1 / 63

Security Force Assistance

HN assumes lead in counterinsurgency Alleviates a large CF presence Stabilize the HN for:- Larger social equality- Economic prosperity- A free and democratic society (self rule). Security Force Assistance. Use of combat arms, combat support, combat service support arms to prot

iago
Download Presentation

Security Force Assistance

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


    1. Security Force Assistance

    2. Foreign Internal Defense is by nature a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. Special operations forces, particularly Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs forces are well suited to conductor support Foreign Internal Defense operations because of their unique functional skills and cultural and language training. Although not exclusively a Special Operation Forces mission, Foreign Internal Defense is a legislatively directed activity for Special Operations Forces under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Special Operations Forces may conduct Foreign Internal Defense unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of general purpose forces. In the National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), the President recognized that “even as the threat of East-West conflict may be diminishing in the new era, lower order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States...“ Current U.S. policy is to deal with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the political, informational, and economic elements of national power. Direct use of military force is the exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem is developing. Foreign Internal Defense is by nature a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. Special operations forces, particularly Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs forces are well suited to conductor support Foreign Internal Defense operations because of their unique functional skills and cultural and language training. Although not exclusively a Special Operation Forces mission, Foreign Internal Defense is a legislatively directed activity for Special Operations Forces under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Special Operations Forces may conduct Foreign Internal Defense unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of general purpose forces. In the National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), the President recognized that “even as the threat of East-West conflict may be diminishing in the new era, lower order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States...“ Current U.S. policy is to deal with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the political, informational, and economic elements of national power. Direct use of military force is the exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem is developing.

    3. Foreign Internal Defense is by nature a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. Special operations forces, particularly Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs forces are well suited to conductor support Foreign Internal Defense operations because of their unique functional skills and cultural and language training. Although not exclusively a Special Operation Forces mission, Foreign Internal Defense is a legislatively directed activity for Special Operations Forces under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Special Operations Forces may conduct Foreign Internal Defense unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of general purpose forces. In the National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), the President recognized that “even as the threat of East-West conflict may be diminishing in the new era, lower order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States...“ Current U.S. policy is to deal with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the political, informational, and economic elements of national power. Direct use of military force is the exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem is developing. Foreign Internal Defense is by nature a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. Special operations forces, particularly Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs forces are well suited to conductor support Foreign Internal Defense operations because of their unique functional skills and cultural and language training. Although not exclusively a Special Operation Forces mission, Foreign Internal Defense is a legislatively directed activity for Special Operations Forces under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Special Operations Forces may conduct Foreign Internal Defense unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of general purpose forces. In the National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), the President recognized that “even as the threat of East-West conflict may be diminishing in the new era, lower order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States...“ Current U.S. policy is to deal with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the political, informational, and economic elements of national power. Direct use of military force is the exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem is developing.

    4. Foreign Internal Defense is by nature a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. Special operations forces, particularly Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs forces are well suited to conductor support Foreign Internal Defense operations because of their unique functional skills and cultural and language training. Although not exclusively a Special Operation Forces mission, Foreign Internal Defense is a legislatively directed activity for Special Operations Forces under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Special Operations Forces may conduct Foreign Internal Defense unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of general purpose forces. In the National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), the President recognized that “even as the threat of East-West conflict may be diminishing in the new era, lower order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States...“ Current U.S. policy is to deal with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the political, informational, and economic elements of national power. Direct use of military force is the exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem is developing. Foreign Internal Defense is by nature a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. Special operations forces, particularly Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs forces are well suited to conductor support Foreign Internal Defense operations because of their unique functional skills and cultural and language training. Although not exclusively a Special Operation Forces mission, Foreign Internal Defense is a legislatively directed activity for Special Operations Forces under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Special Operations Forces may conduct Foreign Internal Defense unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of general purpose forces. In the National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), the President recognized that “even as the threat of East-West conflict may be diminishing in the new era, lower order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States...“ Current U.S. policy is to deal with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the political, informational, and economic elements of national power. Direct use of military force is the exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem is developing.

    5. Cycles of Violence “The police force, to defend themselves, took sort of an offensive approach to it. They committed atrocities and injustices as well, and so it began this cycle of…tribal violence which further destabilized the city and further victimized the people.” Colonel HR McMaster

    6. HN Leadership What are the traits of a great leader? Competent Honest Selfless Trusts his Subordinates All are traits we want to pass on to a professional HN force Discussion: What makes a good leader in the US Army? What are the traits that we want in a boss? What kind of leader do we strive to be? Competent: We are technically and tactically proficient in our jobs. Honest: We are honest with our superiors and subordinates. We give all the information we have, every time. We recognize a half truth for what it is; a lie. Selfless: We are their to serve the unit, the unit is not there to serve us. Trust Subordinates: Allows subordinates the latitude to execute as “the man on the ground” with Commander’s Intent. Discussion: What makes a good leader in the US Army? What are the traits that we want in a boss? What kind of leader do we strive to be? Competent: We are technically and tactically proficient in our jobs. Honest: We are honest with our superiors and subordinates. We give all the information we have, every time. We recognize a half truth for what it is; a lie. Selfless: We are their to serve the unit, the unit is not there to serve us. Trust Subordinates: Allows subordinates the latitude to execute as “the man on the ground” with Commander’s Intent.

    7. What are the principles of a military leader? Know yourself and seek self-improvement Technically and tactically proficient Know your soldiers and look out for their welfare Keep your soldiers informed Set the example Ensure the task is understood, supervised, and accomplished HN Leadership Discussion: What makes a good leader in the US Army? What are the traits that we want in a boss? What kind of leader do we strive to be? Competent: We are technically and tactically proficient in our jobs. Honest: We are honest with our superiors and subordinates. We give all the information we have, every time. We recognize a half truth for what it is; a lie. Selfless: We are their to serve the unit, the unit is not there to serve us. Trust Subordinates: Allows subordinates the latitude to execute as “the man on the ground” with Commander’s Intent. Discussion: What makes a good leader in the US Army? What are the traits that we want in a boss? What kind of leader do we strive to be? Competent: We are technically and tactically proficient in our jobs. Honest: We are honest with our superiors and subordinates. We give all the information we have, every time. We recognize a half truth for what it is; a lie. Selfless: We are their to serve the unit, the unit is not there to serve us. Trust Subordinates: Allows subordinates the latitude to execute as “the man on the ground” with Commander’s Intent.

