1 / 29

Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Mapping the Terrain

Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions. Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Mapping the Terrain. Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates and Trevor Kvaran Georgia State University Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SPP)

gunda
Download Presentation

Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Mapping the Terrain

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript


  1. Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility: Mapping the Terrain Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates and Trevor Kvaran Georgia State University Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SPP) Toronto, June 16, 2007

  2. The Problem of Free Will:Reductive Mechanism, not Determinism

  3. I’m not responsible if my brainmade me do it • “An agent would not be morally responsible at all if he was caused necessarily, predetermined, to try to do what he did, by his brain state…” –Philosopher Richard Swinburne (1989) • “But doesn’t a truly scientific, mechanistic view of the nervous system make nonsense of the very idea of responsibility?” – Scientist Richard Dawkins (edge.org 2006)

  4. I’m not free if my brainmade me do it “And since all behavior is caused by our brains, wouldn’t this mean all behavior could potentially be excused?” –Journalist Jeffrey Rosen NYTimes “The Brain on the Stand” (3/11/07) “If the choices one makes is a reaction to the chemicals in the brain then that is not their own free will.” –Folk #80190 (4/26/07) “no [free will because] the neural processes make the decisions.” –Folk #69709 (4/28/07)

  5. Not to worry, neuroscientists have also shown … • “A spark of free will may exist in even the tiny brain of the humble fruit fly, based on new findings.” —media report on experiment in PLoS 2007 by Brembs et al.

  6. Overview • Why test folk intuitions? • What has been claimed about folk intuitions? • What did we predict? • How did we test folk intuitions? • What did we find? • What does it mean for the free will debate?

  7. Why test folk intuitions? • Nadelhoffer & Nahmias (forthcoming in Philosophical Explorations) • Debates about free will should connect to ordinary beliefs and practices about praise and blame, pride and shame, punishment and reward, morals and meaning … • Systematically mapping ordinary intuitions, beliefs, and conceptual usage can be important for: • Building philosophical theories • Exploring underlying psychological processes (e.g., to consider whether they are reliable) • Correcting folk theories (revisionism)

  8. The Traditional Free Will Debate • Philosophical debates have focused on the compatibility question: Are free will (FW) and moral responsibility (MR) compatible with determinism? (Incompatibilists vs. Compatibilists) • Determinism = holding fixed the laws that govern a system and the state of the system at one time, there is only one possible state of the system at any other (future) time. [(Past & Laws)  Future]

  9. Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? • It is “in our nature to take determinism to pose a serious problem for our notions of responsibility and freedom.” --Galen Strawson (1986: 89) • “In my experience, most ordinary persons start out as natural incompatibilists…. Ordinary persons have to be talked out of this natural incompatibilism by the clever arguments of philosophers. ” --Robert Kane (1999: 217) • “We come to the table, nearly all of us, as pretheoretic incompatibilists.” --Laura Ekstrom (2002: 310)

  10. Experimental Philosophy • Nahmias, Morris, Nadelhoffer, and Turner (2005, 2006) used three different descriptions of deterministic scenarios and found that most people did not express incompatibilist intuitions: on average, two-thirds say agents in such scenarios have FW and four-fifths say agents are MR. • But why, then, have so many philosophers thought that most people have intuitions that support incompatibilism?

  11. Nichols and Knobe: Explaining away compatibilist intuitions • “one condition, the concrete condition, was designed to elicit greater affective response; the other condition, the abstract condition, was designed to trigger abstract, theoretical cognition.” • Majority respond that a specific agent who performs a bad action in a deterministic universe is “fully morally responsible.” • But majority respond that it is not possible for agents (in general) to be “fully morally responsible” in a deterministic universe. • “Performance error” model: “the normal competence with responsibility attribution is skewed by the emotions; that explains why there is such a large difference between the high and low affect in the determinist conditions”

  12. Determinism vs. Reductive Mechanism • Determinism = holding fixed the laws that govern a system and the state of the system at one time, there is only one possible state of the system at any other (future) time. • Reductive Mechanism = the higher-level properties of a system (and its changes through time) reduce to—and can be explained entirely in terms of—the system’s lower-level causal mechanisms (for example, human behavior reduces to causal mechanisms in the brain). • Determinism without Mechanism • Mechanism without Determinism

  13. Backtracking vs. Bypassing • Determinism suggests a backtracking threat to ultimate control because there are sufficient conditions (distant past and laws) for the agent’s actions over which she has no control. • Reductive mechanism suggests a bypassing threat to rational control because the agent’s actions appear to be caused by lower-level mechanisms rather than her rational capacities or her (conscious) mental states.

