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Radiation and Waste Safety

Radiation and Waste Safety. Infrastructure in ASIA & PACIFIC. Ahmad Al Khatibeh Section Head, Regulatory Infrastructure and Transport Safety Section Division of Radiation and Waste Safety Department of Nuclear Safety and Security. 01 January 2020. Index. Background;

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Radiation and Waste Safety

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  1. Radiation and Waste Safety Infrastructure in ASIA & PACIFIC Ahmad Al KhatibehSection Head,Regulatory Infrastructure and Transport Safety Section Division of Radiation and Waste SafetyDepartment of Nuclear Safety and Security 01 January 2020

  2. Index • Background; • Practices withSources of Ionizing Radiation Exposure and the need for Radiation Safety; • Radiation Safety Approach by Six Thematic Safety Areas (TSA) , ASIA&PACIFIC Status; • RASIMS

  3. Background

  4. Specific obligations and responsibilities • (“shall”) Requirements Guides Recommendations to support requirements (“should”) IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS • Underlying principles (aimed at politicians and regulatory bodies) Fundamentals www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/SeriesMain.asp

  5. IAEA’S RADIATION SAFETY STANDARDS • IAEA Safety Standards are not legally binding on Member States but may be adopted by them, at their own discretion however... • IAEA Safety Standards are binding on IAEA in relation to its own operations and to operations assisted by the IAEA; and • Member States receiving IAEA assistance are obliged to apply IAEA Safety Standards • Board of Governors have specifically requested that TC projects involving radiation sources should only be submitted for approval if the country has achieved a certain minimum level of radiation safety

  6. Legal Nature of the IAEA Safety StandardsOffice Legal Affairs OLA (2010) INFCIRC/267, which provide in paragraph A.1(h) that “the IAEA’s Safety Standards and Measures SHALL be applied , were relevant , to operations making use of Technical Assistance provided”

  7. Assistance in Application of Safety Standards 1986 Chernobyl 1979 Three Mile Island 1994 Model Projects 2005 Regional Projects Rapat Missions Regional Projects 40 Proactive Passive 2011 Agency assistance on radiation safety since 1979 Source: TC- WONG, Sin May

  8. Practices withSources of Ionizing Radiation Exposure and the need for Radiation Safety

  9. Car industry e.g: testing airbags Aero industry e.g: testing airframes Testing pipelines & bridges Electronic industry e.g: testing circuit boards Uses of radiation in industry: Non-destructive testing using industrial radiography

  10. Uses of radiation cancer treatment Radioactive sources temporarily or permanently in/on the body (brachytherapy) Treatment with radiation beam (teletherapy) By 2009 - estimated number of new cancer cases per year : 15,000,000 (2/3 in developing countries) source: United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR)

  11. Uses of radiation in nuclear medicine Currently around 30 million nuclear medicine examinations take place in 70 countries per year

  12. Uses of radiation in x-ray diagnosis

  13. Uses of radiation: Oil-well logging

  14. Uses of radiation: Sterilization e.g.: irradiators used to extend shelf-life of food, sterilize medical products, blood etc.

  15. EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIATION • Deterministic • Existence of dose threshold (under this dose, the effect is not observable). • Effect severity increase with dose. • Stochastic • No threshold. • Probability of the effect increases with dose. • Severity is considered maximum (equivalent to fatal event).

  16. Accidents involving industrial radiography • Source not retracted (jammed and/or disconnected) • Source retracted but not locked in the device

  17. Active Use: Accidents involving industrial irradiators: El Salvador, 1989 Workers over-ride safety systems and enter the irradiation room when source rack is unshielded and manipulate it

  18. Incorrect repair of accelerator (Spain) 27 patients were treated using electrons with the faulty equipment Of the 27 patients 15 died as a consequence of overexposure • Radiation injuries of the lung and spinal cord

  19. Loss of control: Accidents in Industrial radiography, Ir-192 source used for industrial radiography became detached from the camera. Small size of source

  20. Loss of control: teletherapy source, Goiania, Brazil (1987) • 1985:Private radiotherapy clinic closed down • 1987: teletherapy head stolen • Unit dismantled, Cs-137 source capsule ruptured causing major contamination, 4 deaths, buildings demolished and costs US$20 million => • 50.9 TBq (1375 Ci) caesium-137 teletherapy machine left in abandoned clinic

  21. Who has been exposed ? • Workers • industrial radiography • irradiators(radioactive sources and accelerators) • Public • orphan sources • Patients • misadministration of radio-pharmaceuticals • miscalibration/miscalculation of dose for radiotherapy • brachytherapy sources left in patient • overexposure during interventional procedures

  22. How can IAEA help? Radiation Safety Approach by Six Thematic Safety Areas (TSA)

  23. Radiation and Waste Safety Infrastructure Areas Thematic Safety Areas (TSA) : • TSA 1: Regulatory Framework • TSA 2: Occupational Radiation Protection • TSA 3: Patient Radiation Protection • TSA 4: Public Radiation Protection • TSA 5: Emergency Preparedness and Response • TSA 6: Education and Training • TSA7 Transport (New)