    8. What are the principles of a military leader? Train your soldiers as a team Make sound and timely decisions Develop a sense of responsibility among your subordinates Employ your command in accordance with its capabilities Seek responsibility and take responsibility for your actions competent HN Leadership Discussion: What makes a good leader in the US Army? What are the traits that we want in a boss? What kind of leader do we strive to be? Competent: We are technically and tactically proficient in our jobs. Honest: We are honest with our superiors and subordinates. We give all the information we have, every time. We recognize a half truth for what it is; a lie. Selfless: We are their to serve the unit, the unit is not there to serve us. Trust Subordinates: Allows subordinates the latitude to execute as “the man on the ground” with Commander’s Intent. Discussion: What makes a good leader in the US Army? What are the traits that we want in a boss? What kind of leader do we strive to be? Competent: We are technically and tactically proficient in our jobs. Honest: We are honest with our superiors and subordinates. We give all the information we have, every time. We recognize a half truth for what it is; a lie. Selfless: We are their to serve the unit, the unit is not there to serve us. Trust Subordinates: Allows subordinates the latitude to execute as “the man on the ground” with Commander’s Intent.

    9. “You have to prove to them your intentions through your deeds and through building relationships, and we were able to do that over a period of a few months. So lifting the fear off the community is the first element. The second element then is to be able to follow that up with the security capability, Iraqi police backed up by Iraqi Army.” Colonel HR McMaster

    10. Overall Advisor Mission The most important mission of an advisor is to enhance the military professionalism of his counterpart. Influence the HN military to deal with the changing environment by emphasizing the concept of “self government” Use of “common sense” or “common decency” is so basic (to us) it is not discussed much in training.

    11. So You Want to Be an Adviser To create an effective Iraqi military, you must accomplish three tasks: 1) Train and equip to a uniform standard 2) Partner each Iraqi organization with a similar coalition formation 3) Provide a small team of combat advisers to live, train, and fight day and night with their Iraqi brothers BG Bolger

    12. Foreign Internal Defense is by nature a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. Special operations forces, particularly Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs forces are well suited to conductor support Foreign Internal Defense operations because of their unique functional skills and cultural and language training. Although not exclusively a Special Operation Forces mission, Foreign Internal Defense is a legislatively directed activity for Special Operations Forces under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Special Operations Forces may conduct Foreign Internal Defense unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of general purpose forces. In the National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), the President recognized that “even as the threat of East-West conflict may be diminishing in the new era, lower order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States...“ Current U.S. policy is to deal with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the political, informational, and economic elements of national power. Direct use of military force is the exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem is developing. Foreign Internal Defense is by nature a joint, multinational, and interagency effort. Special operations forces, particularly Special Forces, psychological operations, and civil affairs forces are well suited to conductor support Foreign Internal Defense operations because of their unique functional skills and cultural and language training. Although not exclusively a Special Operation Forces mission, Foreign Internal Defense is a legislatively directed activity for Special Operations Forces under the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act. Special Operations Forces may conduct Foreign Internal Defense unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort, support other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts, or support the employment of general purpose forces. In the National Security Strategy of the United States (1991), the President recognized that “even as the threat of East-West conflict may be diminishing in the new era, lower order threats like terrorism, subversion, insurgency, and drug trafficking are menacing the United States...“ Current U.S. policy is to deal with these threats through the indirect use of military force in concert with the political, informational, and economic elements of national power. Direct use of military force is the exception rather than the rule. This approach relies on supporting the efforts of the government of the nation in which the problem is developing.

    13. Campaign Plan

    14. Campaign Plan

    15. Campaign Plan

    16. Campaign Plan

    17. Campaign Plan

    18. Campaign Plan

    20. Facilitate HN & Partner Unit Combined Commander’s Update Briefings (CUB) Combined Target Meetings Combined Training Meetings Commander, S-3 attend back briefs HN LNOs Attend parallel planning Proximity is a consideration Treat them as equals, not as subordinatesTreat them as equals, not as subordinates

    21. What the Combat Advisor is not Liaison (Just passing information) A fire and forget mission A supporting effort

    22. Remember, it’s a Marathon Major causes of an advisor’s failure Inability to maintain a good working relationship Fails to understand why his counterparts do not feel the “sense of urgency” that he does Unable to realize that his counterpart will remain and continue to fight the enemy long after his tour is over Insurgency by it’s nature is protractedInsurgency by it’s nature is protracted

    23. Key Points Recognize institutional and cultural differences between the HN and US Army Rapport, credibility, and legitimacy can only be established through time, proximity, and interaction Mentor HN leadership at every opportunity Combat advisor (Must leave the wire) Partner units must always be engaged in every aspect of the HN’s development

    26. Understand the Operational Environment Strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, power centers of the organizations. Interrelationships among these organizations. Assess host nation abilities In Iraq, where the host nation government has been in existence only a short time, the administrative machinery is still developing. The advisor must be aware of such situations and not be overly critical. Goals and motivating factors for each organization. Relationships with the Multinational Force and Iraqi Security Forces. ----------------------------------------- The sources and assistance available to further mission accomplishment. The role of the United States and the international press. The applicable rules of engagement, to include their intent and the specifically enumerated provisions. In an insurgency, the host nation government is experiencing major problems. To begin with, the money needed for social and economic programs is mostly directed toward security needs. In an ideal situation, the host nation government would use this money to cure the society’s economic and social ills. Understand the Operational Environment Strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, power centers of the organizations. Interrelationships among these organizations. Assess host nation abilities In Iraq, where the host nation government has been in existence only a short time, the administrative machinery is still developing. The advisor must be aware of such situations and not be overly critical. Goals and motivating factors for each organization. Relationships with the Multinational Force and Iraqi Security Forces. ----------------------------------------- The sources and assistance available to further mission accomplishment. The role of the United States and the international press. The applicable rules of engagement, to include their intent and the specifically enumerated provisions. In an insurgency, the host nation government is experiencing major problems. To begin with, the money needed for social and economic programs is mostly directed toward security needs. In an ideal situation, the host nation government would use this money to cure the society’s economic and social ills.

    27. Recognize Political Implications All actions by the US as well as Iraqi forces will have political implications. Iraqi forces and their actions are the responsibilities of the US government. Multinational Force represents the US and coalition governments. Recognize Political Implications All actions by the US as well as Iraqi forces will have political implications. Iraqi forces and their actions are the responsibilities of the US government. Multinational Force represents the US and coalition governments.

    28. Facilitate Interagency Activities Example: Joint coordination center External Factors Understand relationship between Iraqi, Combat Advisors, and partnering units as well as with other government agencies. Scope and limitations of each agency’s influence and programs. The legal and political restrictions on their activities. The sources and assistance available to further mission accomplishment. The role of the United States and the international press. The intent and goals of the U.S. government. The applicable rules of engagement, to include their intent and the specifically enumerated provisions. Facilitate Interagency Activities Example: Joint coordination center External Factors Understand relationship between Iraqi, Combat Advisors, and partnering units as well as with other government agencies. Scope and limitations of each agency’s influence and programs. The legal and political restrictions on their activities. The sources and assistance available to further mission accomplishment. The role of the United States and the international press. The intent and goals of the U.S. government. The applicable rules of engagement, to include their intent and the specifically enumerated provisions.

