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MTTR & Spare Policy for the LHC Injectors & Exp . Areas

MTTR & Spare Policy for the LHC Injectors & Exp . Areas. MAGNETS FOR SPS & BEAM LINES. MTTR & Spare Policy for the LHC Injectors & Exp . Areas. SPS & BEAM LINE MAGNET SYSTEMS For the LHC. SPS as LHC Injector : Overview of the Complex.

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MTTR & Spare Policy for the LHC Injectors & Exp . Areas

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  1. MTTR & Spare Policy for the LHC Injectors & Exp. Areas MAGNETS FOR SPS & BEAM LINES

  2. MTTR & Spare Policy for the LHC Injectors & Exp. Areas SPS & BEAM LINE MAGNET SYSTEMS For the LHC

  3. SPS as LHC Injector : Overview of the Complex • SPS as LHC injectorincorporates: • TT10 Beam Transport Tunnel fromPS extraction (TT2) to SPS Injection Point in Sextant 1 • SPS Main Ring • TT40/TI8 Injection Tunnel for the LHC Beam 2; • TT60/TI2 Injection Tunnel for the LHC Beam 1; • 13500 m of BeamLines • 2200 MagneticElements on the LHC way • In addition, 809 Magnetsinstalled in the NorthExp. Area & in the CNGS

  4. 3515 Magnets for the SPS Complex (80 families) Beam Transfer & NorthExp. Area: SpecificReliability & Spare issues adressedduring PS/SPS Days on 24.01.2007. (1) Mixed Use Specific to SPS NorthExp. Area & CNGS Specific to SPS Main Ring & Injection Lines

  5. MagnetTechnology in Use SPS Main Dipole MBB SPS: SeparatedFunction Machine 108 FODO Periods 744 BendingDipoles TI2 & TI8: similarprinciple(Halfcells of 4 dipolesbetweenfocussing/defocussingquadrupoles) MagnetTechnology: LaminatedSteelYokes H ShapedDipoles Welded Structures Water Cooled Copper Coils(excl. Air CooledOrbit Correctors) Fibreglass/Epoxy Insulation

  6. Reliability / Ageing Problems • Failuresrequiringmagnet exchange + overhaul: • Vacuum Chamber(Leaks) • CoilInterturn Short Circuits • Short-Circuit (CoilwithYoke) • Waterleak (Erosioninduced) • Ageingproblemsrequiringpreventive replacement: • Degradation of the soft shimming, inducingcoilmovements. (fatigue on vacuum chamberinsidedipoles, fatigue on coilconductorinsidequadrupoles)

  7. Spare Policy • AboveThreshold: Policy of havingcontinuousmagnetrebuildactivitieswith minimum spareunitsavailable. • Large stock of coils + vacuum chambers • Refurbishment of radioactive coils • Machining of radioactive components Thresholddetermining the need of Refurbishment Workshops. Based on the Return of Experience (REX) Reliability of the equipment • BelowThreshold: Policy of havingenoughspares for the expectedlifetime of the complex Existingfacility for rebuildat CERN Facilitydiscontinued or interrupted

  8. REX Reliability of the SPS Dipoles • 744 Main Dipoles in operationsince 1975 • 76% are still in operation as installed (567 magnets) Infant Mortality End of Life Wear Out Failure Rate Λ(t) Useful Life Time t • The reliability of the SPS magnetsisrelatively good (>99 %/year) and relatively stable over the past 33 years. • Need to understand the evolution of failure rates and the effects of preventive replacements (BathtubCurve for eachmagnet component)

  9. REX Reliability of the SPS Dipoles (II)

  10. Impact of Magnet System Failures • Limited Impact: • No cryogeny, no explosive gas, no pressurizedvessels, few flammablematerials,… • LowRisk of severeinjury or of loss of life (heavyhandling, high voltage) • Risk of contamination is not significant • Moderate Impact: • exposure of personnel to radiation • production of radioactive waste (damaged components) • Possible major impact: Scientific Program

  11. Mitigation of Failure Impact • Impact of magnetfailures on the Scientific program canbemitigated by: • Reducing the failure rate • Extending the lifetimeexpectancy of the components • preventive exchange of magnetsduringshutdowns • RequiresMagnetRebuildFacilities • Bymeans of specific curative actions once a problemisdetected • Requires a consolidation fund • Minimizing the MTTR . • MTTR follows the dictates of the cool down time (remanent radiation levels), of the method of access for the heavyequipment, of the distance for the transport & of the restoration of the vacuum in the sector. • Minimizing MTTR canconflictwith the reduction (mitigation) of the exposure of the personnel to radiation.

  12. MTTR: Interpretation & Objectives M - T - T - R Minimum Time To Repair Maximum Recovery MeanRespond Replace

  13. MTTR: Return of Experience • Breakdowns in SPS Complex : • 2006: 35 interventions (27 in Target & North Areas), 4 magnetsexchanged • 2007: 26 interventions (13 in Target & North Areas), 5 magnetsexchanged • Objectives: remainbelowactualstatistics (hereunder)

  14. Conclusions • Sparemagnets are available: no specificriskdetected on the way to LHC for most of the magnetfamilies • SPS main magnetsremainour top priority and require • A close monitoring of the performance • An earlydetection of a possible accumulation of faults (waterleaks + shorts + vacuum faults) It is vital and itwillrequireimmediate action • To have sparecoils and/or refurbishedcoilsavailable • Otherlargelypopulatedmagnetfamilies (MBIs, MQIs for TI2 & TI8) willrequire • To assesssoon the reliability of the new design and determine the need of new refurbishment workshops Erosion inducedWaterleaks Coil Shorts

  15. Annex: Identifiedotherpotentialrisks • Failure of AssociatedAncillary Equipment would have an important impact: • SPS Main Busbar system (4x SPS circumference), poweringdipoles and quadrupolescouldstillsuffer a major damage (as in 1983, flashover). Mitigation: rawmaterialisavailable, estimated MTTR<2weeks • Water-CooledCables, linking Power converters in surface with the underground SPS main busbar system, and TI2 and TI8 MBI Dipolescouldsuffer a breakage of the innercoolingductleading to waterleaks & electricalinsulationfailure (as in 1993 for SPS, and in 1998 for LEP) ( No mitigation solution ?) • Magnet Installation Vehicles, using modern electronic and software controlledwillrequirespecial maintenance in the future. Those are the onlyvehicles able to install/removemost of the magnets (and the TED dumps) in the Tis, in the CNGS but also in the LHC Main Ring

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