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Beyond Authentication Don’t Trust, Just Verify

Beyond Authentication Don’t Trust, Just Verify. Eran Tromer. BRCMF Inaguration Ceremony 21 Nov 2013. Talking about…. Chinese counterfeit chips causing military hardware crashes […]

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Beyond Authentication Don’t Trust, Just Verify

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  1. Beyond AuthenticationDon’t Trust, Just Verify Eran Tromer BRCMF Inaguration Ceremony 21 Nov 2013

  2. Talking about… • Chinese counterfeit chips causing military hardware crashes • […] • Component failure reports from defense contractors worldwide, including Boeing, Raytheon, BAE, Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed […] and investigations have turned up a significant number of counterfeit parts, sometimes installed in mission-critical systems. • Principles • trusting devices • Things • People authenticating users

  3. Side-channel leakageEven if the software and hardware function correctly… probing optical power electromagnetic acoustic microarchitecture

  4. Talking about… policies andalgorithms • Principles • trusting devices • Things • People authenticating users

  5. The challenge Create general techniques to ensure integrity and confidentialityin computation done bycomponents and parties that are untrustworthy, faulty, leaky&malicious. The approach: modern cryptography

  6. Integrity of computation: SNARKs(SuccintNoninteractive Arguments of Knowledge) v=DB[x]; w=func(v,y); return z; x DB,y Verify z proof Current prototype: The correct execution of arbitrary C programs can be verified in 5 milliseconds using 230-byteproofs.

  7. Integrity via Proof-Carrying Data m3 m1 m6 mout m4 m2 m7 m5 • Diverse network, containing untrustworthy parties and unreliable components. • Impractical to verify internals of each node, so give up. • Enforce only correctness of the messages and ultimate results.

  8. Integrity via Proof-Carrying Data (cont.) Every message is augmented with a proof attesting to its compliance” with a prescribed policy. Compliance can express any property that can be verified by locally checking every node. Proofs can be verified efficiently and retroactively. m33 m11 m66 moutout m44 m22 m77 m55

  9. Proof-Carrying DataIntegrity for distributed computation Implementation underway.Seeking practical impact.

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