    29. Engage the Threat Discriminately - Resources ( Information Operations, Civil Affairs, Civil Military Operations) - COIN Center of Gravity analysis Selection and distribution of resources (personnel and material). Appropriateness, not mass, is the standard. (Prioritize) Select qualified and trained personnel necessary to the effort. Minimizing the Multinational Force presence while (Iraqi face on everything) - Train, Advise, and Assist An understanding of the operational environment and its internal dynamics is key to selecting type of training, operations, and advice to give. Impact is as much a consideration in selecting training and advice as are the political implications of the type of subject and assistance given. - Tactical Considerations Tactical operations in Foreign Internal Defense, whether directed against insurgents, criminal activities (lawlessness), or subversion, must be carefully targeted to avoid alienating the populace being defended. Populace and resource control measures, in particular, must be carefully weighed for potential gain versus potential cost. The use of force in Populace and Resource Control measures should be minimized. The insurgents’ best recruiting program is indiscriminate killing and damage by government forces. Keeping violence to the absolute minimum is important to the government.Engage the Threat Discriminately - Resources ( Information Operations, Civil Affairs, Civil Military Operations) - COIN Center of Gravity analysis Selection and distribution of resources (personnel and material). Appropriateness, not mass, is the standard. (Prioritize) Select qualified and trained personnel necessary to the effort. Minimizing the Multinational Force presence while (Iraqi face on everything) - Train, Advise, and Assist An understanding of the operational environment and its internal dynamics is key to selecting type of training, operations, and advice to give. Impact is as much a consideration in selecting training and advice as are the political implications of the type of subject and assistance given. - Tactical Considerations Tactical operations in Foreign Internal Defense, whether directed against insurgents, criminal activities (lawlessness), or subversion, must be carefully targeted to avoid alienating the populace being defended. Populace and resource control measures, in particular, must be carefully weighed for potential gain versus potential cost. The use of force in Populace and Resource Control measures should be minimized. The insurgents’ best recruiting program is indiscriminate killing and damage by government forces. Keeping violence to the absolute minimum is important to the government.

    30. Consider Long-Term Effects Most Foreign Internal Defense efforts are inherently long-term. Their goal is to alleviate the root causes of the current situation, not just treat the symptoms. Tactical victories are of little value unless they contribute to the overall operational scheme. Understand legal and political constraints (rules of engagement) to avoid strategic failure while achieving tactical success. Understanding the problem in its broader political, military, and psychological context. Consider Long-Term Effects Most Foreign Internal Defense efforts are inherently long-term. Their goal is to alleviate the root causes of the current situation, not just treat the symptoms. Tactical victories are of little value unless they contribute to the overall operational scheme. Understand legal and political constraints (rules of engagement) to avoid strategic failure while achieving tactical success. Understanding the problem in its broader political, military, and psychological context.

    31. Ensure Legitimacy and Credibility of Operations -Legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and international support. -Without legitimacy and credibility, operations will not receive the support of the Iraqis, the U.S. populace, and the international community Ensure Legitimacy and Credibility of Operations -Legitimacy is the most crucial factor in developing and maintaining internal and international support. -Without legitimacy and credibility, operations will not receive the support of the Iraqis, the U.S. populace, and the international community

    32. Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects - All operations have significant psychological effects. - Populace and Resource Control measures, combat operations, and civic action programs. - Some operations are done specifically for the psychological effect. - Tactical victory maybe negated or overshadowed by negative psych. effects. - Perception is more important than reality. - Include Information Operations in all planning and execution of operations. Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects - All operations have significant psychological effects. - Populace and Resource Control measures, combat operations, and civic action programs. - Some operations are done specifically for the psychological effect. - Tactical victory maybe negated or overshadowed by negative psych. effects. - Perception is more important than reality. - Include Information Operations in all planning and execution of operations.

    33. Apply Capabilities Indirectly - Primary role of Combat Advisors and partnering units is to advise, train, and help host nation forces take the lead in the fight and to stabilize Iraq. - It is important to teach them to plan instead of giving them tasks. - Successful Multinational Force efforts reinforce and enhance the legitimacy and credibility of the Iraqi armed forces and government. - Legitimacy gives us credibility with the Iraqis which helps divide the Insurgents with the population. Apply Capabilities Indirectly - Primary role of Combat Advisors and partnering units is to advise, train, and help host nation forces take the lead in the fight and to stabilize Iraq. - It is important to teach them to plan instead of giving them tasks. - Successful Multinational Force efforts reinforce and enhance the legitimacy and credibility of the Iraqi armed forces and government. - Legitimacy gives us credibility with the Iraqis which helps divide the Insurgents with the population.

    34. Develop Multiple Options - The nature of COIN and guerrilla warfare is the unexpected. - Prepare for contingencies and follow-on missions. - Plan to use full range of capabilities - Operational environment may dictate a change of ROE or mission. - Adaptability and operational flexibility by developing a broad range of options. ( Center of Gravity analysis) - Can shift from one option to another before and during mission execution. Develop Multiple Options - The nature of COIN and guerrilla warfare is the unexpected. - Prepare for contingencies and follow-on missions. - Plan to use full range of capabilities - Operational environment may dictate a change of ROE or mission. - Adaptability and operational flexibility by developing a broad range of options. ( Center of Gravity analysis) - Can shift from one option to another before and during mission execution.

    35. Ensure Long-Term Sustainment - Limited advice and training of host nation forces in techniques and procedures beyond their capabilities to sustain. - Modify Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures, training, operations, and logistics to fit the culture, educational level, and technological capability of the host nation forces. - Recognize the programs that are durable, consistent, and sustainable by the host nation. - Do not begin programs beyond economic or technological capacity of the host nation. - Develop hand-over and sustainment in economic, social, political, and military/security initiatives and projects. - Multinational Force funded programs are counterproductive if the populace becomes dependent on them and funding subsequently is lost. Ensure Long-Term Sustainment - Limited advice and training of host nation forces in techniques and procedures beyond their capabilities to sustain. - Modify Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures, training, operations, and logistics to fit the culture, educational level, and technological capability of the host nation forces. - Recognize the programs that are durable, consistent, and sustainable by the host nation. - Do not begin programs beyond economic or technological capacity of the host nation. - Develop hand-over and sustainment in economic, social, political, and military/security initiatives and projects. - Multinational Force funded programs are counterproductive if the populace becomes dependent on them and funding subsequently is lost.

