Perspectives of Managing Radiation Protection in United States

1. Perspectives of Managing Radiation Protection in United States Chen Lin Atomic Energy Council

2. History 2005 ICRP Draft Process for Providing Guidance on Radiation Protection Policies and Practices Radiological Terrorism and Security impact Current Challenges in Developing Radiation Protection Guidance Future Radiation Protection Goals Contents

3. History U.S. Advisory Committee on X-ray and Radium Protection U.S. National Committee on Radiation Protection 1964 National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements charted by U.S. Congress

4. 1. Transportation of Co-60 sources 2. Teletherapy sources (hospitals) 3. Disused and orphaned radioisotope thermoelectric generatorsRTGs 4. Orphan seed irradiators 5. Industrial irradiators, blood irradiators 6. Sales/re-sales of Co-60 sources and radiography sources 7. RTGs, research irradiators, well-logging sources 8. Disused well-logging sources 9. Sales/re-sales of radiography sources and blood irradiators 10. Transportation of radiography, well logging, and blood irradiators Big Ten Radiological Threats

5. radioisotope thermoelectric generators

6. Voyager • Voyager 2 launched on August 20th, 1977 • Voyager 1 launched on September 5th, 1977

7. Cornerstones of national role in radiation protection: Provide information and recommendations in the public interest about (a) protection against radiation and (b) radiation measurements, quantities and units Develop basic concepts of radiation protection Facilitate effective use of combined resources of organizations concerned with radiation protection Cooperate with national and international governmental and private organizations Key Elements of NCRP’s Charter

8. Program Area Committees are chaired by NCRP Vice Presidents, and identify where new work is needed and potential sources of funding for this work Identification of new NCRP projects also occurs through recommendations made by federal agencies, collaborating organizations, and individual scientists Following Board approval of a new activity and if a source of funding is available, a scientific committee is formed to write an NCRP report. NCRP currently has 25 active scientific committees with 225 members NCRP Scientific Program Areas

9. Scientific Basis of Standards:Focus on research needs for setting radiation protection guidelines, the validity of the linear, non-threshold dose-response model, and risk as a basis for classifying hazardous wastes Dose Control:Focus on minimizing radiation exposures and applying ALARA principles NASA Space Program:Relate to astronaut safety and evaluation of the risk of using plutonium for power generation in space Recent Radiation Protection of Interest (1)

10. Terrorism Threats: Management of terrorist events involving the release of radioactive materials Nuclear Materials:Options on managing the disposition of potentially radioactive scrap metals from radiological regulated facilities Medicine:Recommendations on exposure criteria for diagnostic ultrasound based on all known mechanisms of interaction Recent Radiation Protection of Interest (2)

11. Dose Limits for the Public (1) • In ICRP Publication 26 it was noted that the risk of public transport was in the range of 10-6 to 10-5 per year and that this would lead to 100mrem per year • British members wanted to keep the limit at 500 mrem per year. This was somewhat changed in 1984 with :--be limited to 5 mSv, and for repeated exposures over prolonged periods, that it would be prudent --1 mSv--”.

12. In NCRP Report No.91 (and 116) “--- it is recommended that the annual effective dose equivalent not exceed 1 mSv (0.1rem).” In addition “---limit of 5 mSv (0.5 rem) is recommended to provide for infrequent exposures.” Dose Limits for the Public (2)

13. Dose limits increasingly more restrictive: no basis in science or epidemiology Substantial economic costs ICRP: considering recommendation to lower annual occupational exposure limit to 20 mSv EPA: annual individual-protection standard of 0.15 mSv for Yucca Mountain Restrictive Dose Limits

14. NCRP Report No. 91 (and 116) : “whenever the potential exits for an individual (member of the public) to exceed 25% of the annual limit from irradiation attributable to any single site, the site operator should be required to assure that the annual exposure of the maximally exposed individual--wouldnot exceed 1 mSv (100 mrem) on a continuous basis.” Control of Source Related Exposures

15. NCRP Report No. 127 (1998) Operational Radiation Safety Program: “Because--- it is recommended that shielding for any single source be designed to limit exposure to some fraction of the recommended dose limit—” Facility Design

16. ICRP Publication 77(1997) Radiological Protection Policy for the Disposal of Radioactive Wastes: 0.3mSv/y constraint USNRC Part 20: For D&D .25mSv constraint and for Part 61 a limit of .25mSv for waste facilities Control of Source Related Exposures

17. Current Challenges in DevelopingRadiation Protection Guidance(1) Growing trend toward decentralized federal regulations on radiation policy and practices Many agency-specific activities in radiation health protection

