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Functionalism and the Mind-Body Problem

Metaphysics of mind. Substance: needs no other thing to existDualism: there are two sorts of substance, mind (or soul) and matterMental properties are properties of a mental substanceMaterialism: there is just one sort of thing, matterMental properties are properties of a material substance. Men

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Functionalism and the Mind-Body Problem

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    1. © Michael Lacewing Functionalism and the Mind-Body Problem Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk

    2. Metaphysics of mind Substance: needs no other thing to exist Dualism: there are two sorts of substance, mind (or soul) and matter Mental properties are properties of a mental substance Materialism: there is just one sort of thing, matter Mental properties are properties of a material substance

    3. Mental properties Substances can have different sorts of properties Property dualism: mental properties are not physical properties Type identity theory: mental properties are physical properties Thinking a thought is exactly the same thing as certain neurones firing

    4. Reduction Ontological reduction: the things in one domain (e.g. mental things) are identical with some of the things in another domain. Reduction: this makes the ‘reduced’ domain more intelligible

    5. Multiple realizability Mental properties cannot be identical to physical properties because the same mental property can be ‘realized by’ different physical properties, e.g. the brain states that relate to pain are different in different species, but pain is the same mental state.

    6. Functionalism The property ‘having the function x’ can be realized by many different things, e.g. being a mousetrap, being a poison Mental properties/states are functional properties/states - if a physical state plays a certain causal-functional role, then it is a mental state Token identity: each mental state is nothing more than a physical state (playing a certain function)

    7. Consciousness Can consciousness be reduced to functions? The issue of ‘qualia’ Inverted spectrum Absent qualia: the Chinese mind Feelings aren’t functions Replies could a state play exactly the functional role of pain and not feel like pain? Feelings are not just functions, but depend on physiological properties as well

    8. Consciousness Appealing to physiology undermines multiple realizability. The point is: feelings can’t be reduced to anything else - property dualism

    9. Searle’s Chinese Room Functionalism can’t distinguish a real mind from a simulation The Chinese room: input, output, rulebook Reply: wrong causal-functional roles identified; understanding is nothing more that interaction, but more complex than this

    10. Mental causation Causation requires things to ‘happen’. ‘Things happening’ are events. A cause and its effect are both events, changes at a time (or over time) in the properties of objects. Like picking up the remote control

    11. Properties and causes Events cause their effects in virtue of certain properties and not others. Is it because of its physical properties or because of its mental properties that a mental event causes its effects? The mental (functional) property is explained in terms of the causal powers of the physical properties

    12. Picturing the problem

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