    36. Provide Sufficient Intelligence Intelligence forms the basis for all COIN activities and programs. Detailed, near-real-time, all-source tactical intelligence products. Act on information in a timely manner. Operations also depend on detailed and comprehensive intelligence on all aspects of the operational environment and its internal dynamics. Establish priority of effort when identifying intelligence requirements. They note which are mission essential and which are “nice to have.” Prioritize and request specific request for information to receive timely and specific intelligence. Combat Advisors and partnering units insure host nation are conducting operations using accurate, real-time intelligence. Human Intelligence, urban recon, and internal security elements which can assess the insurgent threat, warn the government, take action to penetrate the insurgent organization, and assist in neutralizing it. In assessing the enemy threat consider aspects of the society not directly related to the tactical combat situation. The information from intelligence assets allows them to advise, train, and help host nation counterparts and ease interagency efforts. Provide Sufficient Intelligence Intelligence forms the basis for all COIN activities and programs. Detailed, near-real-time, all-source tactical intelligence products. Act on information in a timely manner. Operations also depend on detailed and comprehensive intelligence on all aspects of the operational environment and its internal dynamics. Establish priority of effort when identifying intelligence requirements. They note which are mission essential and which are “nice to have.” Prioritize and request specific request for information to receive timely and specific intelligence. Combat Advisors and partnering units insure host nation are conducting operations using accurate, real-time intelligence. Human Intelligence, urban recon, and internal security elements which can assess the insurgent threat, warn the government, take action to penetrate the insurgent organization, and assist in neutralizing it. In assessing the enemy threat consider aspects of the society not directly related to the tactical combat situation. The information from intelligence assets allows them to advise, train, and help host nation counterparts and ease interagency efforts.

    37. Balance Security and Synchronization Partnering units often conduct planning, intelligence, and contingencies unilaterally due to security concerns, but compartmentalizing can exclude key Iraqis from the planning and learning process. (Unity of Effort) Insufficient security may compromise a mission, but excessive security will usually cause the mission to fail because of inadequate coordination. (Armed Forces and Police) Multinational Force forces must resolve these conflicting demands on mission planning and execution. Balance Security and Synchronization Partnering units often conduct planning, intelligence, and contingencies unilaterally due to security concerns, but compartmentalizing can exclude key Iraqis from the planning and learning process. (Unity of Effort) Insufficient security may compromise a mission, but excessive security will usually cause the mission to fail because of inadequate coordination. (Armed Forces and Police) Multinational Force forces must resolve these conflicting demands on mission planning and execution.

    38. Challenges for the Combat Advisor Discussion: What makes a good leader in the US Army? What are the traits that we want in a boss? What kind of leader do we strive to be? Competent: We are technically and tactically proficient in our jobs. Honest: We are honest with our superiors and subordinates. We give all the information we have, every time. We recognize a half truth for what it is; a lie. Selfless: We are their to serve the unit, the unit is not there to serve us. Trust Subordinates: Allows subordinates the latitude to execute as “the man on the ground” with Commander’s Intent. Discussion: What makes a good leader in the US Army? What are the traits that we want in a boss? What kind of leader do we strive to be? Competent: We are technically and tactically proficient in our jobs. Honest: We are honest with our superiors and subordinates. We give all the information we have, every time. We recognize a half truth for what it is; a lie. Selfless: We are their to serve the unit, the unit is not there to serve us. Trust Subordinates: Allows subordinates the latitude to execute as “the man on the ground” with Commander’s Intent.

    39. It is necessary to empower HN junior leaders. Through out Arab history officers have led down to the lowest level. The development of a strong NCO and Warrant Officer base is the road to a highly successful military. How do we build an NCO Corps? Answer: Effective training centers Promotion on merit Combat Advisors insured senior unit HN leaders directed HN junior leaders to push NCOs into leadership. Senior leaders expressed that a mistake by an NCO would not be detrimental (no zero defect) Answer: Effective training centers Promotion on merit Combat Advisors insured senior unit HN leaders directed HN junior leaders to push NCOs into leadership. Senior leaders expressed that a mistake by an NCO would not be detrimental (no zero defect)

    40. Cultural Obstacles A Professional Culture that values Who you know Denial in the interest of saving face Entitlements Micro-management

    41. The Warehouse Many IA soldiers were short Individual equipment to include: body armor, helmets, and NVDs. Paperwork showed that all the equipment in sufficient quantities had been delivered to the BDE. MiTTs began to inspect the base warehouses. All the equipment was in the warehouses, the supply officer hadn’t issued it out. Having “things” equates to power. Therefore the more “things”: people, equipment, whatever I have, the more important and prestigious I am. Having “things” equates to power. Therefore the more “things”: people, equipment, whatever I have, the more important and prestigious I am.

    42. The Number 2 Man An American unit trained an IA Strike element for Direct Action missions. The unit was proficient in small unit tactics and CQB. Each individual team and squad was able to “flow” through a building. However, each time the unit prepared to breach a structure, the Platoon Leader was always in the initial stack. The Major viewed the flashbang as an important item. Therefore it was important for him to choose which soldiers would receive the equipment.The Major viewed the flashbang as an important item. Therefore it was important for him to choose which soldiers would receive the equipment.

    43. Culture of Change The HN security forces are the model and best hope to break cycles of violence. When we do make a change in the attitudes and habits of HN leadership, the effectiveness of the unit increase exponentially.

    44. Building Teams Cohesive US units are not created overnight Effective junior leaders are not born, they are built Good leaders and good units eat, sleep, sweat and bleed TOGETHER.

    45. Challenges for U.S. Units “Take Charge” attitude Dignity and Respect Cultural sensitivity Is perfection the enemy of good enough? Over-coaching desensitizes the unit in training Patience

    46. Chow Plan for Combat Advisors An American Bn S-3 decided to send a transition team an MKT (mobile kitchen) and crew due to the following situation: - Combat Advisors was constantly sick from HN mess hall. - US and HN unit were geographically separated enough to make daily resupply unrealistic The Major viewed the flashbang as an important item. Therefore it was important for him to choose which soldiers would receive the equipment.The Major viewed the flashbang as an important item. Therefore it was important for him to choose which soldiers would receive the equipment.

    47. The Military as a Reflection… How do we change a people? Build Rapport: HN must believe you care for him and his people. Establish Credibility: As a professional and a soldier Legitimacy: Do you practice what you preach?

    48. You must have a plan Part of infiltration plan Rapport Plan Language Culture History Credibility Technically and tactically proficient WHAT can you do and HOW can you do it?

    49. Time, Proximity, and Interaction How do you (Combat Advisor and Partner Unit) build rapport, credibility, and legitimacy? You must be there. A cohesive, effective US unit is built as a Team Why would we expect to create an effective HN unit, if we are not willing to be part of the team? Only then will you be able to teach, coach, and mentor. (Shape the HN Security Forces) How do you build rapport? You must invest your time in them.How do you build rapport? You must invest your time in them.