  14. Our theory: Explaining away incompatibilist intuitions Determinism → Backtracking threat → No Ultimate Control → No FW or MR Mechanism → Bypassing threat → No Rational Control → No FW or MR Determinism

  15. Participant Stance vs. Mechanistic Stance • Participant stance involves understanding an agent’s actions in terms of their mental states (Theory of Mind) and taking reactive attitudes towards them. (Peter Strawson 1962) • Mechanistic stance involves understanding a system’s behavior in terms of lower-level causal mechanisms (e.g., neural processes and chemical reactions). • When people take a mechanistic stance towards a system, this tends to displace “any explanation in terms of beliefs, desires, and intentions.” (Daniel Dennett 1973) • Specific, emotionally charged actions may provoke people to take the participant stance.

  16. What did we predict? • Most people will judge that determinism is not threatening to FW and MR if determinism is described in non-mechanistic (e.g., psychological) terms. • Significantly more people will judge determinism to be threatening to FW and MR if determinism is described in reductive mechanistic (e.g., neuroscientific) terms. • Judgments of FW and MR will be significantly higher in response to descriptions of specific agents who perform bad acts in comparison to agents and actions described in an abstract way.

  17. How did we test folk intuitions? • We used QuestionPro online software. • We surveyed 1,124 GSU Undergrads (632 used for analysis, taking out those who failed manipulation check or had prior philosophy class). • We used 8 scenarios: • Neuro vs. Psych • Abstract vs. Bad vs. Good • Alternate world (Erta) vs. Real world (Earth)

  18. Describing Determinism (Real Psych scenario) Most respected psychologists are convinced that eventually we will figure out exactly how all of our decisions and actions are entirely caused. For instance, they think that whenever we are trying to decide what to do, the decision we end up making is completely caused by the specific thoughts, desires, and plans occurring in our minds. The psychologists are also convinced that these thoughts, desires, and plans are completely caused by our current situation and the earlier events in our lives, and that these earlier events were alsocompletely caused by even earlier events, eventually going all the way back to events that occurred before we were born. So, if these psychologists are right, then once specific earlier events have occurred in a person’s life, these events will definitely cause specific later events to occur. For instance, once specific thoughts, desires, and plans occur in the person’s mind, they will definitely cause the person to make the specific decision he or she makes.

  19. Neuro vs. Psych (Real world scenarios) Most respected neuroscientists [psychologists] are convinced that eventually we will figure out exactly how all of our decisions and actions are entirely caused. For instance, they think that whenever we are trying to decide what to do, the decision we end up making is completely caused by the specific chemical reactions and neural processes [thoughts, desires, and plans] occurring in our brains [minds]. The neuroscientists [psychologists] are also convinced that these chemical reactions and neural processes [thoughts, desires, and plans] are completely caused by our current situation and the earlier events in our lives, and that these earlier events were also completely caused by even earlier events, eventually going all the way back to events that occurred before we were born. So, if these neuroscientists [psychologists] are right, then once specific earlier events have occurred in a person’s life, these events will definitely cause specific later events to occur. For instance, once specific chemical reactions and neural processes [thoughts, desires, and plans] occur in the person’s brain [mind], they will definitely cause the person to make the specific decision he or she makes.