18. In the past year two leading radiation protection institutions, HPS and NCRP, went on record on the issue of x-ray screening of people for security purposes. Their recommendations are in harmony with the 2002 TEPRSSC recommendations. FDA will take all these documents and the previous CRCPD resolution into consideration in drafting a mandatory standard. Technical Electronic Products Radiation Safety Standards Committee (TEPRSSC)Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors(CRCPD) X-Ray Personnel Security Screening Systems Update

19. ANSI N43.17 Dose Limits • 0.1Sv (10µrem) effective dose per scan • 250 Sv (25mrem) effective dose per year

20. Risk assessment Appropriate use conditions Targeted and susceptible populations Dose limits Informed consent Operator qualifications Benefit vs. risk (net benefit?) Record keeping General screening vs. follow-up evaluations FDA’s Request to NCRP for Guidance

21. NCRP Report SC 1-12: Recommendations (1) Two Categories: • General-Use Systems • Conform with ANSI N43.17 dose requirement of 0.1 Sv/scan (10 rem/scan) • Limited-Use Systems • Between 0.1 and 10 Sv/scan (10 rem to 1 mrem/scan)

22. General-Use Systems May be used for screening general public. Limited-Use Systems Must be used with discretion (e.g. second tier screening). Should consider non-ionizing alternatives. Must limit usage so that any one individual not exceed 0.25 mSv in a year from one site. NCRP Report SC 1-12: Recommendations (2)

23. Bystanders Should have the same level of protection as individuals screened (i.e. 0.25 mSv/y from one site). Operators The same level of protection is recommended. NCRP Report SC 1-12: Recommendations (3)

24. 1990 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PRACTICES JUSTIFICATION (of practices) Overall net benefit. OPTIMIZATION (of sources) As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA), economic and social factors being taken into account. Restricted byDose and Risk Constraints, to balance the unfairness of costs and benefits, which may not be the same for all individuals affected by a source. DOSE LIMITS (for individuals) Ensuring the individual risk is not unacceptable from ALL sources under control.

25. Principles: Dose Limits and Constraints Dose constraints are much more important: “ . . . the fundamental level of protection . . . where action to avert exposures and reduce doses is virtually certain to be justified.” Quantified for all“controllable situations” Normal sources Existing exposures Emergencies Natural radiation background:“a benchmark for judgement about . . . relative importance [of added exposures] and the need for action.” Basis for recommendedmaximumvalues for dose constraints

26. Emergencies, evacuations, no justification above 100 Incremental dose mSv in a year 20 Some benefits to exposed individuals Societal rather than individual benefit 1 0.01 Natural background (1 mSv/a) Minimum value Principles: Dose Limits and Constraints Recommendedmaximumvalues for dose constraints on singlesources

27. RADON-222 Recommendations in Publication 65 are adapted for 2005 Constraints set where action is almost always warranted Home 600 Bq m-3 Work 1500 Bq m-3 NATIONAL AUTHORITY establishes a lower level- Below which, at work, exposures are NOT subject to the system of protection And, no action to reduce levels in homes

28. EVOLUTION OF RECOMMENDATIONS Some things are to- remain because they work and are clear differ because understanding has evolved be added because there has been a void be elaborated because more guidance is needed There appears to be no need for significant changes in the currently applied Basic Safety Standards It may not be necessary to change regulations in those countries that have adopted Publication 60.

29. ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 9 additional Publications since 1990 recommending nearly 30 different numerical constraints. They are justified in at least 6 different ways individual annual fatal risk, upper end of an existing range, multiples or fractions of natural background, formal cost-benefit analysis, qualitative, non-quantitative arguments, and avoidance of deterministic effects.

30. Are the Proposed Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection Taking Us in the Right Direction?

31. The Right Direction? Interpretation of science………………………………..yes Terminologyand concepts……………………….yes/no Adjustment of quantities……………………………….yes Clarificationof “Justification” …………………….yes Emphasis on dose constraints rather than limits……yes but . . . basis of annual natural background………..no Emphasis on broad-based optimisation……………...yes but . . . advice on implementation…………………...no continued . . .