    50. Mutual Respect Only after rapport, credibility and legitimacy are established can you effect change. Imparting the “Good Boss” on a fellow professional

    51. Pick and Choose Your Battles You cannot change culture They want to emulate you They want to be successful Make your opinion valuable A professional Army Promotion based on merit Professional NCO corps Military must support political process Defend the rights of citizens You can’t change a culture, but you can understand it. Are our soldiers going to change their culture? No, but we can get the HN to understand it. Only in a professional army can you reach self actualization. Professional army will never overthrow their government They are defending the polling sites but they don’t know about the process they are defending You can’t change a culture, but you can understand it. Are our soldiers going to change their culture? No, but we can get the HN to understand it. Only in a professional army can you reach self actualization. Professional army will never overthrow their government They are defending the polling sites but they don’t know about the process they are defending

    52. Being There Trends that can not be addressed if advisors are not there CQB – didn’t communicate/mark rooms clears, no one cleared or communicated moving to stairwell and roof Didn’t utilize NCOs Actions on contact Hand and arm signals Finger in trigger well Fire control measures Can’t call for assets Assessment Do you go on the raid? Are you in the Stack? Do you go in the building? When you first show up and take over for a MiTT they will tell you everything is good, we are Ts across the board. Wrong!! You must do your own assessmentDo you go on the raid? Are you in the Stack? Do you go in the building? When you first show up and take over for a MiTT they will tell you everything is good, we are Ts across the board. Wrong!! You must do your own assessment

    53. Combat Advisor Duties and Responsibilities

    54. MiTT Chief ensures the HN Commander: Issues planning guidance Provides C2 Devises time plan COA development Ensures OPLAN are IAW higher OPORD MiTT Staff ensures the HN Staff: Prepares estimates of COA for identified task Prepare tentative plan of COA Coordinate execution of tasks Mission Planning Commander The MiTT commander issues planning guidance for planning the execution of the FID mission and ensures that his intent is clearly understood. He provides C2 during the MiTT's FID mission planning process. He devises a time event plan and ensures that planning is completed accordingly. He selects COAs examined in staff estimates that are IAW his intent, the higher commander’s OPORD or OPLAN, and the available external CłI, CS, and CSS. He ensures the completed portions of the MiTT's OPLAN for the execution of all specified and implied mission-essential tasks are IAW the higher commander’s OPORD or OPLAN and international and domestic laws. S t a f f The MiTT staff prepares estimates of COAs for those tasks identified as essential during the mission analysis IAW their functional areas or as directed. The staff members prepare estimates that include, as a minimum, the best alternative COAs supported by significant information and the coordination that will be necessary for them. They write tentative plans IAW the COAs selected by the MiTT commander, based on the planning guidance and unit’s SOP. They include in tentative plans primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans, based on the criticality of the task, the planning guidance, and anticipated changes to the mission. They coordinate the execution of the tasks they are planning by disseminating pertinent portions of their plans to other concerned SFODs, senior and subordinate staff sections, and supporting elements. They notify other concerned (higher, lower, or adjacent) staff sections of modified estimates and plans. They update, in coordination with the S2, the MiTT's CCIR list IAW the latest information available and requirements for additional CCIRs that arise from modified estimates and plans. Commander The MiTT commander issues planning guidance for planning the execution of the FID mission and ensures that his intent is clearly understood. He provides C2 during the MiTT's FID mission planning process. He devises a time event plan and ensures that planning is completed accordingly. He selects COAs examined in staff estimates that are IAW his intent, the higher commander’s OPORD or OPLAN, and the available external CłI, CS, and CSS. He ensures the completed portions of the MiTT's OPLAN for the execution of all specified and implied mission-essential tasks are IAW the higher commander’s OPORD or OPLAN and international and domestic laws. S t a f f The MiTT staff prepares estimates of COAs for those tasks identified as essential during the mission analysis IAW their functional areas or as directed. The staff members prepare estimates that include, as a minimum, the best alternative COAs supported by significant information and the coordination that will be necessary for them. They write tentative plans IAW the COAs selected by the MiTT commander, based on the planning guidance and unit’s SOP. They include in tentative plans primary, alternate, contingency, and emergency plans, based on the criticality of the task, the planning guidance, and anticipated changes to the mission. They coordinate the execution of the tasks they are planning by disseminating pertinent portions of their plans to other concerned SFODs, senior and subordinate staff sections, and supporting elements. They notify other concerned (higher, lower, or adjacent) staff sections of modified estimates and plans. They update, in coordination with the S2, the MiTT's CCIR list IAW the latest information available and requirements for additional CCIRs that arise from modified estimates and plans.

    55. MiTT XO ensures HN Executive Officer: Chief of Staff Performs analysis Directs development Coordinates and prepares plans Reviews tentative plans with S3 MiTT S-1 ensures HN S1: Prepares HN personnel status estimate Prepares personnel support of the IA’s OPLAN Proper coordinations Mission Planning Executive Officer The MiTT XO (WO) performs the organizational analysis of the MiTT's coordinating staff sections to ensure efficiency during the planning process IAW the initial planning guidance. He directs the development of estimates and plans by the staff sections IAW the time event plan. He coordinates and prepares planning 2-3 FM 31-20-3 documents for defensive source operations IAW oversight directives and mission guidance. He reviews, with the MiTT S3, all estimates and tentative plans for completeness to ensure they satisfy the planning requirements for essential tasks, for specified or implied requirements for coordination, and for compliance with the MiTT commander’s intent. He identifies and resolves conflicts between tentative plans by first directing coordination between the concerned staff sections and then, if necessary, requesting a decision from the MiTT commander. He approves completed tentative plans and acts on specific matters IAW the MiTT commander’s guidance. He also performs CMO officer (S5) FID mission planning duties and prepares the CMO estimate and the civil affairs annex for the MiTT's OPLAN. Adjutant The MiTT adjutant (S1) prepares the MiTT personnel status estimate. He prepares the personnel support portion of the MiTT's OPLAN covering all phases of the mission including, as a minimum, MiTT unit strength maintenance, administrative and morale support services, and discipline. He coordinates with the proper agencies for administrative and morale support services for MiTT personnel during all phases of the mission. He reviews HN training plans for safety and accident prevention measures. Executive Officer The MiTT XO (WO) performs the organizational analysis of the MiTT's coordinating staff sections to ensure efficiency during the planning process IAW the initial planning guidance. He directs the development of estimates and plans by the staff sections IAW the time event plan. He coordinates and prepares planning 2-3 FM 31-20-3 documents for defensive source operations IAW oversight directives and mission guidance. He reviews, with the MiTT S3, all estimates and tentative plans for completeness to ensure they satisfy the planning requirements for essential tasks, for specified or implied requirements for coordination, and for compliance with the MiTT commander’s intent. He identifies and resolves conflicts between tentative plans by first directing coordination between the concerned staff sections and then, if necessary, requesting a decision from the MiTT commander. He approves completed tentative plans and acts on specific matters IAW the MiTT commander’s guidance. He also performs CMO officer (S5) FID mission planning duties and prepares the CMO estimate and the civil affairs annex for the MiTT's OPLAN. Adjutant The MiTT adjutant (S1) prepares the MiTT personnel status estimate. He prepares the personnel support portion of the MiTT's OPLAN covering all phases of the mission including, as a minimum, MiTT unit strength maintenance, administrative and morale support services, and discipline. He coordinates with the proper agencies for administrative and morale support services for MiTT personnel during all phases of the mission. He reviews HN training plans for safety and accident prevention measures.

