • DOESN’T help us with legacy/current applications • DOES help drive remediation planning / gap analysis in existing applications • DOES focus remediation toward areas with greatest force multiplier (e.g. Top Ten Defenses) • DOES allow objective evaluation of firewalls and frameworks

  16. Q & A

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