32. The Right Direction? Excluded activity concentrations……………….…...maybe Development of tools for biotaprotection………...yes but . . . framework development…………………...no Evolutionary not revolutionary………………….…...yes but . . . overall direction………………………………no Consultative process…………………………………...yes

33. Adequacy of environmental protection in question Can current ICRP system be extended to protect biota? Current system of protection documented in ICRP 60 Anthropocentric philosophy assume protection of humans also protects environment Revised system of protection new ICRP recommendations expected in 2005 include consideration of impacts on non-human species specific environmental recommendations unlikely Environmental Protection

34. comprehensive approach to the study of the effects on, and protection of, all living matter develop a system of radiological protection that includes protection of nonhuman species interpret basic knowledge of radiation effects in species other than humans develop a small set of primary reference fauna and flora Reviews/revisions of environmental protection system as new knowledge develops ICRP Approach toEnvironmental Protection

35. Detection and Interdiction for Public Protection From Terrorism

37. A Significant Issue • A dirty bomb explodes • The important medical concern is rapid first aid to the injured • Contamination issues should not take precedence over medical attention • Turnout gear including respiratory protection should be sufficient

38. Radiological attacks constitute a credible threat RAM sources highly decentralized; little security Radiological attacks not likely to result in significant radiogenic fatalities Major impact is widespread contamination evacuation of large areas possible social/economic costs related to relocation and demolition Source: J Fed Amer Sci March/April 2002 Radiological Terrorism and Security

39. Reduce access to radioactive materials material recovery and storage licensing, security, inspection Early detection development and implementation of radiation detection systems Effective disaster response protection of first responders, hospital personnel and victims cleanup of radiological contaminated areas Radiological Terrorism and Security

40. R&D Needs(1) Aggressive development/commercialization requiring no new discoveries • Handheld radiation monitor-locator-identifier • Unattended portal monitors • Improved vehicle presence and velocity sensors • Identification and tracking subsystems • Automatic, real-time triage with smart alerts to remote centers • Gamma-ray and neutron passive detection improvements • Modularization (both hardware and software)

41. R&D Needs(2) Strategic enhancements likely dependent on new research • Low-cost, large-area detectors with identification • Detection over huge areas • Active probes and detection with imaging • Automation aids for rapid strip searches of containers, etc.

42. Current Challenges in DevelopingRadiation Protection Guidance Multiple federal regulations and agency responsibilities require coordination -- Committee on Interagency Radiation Research and Policy Coordination (CIRRPC): 1985-1994 -- Interagency Steering Committee on Radiation Standards (ISCORS): 1995-present -- Interagency Memoranda of Understanding (e.g., NRC/EPA MOU on cleanup of radioactively contaminated nuclear sites signed in October 2002)

43. Basis of Radiation Protection Guidance -- Collaboration of radiation policies and practices in the United States and harmonization with international guidelines -- Assessment of adequacy of radiation protection guidance for specialized applications of ionizing and non-ionizing radiation (e.g., in medical procedures and wireless telecommunications) -- Extrapolation of laboratory observations on low-dose radiation effects to potential health effects in humans Future Radiation protection Goals (1)

44. Operational Radiation Safety -- Operational safety in manufacturing, educational and research facilities and procedures -- Management of disposition of radioactive solid materials, especially from regulated nuclear facilities Radiation Protection in Medicine -- Safety of diagnostic and therapeutic medical and veterinary procedures and facilities -- Dose control and quality assurance in diagnostic procedures, brachytherapy and high-dose radiotherapy procedures Future Raradiation protection Goals (2)

45. Environmental and Radioactive Waste Issues -- Remediation, management and risk assessment for radioactively contaminated materials, nuclear sites and ecosystems -- Strategies for radioactive and mixed waste reduction and for minimizing environmental releases -- Regulatory aspects, performance assessments and quantitative criteria for radioactive releases to the environment and for waste transport and disposal Future Raradiation protection Goals (3)

46. Meet Specialized Needs in Radiation Protection -- Advice on dose limitations and effective public communication in radiological terrorism events -- Guidance to protect individuals with the risk of high occupational exposures -- Updated analysis of radiation exposures of the United States population -- Recommendations on training needs in radiological health sciences -- Mechanisms for improving public communication of radiation protection policies and practices Future Scientific Goals (4)

47. Reference • Thomas S. Tenforde, Role of the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements on Providing Guidance for Radiation Health Protection, 35th National Conference on Radiation Control, May 4-7, 2003 • Roger H Clarke, THE EVOLUTION OF THE SYSTEM OF RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION: ICRP ECOMMENDATIONS, Conference of Radiation Control Program Directors, 35th National Conference on Radiation Control, Anaheim, CA, 4 - 7 May 2003 • Kenneth L. Mossman , Bridging Radiation Science and Policy: Challenges for Radiation Protection in the 21st Century, AAAS Symposium: Toxic Agent Exposure and Human Health Protection, 13 February 2004, Seattle, WA • Richard V. Osborne, Robert S. Landauer, “Are the Proposed Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection, Taking Us in the Right Direction?”, 49th Annual Meeting of the Health Physics Society, Washington, DC, 2004 July 11-15