    56. MiTT Intelligence Officer ensures HN S-2: Prepares intelligence estimate and annex for OPLAN Prepares IPB and intelligence collection plans Updates PIR’s and IR’s from higher Prepares Target Package MiTT Operations and Training Officer ensures HN S3: Prepares IA’s operation estimate Supervises updating CCIR Task organizes the HN unit Responsible for advising HN on PSYOP activities Issues planning guidance from partner unit commander’s guidance Prepares training plans Advises on paragraph 2 ,3 and 5 Mission Planning Intelligence Officer Focuses those CTR teams and collection assets Teaches how to conduct IPB and incorporate ASCOPE Insures they are using their vast HUMINT capability Continually facilitates cross talk with partner unit S2 Operations OfficerThe MiTT S2 prepares the MiTT intelligence estimate and annex for the MiTT's OPLAN IAW the format in FM 101-5. He prepares the MiTT's IPB and intelligence collection plans IAW FMs 34-36 and 34-130. He prepares the MiTT for all phases of the mission, updating the MiTT's PIR ardor IR list and the area assessment. He prepares other estimates and portions of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as SFOD-provided HN intelligence training and/or advisory assistance, as directed. He analyzes the MiTT OPSEC measures and recommends to the MiTT S3 additions and/or changes to the MiTT's OPSEC measures and plans. He supervises the dissemination of intelligence and other operationally pertinent information within the MiTT and, as applicable, to higher, lower, and adjacent concerned units or agencies. He coordinates for intelligence support by consolidating IRs and routing them to the proper supporting agencies IAW the MiTT's collection plan(s). He ensures the security of the planning area and personnel. Training Officer Operations and The MiTT S3 prepares the MiTT's operations estimate. He supervises the updating of the SFOD'S CCIR list. He presents to the MiTT commander the significant changes to the MiTT's CCIRs that will cause changes to the intended execution of the mission. He task organizes the MiTT to include the integration of any attachments IAW the approved concept of the operation. He takes responsibility for planning and coordinating all PSYOP activities. He issues planning guidance through the MiTT XO to the MiTT staff sections for the development of their portions of the MiTT's OPLAN. This guidance also includes the assignment of specific tasks, the approved task organization, the concept of the operation, the coordinating instructions, and the desired OPLAN format. He prepares Paragraph 2 (Mission) for the MiTT's OPLAN. He coordinates the restated mission statement with the MiTT commander. He prepares Paragraph 3 (Execution) of the MiTT's OPLAN including the MiTT commander’s intent. He prepares Paragraph 5 (Command and Signal) of the MiTT's OPLAN with the assistance of the MiTT's communications-electronics (CE) staff. He prepares planning documents and OPLAN annexes. He also schedules MiTT training to support defensive source operations. He prepares other estimates and portions of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as SFOD-provided HN operational training and/or advisory assistance, as directed. He prepares the MiTT commander’s guidance and the time event plan for predeployment MiTT training and the rehearsal of mission essential tasks. As a minimum, the rehearsals of the HN training program of instruction (IWI) and/or advisory assistance are included. He compiles all prepared and approved portions of the MiTT's OPLAN into one document IAW FM 101-5. He supervises MiTT OPSEC measures IAW the unit’s SOP, the MiTT commander’s guidance, and the S2’s recommendations. Intelligence Officer Focuses those CTR teams and collection assets Teaches how to conduct IPB and incorporate ASCOPE Insures they are using their vast HUMINT capability Continually facilitates cross talk with partner unit S2 Operations OfficerThe MiTT S2 prepares the MiTT intelligence estimate and annex for the MiTT's OPLAN IAW the format in FM 101-5. He prepares the MiTT's IPB and intelligence collection plans IAW FMs 34-36 and 34-130. He prepares the MiTT for all phases of the mission, updating the MiTT's PIR ardor IR list and the area assessment. He prepares other estimates and portions of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as SFOD-provided HN intelligence training and/or advisory assistance, as directed. He analyzes the MiTT OPSEC measures and recommends to the MiTT S3 additions and/or changes to the MiTT's OPSEC measures and plans. He supervises the dissemination of intelligence and other operationally pertinent information within the MiTT and, as applicable, to higher, lower, and adjacent concerned units or agencies. He coordinates for intelligence support by consolidating IRs and routing them to the proper supporting agencies IAW the MiTT's collection plan(s). He ensures the security of the planning area and personnel. Training Officer Operations and The MiTT S3 prepares the MiTT's operations estimate. He supervises the updating of the SFOD'S CCIR list. He presents to the MiTT commander the significant changes to the MiTT's CCIRs that will cause changes to the intended execution of the mission. He task organizes the MiTT to include the integration of any attachments IAW the approved concept of the operation. He takes responsibility for planning and coordinating all PSYOP activities. He issues planning guidance through the MiTT XO to the MiTT staff sections for the development of their portions of the MiTT's OPLAN. This guidance also includes the assignment of specific tasks, the approved task organization, the concept of the operation, the coordinating instructions, and the desired OPLAN format. He prepares Paragraph 2 (Mission) for the MiTT's OPLAN. He coordinates the restated mission statement with the MiTT commander. He prepares Paragraph 3 (Execution) of the MiTT's OPLAN including the MiTT commander’s intent. He prepares Paragraph 5 (Command and Signal) of the MiTT's OPLAN with the assistance of the MiTT's communications-electronics (CE) staff. He prepares planning documents and OPLAN annexes. He also schedules MiTT training to support defensive source operations. He prepares other estimates and portions of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as SFOD-provided HN operational training and/or advisory assistance, as directed. He prepares the MiTT commander’s guidance and the time event plan for predeployment MiTT training and the rehearsal of mission essential tasks. As a minimum, the rehearsals of the HN training program of instruction (IWI) and/or advisory assistance are included. He compiles all prepared and approved portions of the MiTT's OPLAN into one document IAW FM 101-5. He supervises MiTT OPSEC measures IAW the unit’s SOP, the MiTT commander’s guidance, and the S2’s recommendations.