  20. Abstract vs. Bad vs. Good (Ertan scenarios) Story: On Erta, the landscape and life are very similar to Earth, and there are advanced life forms called Ertans who look, talk, and behave very much like we do. For instance, the Ertans have families, schools, various jobs, parties, arguments, etc. However, the Ertans’ science has advanced far beyond ours. Specifically, Ertan neuroscientists [psychologists] have discovered exactly how Ertans’ brain [minds] work. For instance, they have discovered that whenever an Ertan is trying to decide what to do, the decision the Ertan ends up making is completely caused by the specific chemical reactions and neural processes [thoughts, desires, and plans] occurring in his or her brain [mind]. The neuroscientists [psychologists] have also discovered that these chemical reactions and neural processes [thoughts, desires, and plans] are completely caused by the Ertan’s current situation and the earlier events in his or her life. These earlier events were also completely caused by even earlier events, eventually going all the way back to events that occurred before the Ertan was born. So, once specific earlier events have occurred in an Ertan’s life, these events will definitely cause specific later events to occur. For instance, once specific chemical reactions and neural processes [thoughts, desires, and plans] occur in the Ertan’s brain [mind], they will definitely cause the Ertan to make the specific decision he or she makes. So, once specific earlier events have occurred in an Ertan’s life, these events will definitely cause specific later events to occur. For example, one day an Ertan named Smit decides to kill his wife so that he can marry his lover [donate a large sum of money to an orphanage in his community], and he does it. Once the specific chemical reactions and neural processes [thoughts, desires, and plans] occur in Smit’s brain [mind], they will definitely cause his decision to kill his wife [donate a large sum of money to an orphanage in his community].

  21. What did we find? (Results for predictions 1 and 2) • Prediction 1: Significant majority of participants in Psych Real condition offered compatibilist judgments for FW, MR, ‘up to,’ praise and blame. • Prediction 2: Judgments of FW, MR, ‘up to,’ praise, and blame were significantly higher in the Psych scenarios than in the Neuro scenarios, especially in Real world condition.

  22. The Effect of Mechanism

  23. What did we find? (Results for prediction 3) • Significant differences in judgments of FW, MR, ‘up to,’ praise, and blame between Abstract and Bad Ertan scenarios. (No significant differences between Abstract and Good Ertan scenarios, though judgments for these questions were almost always higher in the Good scenario than Abstract and lower than Bad.) • Judgments showed a consistent pattern: lowest in the Abstract scenarios, highest in the Bad scenarios, and somewhere in between in the Good scenarios, and consistently higher in Psych scenarios than Neuro scenarios.

  24. The Effect of Affect?

  25. Future Work and Alternative Interpretations • Test indeterministic cases. • Test neutral concrete cases: specific agents performing specific neutral actions (e.g., mowing the lawn). • Test whether taking mechanistic stance reduces attributions of psychological states in general (e.g., beliefs and desires) as well as attributions of FW and MR. • The folk just don’t get it when you describe determinism in psychological terms? • Determinism entails reductive mechanism?

  26. What do our results mean for the free will debate? • Folk concept of FW and practices regarding MR may not require (much) revision if determinism is discovered to be true, but may require significant revision depending on how naturalistic theories of mind are developed and presented… • Re-direct some of the philosophical attention away from issue of determinism (what physicists might discover) and towards issue of how to understand reductive mechanism (mind-body debate) and what sciences of the mind might discover.

  27. “Science Proves Free Will is an Illusion” “It seems we are agents. It seems we cause what we do…. It is sobering and ultimately accurate to call all this an illusion.” – Daniel Wegner (2002) “The bottom line of neuroscience is that, let’s not kid ourselves, we’re all concatenations of molecules containing DNA, hard wired into a chemical analogue computer known as the human brain, which as software has a certain genetic code. And your idea that you have a soul or even a self, much less free will, is just an illusion… The conclusion people out beyond the laboratory walls are drawing is: The fix is in! We're all hardwired! That, and: Don't blame me! I'm wired wrong!” –Tom Wolfe (in The Economist, 1996)

  28. “When people try to rationally analyze potential options, their unconscious, emotional thoughts take over and make the choice for them… Decisions are made for us by our unconscious, the conscious [mind] is in charge of making up reasons for those decisions which sound rational.” –Roger Shank (edge.org 2005)

  29. A New Copernican Revolution • Revisionism about reductive mechanism … • Reconciling reductive mechanism with meaning, morality, free will, responsibility. • “Realizing that there are biological mechanisms behind the most sublime human behavior [e.g., altruism and free will] does not imply a simplistic reduction to the nuts and bolts of neurobiology.” —Antonio Damasio Descartes’ Error (125-6)

More Related