  24. PI = 3 PI = 2 PI = 0 or 1 Quantitative Assessment of Progress - Performance Indicators (PIs) • Each TSA is composed of various elements derived from IAEA Safety Standards • The progress made in each element by a State is assigned a Performance Indicator between 0 (no progress) and 3 (good progress)

  25. National Regulatory Infrastructure (TSA 1)

  26. National Regulatory Infrastructure (TSA 1) Focuses on establishing an independent and functional regulatory infrastructure in a Member State (MS) so that it meets IAEA Safety Standards. • It include 14 Elements: • Legislation, • Regulations and Guidance, • Regulatory Body Establishment and independence • Regulatory Body Staffing and Training • Regulatory Body Funding • Coordination and Cooperation and the National Level • International Cooperation • Notification and National Register of Radiation Sources • Authorization • Safety and Security of Radiation Sources • Inspection • Enforcement • Information management • Quality Management

  27. TSA 1 Status Asia & Pacific 2009-2012 2012 2009 Status 25% low Progress 16% low Progress 40% Medium Progress 53% Medium Progress 35% High Progress 31% High Progress

  28. TSA 1 Status by Element 2012

  29. TSA 1 – Asia & the Pacific: Main Needs

  30. TSA 1 – Asia & the Pacific: Main Needs • A national system of radiation safety legislation has been established in most of the countries. • In most of the countries the current legislative framework provides the basis for the safety and security of radioactive sources. • Availability of qualified staff to undertake the regulatory activities. • Main needs: • Registry of sources, inspection and authorization 30% • Lack or Weak Enforcement system 59%

  31. Occupational Radiation Protection (TSA 2)

  32. Occupational Radiation Protection (TSA 2) To establish and develop a national programme for ORP in compliance with the requirements of the BSS and relevant safety guides; • Elements of TSA 2 include among others : • Individual monitoring for external radiation sources • Individual monitoring for intake radionuclides • Workplace monitoring • Service providers

  33. TSA 2 Status Asia & Pacific 2009-2012 2012 2009 35% low Progress 30% low Progress 55% Medium Progress 60% Medium Progress 10% High Progress 10% High Progress

  34. TSA 2 Status by Element

  35. TSA 2 – Asia & the Pacific: Main needs

  36. TSA 2 – Asia & the Pacific: Main needs • Most of the countries have an external monitoring system in place , however still 31% of the MSs in which this system should be established; • Limitations concerning facilities for monitoring of internal exposure 75%; • Limitations concerning facilities for workplace monitoring in almost 50% of the countries; • Radiation protection activities due to natural sources should be addressed 84%;

  37. Radiological Protection of Patients and Protection in Medical Exposure (TSA 3)

  38. Radiological Protection of Patients(RPP)Thematic Safety Area (TSA) 3 • to enhance radiological protection of patients and the control of exposures in diagnostic and interventional radiology, radiotherapy and nuclear medicine; • to build capacity and develop technical capabilities for quality assurance (QA) programmes for radiation protection in medicine; • Radiation protection of patients in: • diagnostic & interventional radiology • radiotherapy • nuclear medicine • Quality assurance

  39. TSA 3 Status Asia & Pacific 2009-2012 2012 2009 51% low Progress 50% low Progress 43% Medium Progress 44% Medium Progress 6% High Progress 6% High Progress

  40. TSA3 Status by Element 2012

  41. TSA 3 - Asia & the Pacific: Main needs

  42. TSA 3 - Asia & the Pacific: Main needs • Lack or weak implementation of quality assurance programmes in diagnostic radiology. • Lack of qualified experts and training in diagnostic radiology. • Lack of qualified experts and training in diagnostic radiology and optimization programmes in Interventional Radiology. • Establishment of patient dosimetry in hospitals is missing in many countries

  43. Public & Environmental Radiological Protection (TSA 4) (including Waste Safety) Division of Radiation, Waste and Transport Safety

  44. Public Radiological Protection Includes mainly: • Optimization and limitation of public exposure. • Environmental monitoring. • Safety of radioactive waste management.

  45. TSA 4 Status Asia & Pacific 2009-2012 2012 2009 37% low Progress 37% low Progress 60% Medium Progress 60% Medium Progress 3% High Progress 3% High Progress

  46. TSA 4 Status for each element 2012

  47. TSA 4 - Asia & the Pacific: Main Needs 41%72%66%38%84%78%69%59%56%72%78%63%81%97%97%

  48. TSA 4 - Asia & the Pacific: Main Needs • In many countries existing regulations only partially consider the requirements for public exposure established in the BSS. • In many countries adequate criteria for discharges are not defined, but regulatory activities and provisions made by the operators appear to ensure a reasonable standard of protection . • Lack of National Strategy for Waste Management • Lack of radioactivity control for recycling • Limited national storage or disposal facilities

  49. Emergency Preparedness and Response (EPR) TSA 5 Incident and Emergency Centre (IEC)

  50. IEC Mission Statement Global Focal Point for International Preparedness and Response to Nuclear and Radiological Safety or Security related Incidents, Emergencies, Threats or Events of Media Interest

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