    57. MiTT Logistics Officer ensures HN S4: Advises on paragraph 4 Prepares logistic support Train HN on logistic support MiTT Electronics Staff (Communications) ensures HN Staff: Prepares communications estimate Prepares paragraph 5 Develop military and nonmilitary communications Develop training on communications equipment Mission Planning Supply Officer The MiTT supply officer (S4) prepares Paragraph 4 (Service Support) of the MiTT's OPLAN with the assistance of the MiTT S1. He prepares the logistic support portion of the MiTT's OPLAN covering all phases of the mission. He coordinates for all MiTT logistic support by consolidating requests and ensuring they are routed to the proper supporting agencies. He prepares other estimates and portions of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as SFOD-provided HN logistic and/or advisory assistance, as directed. Electronics Staff Communications- The MiTT CE staff prepares the MiTT's communications estimate. The staff helps the MiTT S3 prepare Paragraph 5 of the MiTT's OPLAN. The staff prepares the communications portion of the MiTT's OPLAN covering all phases of the mission. This portion includes internal MiTT communications; communications with higher, lower, and adjacent U.S. units and agencies for C3I, CS, and CSS; and the integration of available HN military and nonmilitary communications into the MiTT's communications plan. The staff requests additional communications resources and support, as needed, ensuring that requests are routed to the proper supporting agencies. The staff also prepares other estimates and portions of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as SFOD-provided HN communications training and/or advisory assistance, as directed. Supply Officer The MiTT supply officer (S4) prepares Paragraph 4 (Service Support) of the MiTT's OPLAN with the assistance of the MiTT S1. He prepares the logistic support portion of the MiTT's OPLAN covering all phases of the mission. He coordinates for all MiTT logistic support by consolidating requests and ensuring they are routed to the proper supporting agencies. He prepares other estimates and portions of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as SFOD-provided HN logistic and/or advisory assistance, as directed. Electronics Staff Communications- The MiTT CE staff prepares the MiTT's communications estimate. The staff helps the MiTT S3 prepare Paragraph 5 of the MiTT's OPLAN. The staff prepares the communications portion of the MiTT's OPLAN covering all phases of the mission. This portion includes internal MiTT communications; communications with higher, lower, and adjacent U.S. units and agencies for C3I, CS, and CSS; and the integration of available HN military and nonmilitary communications into the MiTT's communications plan. The staff requests additional communications resources and support, as needed, ensuring that requests are routed to the proper supporting agencies. The staff also prepares other estimates and portions of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as SFOD-provided HN communications training and/or advisory assistance, as directed.

    58. MiTT Medical staff ensures HN Staff: - Prepares medical estimate - Input for paragraph 4 - Prepares the health services portion of the OPLAN - Develop medical training Mission Planning Medical Staff The MiTT medical staff prepares the MiTT medical estimate. The staff provides the MiTT S1 (MiTT B XO) input for Paragraph 4 of the MiTT's OPLAN. The staff prepares the health service portion of the MiTT's OPLAN covering all phases of the mission. This portion includes intradetachment support; support to and from higher, lower, and adjacent U.S. units and agencies; and the integration of available HN military and nonmilitary medical assets into the MiTT's health services plan. The staff requests additional medical resources and support, as needed, ensuring requests are routed to the proper supporting agencies. The staff 2-5 FM 31-20-3 prepares other estimates and portions of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as SFODprovided HN medical training and/or advisory assistance, as directed. Medical Staff The MiTT medical staff prepares the MiTT medical estimate. The staff provides the MiTT S1 (MiTT B XO) input for Paragraph 4 of the MiTT's OPLAN. The staff prepares the health service portion of the MiTT's OPLAN covering all phases of the mission. This portion includes intradetachment support; support to and from higher, lower, and adjacent U.S. units and agencies; and the integration of available HN military and nonmilitary medical assets into the MiTT's health services plan. The staff requests additional medical resources and support, as needed, ensuring requests are routed to the proper supporting agencies. The staff 2-5 FM 31-20-3 prepares other estimates and portions of the MiTT's OPLAN, such as SFODprovided HN medical training and/or advisory assistance, as directed.

    59. The MiTT commander - Advises and assists the HN unit commander - Recommends improvements or additions - Helps the HN unit commander understand and executes the partner unit commander’s intent - Keeps the command communications channels open between HN and partner unit Conduct of Operations -advises and assists the HN unit commander in the C˛ process of tactical COIN operations. Accompanies the HN unit commander when he receives his mission from higher headquarters. -Assists the HN commander in anticipating his next mission. -Monitors the HN unit commander’s identification and understanding of his commander’s intent and all specified or implied tasks. He recommends improvements or additions, as needed. -Reviews the HN unit commander’s identified operational constraints and restraints for completeness. -Reviews the HN unit commander’s time event plan and troop leading procedures and recommends improvements as necessary. -Helps the HN unit commander provide C˛ during COIN operations. -Monitors the tactical situation and recommends changes to the present COA to exploit changes in the situation. -The MiTT commander also monitors the flow of information to the HN commander. -He recommends improvements needed to make continuous use of intelligence collection assets and to keep subordinates reporting combat information. -He screens the information given to the HN commander to prevent information overload. He keeps the command communications channels open for critical information. -advises and assists the HN unit commander in the C˛ process of tactical COIN operations. Accompanies the HN unit commander when he receives his mission from higher headquarters. -Assists the HN commander in anticipating his next mission. -Monitors the HN unit commander’s identification and understanding of his commander’s intent and all specified or implied tasks. He recommends improvements or additions, as needed. -Reviews the HN unit commander’s identified operational constraints and restraints for completeness. -Reviews the HN unit commander’s time event plan and troop leading procedures and recommends improvements as necessary. -Helps the HN unit commander provide C˛ during COIN operations. -Monitors the tactical situation and recommends changes to the present COA to exploit changes in the situation. -The MiTT commander also monitors the flow of information to the HN commander. -He recommends improvements needed to make continuous use of intelligence collection assets and to keep subordinates reporting combat information. -He screens the information given to the HN commander to prevent information overload. He keeps the command communications channels open for critical information.

    60. MiTT XO: - Monitors all HN staff sections - Helps his counterpart - Monitors the liaison and coordination with higher HN units MiTT S1: - Monitors maintenance - Monitors processing of wounded - Monitors the processing of detainees/Records HR violations - Monitors the HN unit morale Conduct of Operations MiTT XO: -Monitors all HN staff sections and recommends changes in organization and procedures, as necessary, to improve efficiency. -Helps his counterpart during periods when the counterpart is in command of the HN force. -Monitors the liaison and coordination with higher HN headquarters. He recommends changes, as necessary, to improve efficiency. MiTT S1: -Monitors the maintenance of HN unit strength and recommends improvements. -Monitors the processing of HN wounded and killed in action (KIA) and recommends improvements. -Monitors the processing of prisoners of war (PWs) and detainees to ensure respect for human rights. -Monitors the HN unit morale and recommends actions to improve it. MiTT XO: -Monitors all HN staff sections and recommends changes in organization and procedures, as necessary, to improve efficiency. -Helps his counterpart during periods when the counterpart is in command of the HN force. -Monitors the liaison and coordination with higher HN headquarters. He recommends changes, as necessary, to improve efficiency. MiTT S1: -Monitors the maintenance of HN unit strength and recommends improvements. -Monitors the processing of HN wounded and killed in action (KIA) and recommends improvements. -Monitors the processing of prisoners of war (PWs) and detainees to ensure respect for human rights. -Monitors the HN unit morale and recommends actions to improve it.

