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Circuit City Cessna 560 Pueblo, CO February 16, 2005

Circuit City Cessna 560 Pueblo, CO February 16, 2005. Dr. Daniel Bower Aircraft Performance. Overview. Types of icing environments- SLD Accident aircraft performance Cessna 560 modified stall warning system De-ice boot activation Automatic mode for de-ice boots

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Circuit City Cessna 560 Pueblo, CO February 16, 2005

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  1. Circuit City Cessna 560Pueblo, COFebruary 16, 2005 Dr. Daniel Bower Aircraft Performance

  2. Overview • Types of icing environments- SLD • Accident aircraft performance • Cessna 560 modified stall warning system • De-ice boot activation • Automatic mode for de-ice boots • Previous icing recommendations

  3. Part 25 Appendix CContinuous Maximum 97-99% LWC SLD 40µ 15µ MVD

  4. Effect of SLD on ice accretion Wing leading edge cross section Appendix C Direction of flight SLD

  5. Front Edge of Wing Rough Ice

  6. Altitude Time History Gray ice mentioned De-ice boots operated Clear ice mentioned Stall PUB

  7. Accident Airplane Relevant Speeds 114 Approach speed in icing 90 Accident Stall Speed 86 “Ice” Stick Shaker 81 “Ice” Stall Speed Clean Stall Speed 76 Knots

  8. Accident Sequence • Airplane slowed below Vapproach • De-ice boots not operated in second icing layer • Presence of an estimated 1/6 of an inch or less of ice accreted in SLD conditions caused the airplane to stall prior to stick shaker • Airplane entered a rapid left roll • Airplane did not recover in the 1,500 feet agl available

  9. Stall Warning modifications • 1996 - In response to 3 accidents in icing conditions FAA performed flight testing with artificial 1/2-inch ice shapes. • Ice Shape generated using one App C condition • Larger droplets not considered • Resulted in modifications to stall warning system to increase stick shaker speed in icing conditions

  10. De-ice Boot Operation • 1998 – NTSB issued Rec. A-98-91 to activate deice boots upon entering icing conditions • FAA issued NPRM for several airplanes including the 560. • Cessna used results from 1996 flight tests with 1/2-inch ice shape to request withdrawal of NPRM • FAA withdrew NPRM

  11. De-ice Boot Operation • Current company and manufacturer guidance states boots should be operated when ice is 1/4- to 1/2-inch thick, and AFM states • “early activation of the boots may result in ice bridging on the wing” • Deice Boot Bridging – Ice in the shape of an inflated deice boot forms as the boot is cycled, which cannot be removed by subsequent cycles

  12. De-Ice Boot Bridging - Recent research • 1997 Deice Boot Bridging Workshop • FAA AC 25.1419 (2004) • Recent research by FAA No evidence that modern turbine powered airplanes are at risk for bridging Total number of accidents investigated by the Board related to bridging = 0

  13. Automatic boot cycle • Bridging is no longer a valid reason to allow a buildup between boot cycles • Research by FAA indicates residual ice is not as detrimental as intercycle ice • Manually operated boots can lead to excessive intercycle ice buildup in high workload situations

  14. Revised Icing Certification • Upgrade aircraft icing certification criteria to include SLD(A-96-54) • Research into effects of in-flight icing, including intercycle and residual ice(A-98-92) • All de-ice boot aircraft certified for icing should be subject to revised icing criteria

  15. Summary • Airplane slowed below approach speed • Deice boots were not operated during approach • Airplane encountered supercooled large droplets • Caused a thin, rough ice accretion with large aerodynamic penalties • Stall warning was inadequate • Ice accretions used to determine the stall warning margin were not representative of the most detrimental

  16. Summary • Deice Boots bridging is not a concern • Warrants activation of deice boots upon entering icing conditions • Warrants development of system for automatically cycling of deice boots • Icing certification standards • Need to be updated based on accident history and recent research, and applied to all deice boot equipped aircraft

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