    61. MiTT S2: - Monitors OPSEC - Monitors the updating of the situation map - Monitors the collection, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of information - Assists HN in examining captured insurgent documents, material, and personnel . - Recommends and assists in requesting intelligence reports - Monitors the dissemination of intelligence to the HN commander - Assists in the briefing and debriefing of patrols - Assists, with the MiTT S3 and his counterpart, in developing reconnaissance and surveillance, I/O Conduct of Operations MiTT S2: - Monitors OPSEC and other procedures used to protect classified and sensitive material and operations and recommends improvements. -Monitors the updating of the situation map. He recommends actions to keep it current based on the available intelligence. -Recommends improvements, as necessary, to the HN unit’s tactical operations center (TOC) communications SOP to ensure the S2 section receives situation reports from the S3 and all attached units. -Monitors the collection, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of information on the effects of weather and terrain on operations. He also monitors their effects on friendly or insurgent COAs. -Assists in examining captured insurgent documents and material. -Recommends and assists in requesting intelligence reports from available sources to ensure the exploitation of all assets. -Monitors the dissemination of intelligence to the HN commander, staff, higher headquarters, subordinate units and attachments. He recommends improvements in procedures, as necessary. -Assists in the briefing and debriefing of patrols operating as a part of reconnaissance and surveillance activities. -Assists, with the MiTT S3 and his counterpart, in developing reconnaissance and surveillance plans to ensure the complete coverage of the AO. MiTT S2: - Monitors OPSEC and other procedures used to protect classified and sensitive material and operations and recommends improvements. -Monitors the updating of the situation map. He recommends actions to keep it current based on the available intelligence. -Recommends improvements, as necessary, to the HN unit’s tactical operations center (TOC) communications SOP to ensure the S2 section receives situation reports from the S3 and all attached units. -Monitors the collection, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of information on the effects of weather and terrain on operations. He also monitors their effects on friendly or insurgent COAs. -Assists in examining captured insurgent documents and material. -Recommends and assists in requesting intelligence reports from available sources to ensure the exploitation of all assets. -Monitors the dissemination of intelligence to the HN commander, staff, higher headquarters, subordinate units and attachments. He recommends improvements in procedures, as necessary. -Assists in the briefing and debriefing of patrols operating as a part of reconnaissance and surveillance activities. -Assists, with the MiTT S3 and his counterpart, in developing reconnaissance and surveillance plans to ensure the complete coverage of the AO. MiTT S2: - Monitors OPSEC and other procedures used to protect classified and sensitive material and operations and recommends improvements. -Monitors the updating of the situation map. He recommends actions to keep it current based on the available intelligence. -Recommends improvements, as necessary, to the HN unit’s tactical operations center (TOC) communications SOP to ensure the S2 section receives situation reports from the S3 and all attached units. -Monitors the collection, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of information on the effects of weather and terrain on operations. He also monitors their effects on friendly or insurgent COAs. -Assists in examining captured insurgent documents and material. -Recommends and assists in requesting intelligence reports from available sources to ensure the exploitation of all assets. -Monitors the dissemination of intelligence to the HN commander, staff, higher headquarters, subordinate units and attachments. He recommends improvements in procedures, as necessary. -Assists in the briefing and debriefing of patrols operating as a part of reconnaissance and surveillance activities. -Assists, with the MiTT S3 and his counterpart, in developing reconnaissance and surveillance plans to ensure the complete coverage of the AO. MiTT S2: - Monitors OPSEC and other procedures used to protect classified and sensitive material and operations and recommends improvements. -Monitors the updating of the situation map. He recommends actions to keep it current based on the available intelligence. -Recommends improvements, as necessary, to the HN unit’s tactical operations center (TOC) communications SOP to ensure the S2 section receives situation reports from the S3 and all attached units. -Monitors the collection, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination of information on the effects of weather and terrain on operations. He also monitors their effects on friendly or insurgent COAs. -Assists in examining captured insurgent documents and material. -Recommends and assists in requesting intelligence reports from available sources to ensure the exploitation of all assets. -Monitors the dissemination of intelligence to the HN commander, staff, higher headquarters, subordinate units and attachments. He recommends improvements in procedures, as necessary. -Assists in the briefing and debriefing of patrols operating as a part of reconnaissance and surveillance activities. -Assists, with the MiTT S3 and his counterpart, in developing reconnaissance and surveillance plans to ensure the complete coverage of the AO.

    62. MiTT S3 Assists in preparing tactical plans with the HN S2 using estimates, predictions, and information. Monitors command and communications net Assists in supervising training and preparing for operations. Monitors and makes recommendations MiTT S4 Monitors the maintenance of equipment readiness, Monitors the support provided to the HN unit, its subunits, and attachments. He recommends improvements as necessary. Assists in supervising the use of transportation assets. MiTT Fire Direction NCO Assists the HN unit in planning for, coordinating, requesting, and using fire support. Recommends using fire support based on firepower restrictions and the principle of minimum-essential force. Conduct of Operations MiTT S3 Assists in preparing tactical plans with the HN S2 using estimates, predictions, and information. Monitors command and communications nets. Assists in preparing all orders and plans. Assists in supervising training and preparing for operations. Monitors and makes recommendations to ensure operations are consistent with overall IDAD goals. Assists in coordinating and implementing CA and/or PSYOP tasks assigned to the HN unit. MiTT S4 Monitors the maintenance of equipment readiness, recommending improvements as necessary. Monitors the support provided to the HN unit, its subunits, and attachments. He recommends improvements as necessary. Assists in supervising the use of transportation assets. MiTT Weapons NCO Assists the HN unit in planning for, coordinating, requesting, and using fire support. Recommends using fire support based on firepower restrictions and the principle of minimum-essential force. MiTT S3 Assists in preparing tactical plans with the HN S2 using estimates, predictions, and information. Monitors command and communications nets. Assists in preparing all orders and plans. Assists in supervising training and preparing for operations. Monitors and makes recommendations to ensure operations are consistent with overall IDAD goals. Assists in coordinating and implementing CA and/or PSYOP tasks assigned to the HN unit. MiTT S4 Monitors the maintenance of equipment readiness, recommending improvements as necessary. Monitors the support provided to the HN unit, its subunits, and attachments. He recommends improvements as necessary. Assists in supervising the use of transportation assets. MiTT Weapons NCO Assists the HN unit in planning for, coordinating, requesting, and using fire support. Recommends using fire support based on firepower restrictions and the principle of minimum-essential force.

    63. Terminal Learning Objective Advisors understand the institutional and cultural differences between HN and American units. Advisors understan how their actions facilitate the creation of a successful, professional HN Army.

More Related