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Japan and Taiwan

Japan and Taiwan. Pushing the Limits Brian Bridges. Legacies of History. 1. First step in Japanese colonial empire: - modernity but exploitation - ‘Japanization’ but Taiwanese consciousness stimulated

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Japan and Taiwan

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  1. Japan and Taiwan Pushing the Limits Brian Bridges

  2. Legacies of History 1. First step in Japanese colonial empire: - modernity but exploitation - ‘Japanization’ but Taiwanese consciousness stimulated 2. 1952 Japan-ROC Peace Treaty – tourism and trade 3. ‘Nixon shock’ and Japanese recognition of PRC – strategic and economic concerns

  3. Informal Relations • Economic and human ties remained, even though diplomatic set-back for Taiwan • Japan kept ‘working relations of a non-governmental nature’, using Japan Interchange Association as ‘embassy’ • Politicians’ contacts between Kuomintang (KMT) and Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)

  4. Taiwanese Dynamics (I) • Rise of locally-born Taiwanese within KMT, leading to Lee Teng-hui becoming President – strong personal links to Japan • encouraged economic and cultural links with Japan • charm offensive

  5. Taiwanese Dynamics (II) • From 2000, Chen Shui-bian as President – nostalgic view of Japan from pro-independence supporters (DPP) - more ‘assertive’ approach to pull Japan to Taiwan’s side, even suggesting a Japanese version of the US’s Taiwan Relations Act and a ‘semi-strategic partnership’ – shared - Taiwanese public’s preference for status quo but with more international space

  6. Quietly Up-grading Relations • Politicians and officials visiting each way more frequently and at higher level of seniority • From 2003 Interchange Association in Taipei formally celebrated Emperor’s birthday • Unofficial defence/military contacts through ‘academic’ conferences

  7. The Japanese Approach • After 1972, Japan pursued ‘official’ relations with PRC and ‘unofficial’ relations with Taiwan (ROC). • Japan promoted a ‘one China’ policy, but was reluctant to sign up to the so-called ‘three nos’ • Japan had no wish for Taiwan to be absorbed into PRC, but did not want to be directly entangled

  8. Japan’s Interests in Better Contacts (I) • ‘Pro-Taiwan’ politicians within LDP rising to greater prominence • Decline of ‘pro-PRC’ opposition parties (and new major party, Democratic Party, also favourable to Taiwan) • Japanese sympathy for Taiwanese democracy • Trade/investment benefits from Taiwan market for Japanese companies rising

  9. Japan’s Interests in Better Contacts (II) • Japanese media more active – and growing popular Japanese interest in Taiwanese food and tourism • Greater concern about peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits – wake-up call of 1995-96 crisis – 1997 guidelines for Japan-US defence cooperation – 2005 Japan-US statement – pushing against the constitutional limitations

  10. Limitations and Constraints (I) • The China factor For PRC a strengthened Japan-Taiwan relationship encourages Taiwanese independence tendencies – warnings to Japan not to ‘cross the line’ in contacts Sino-Japanese relations becoming increasingly complex and during Koizumi era characterised by ‘economically hot, politically cold’ – but Japan needs China market more ?

  11. Limitations and Constraints (II) • The US factor Influence of US Asian policy on Japan’s foreign policy – US wishes to maintain a balance across the Taiwan Straits and does not want to see either Taiwan or PRC (or Japan) upset that situation Any military confrontation across the Straits would bring in Japan – bases on Japanese soil would be used by any US forces involved

  12. Japanese Policy Perspectives Form of ‘quasi-alignment’ with Taiwan - Japan wishes to show support for Taiwan, but not in such an unambiguous manner that Taiwanese expectations are of Japanese support in any circumstances - No alliance despite both sides sharing a common ‘adversary’ and a close relationship with a common fourth power

  13. Two Sides of the Same Coin? • In March 2006, Chen said that Taiwan-Japan relations were at their closest since the two sides broke official relations in 1972. • The previous April (2005) a senior Chinese official said that Sino-Japanese relations were at their lowest level since 1972.

  14. Going Forward Domestic change in both Japan and Taiwan - Abe – pragmatism and power (‘normal’) - March 2008 Taiwanese presidential elections (Ma and KMT to win?) – ongoing debate on Taiwanese ‘identity’ Chinese leaders’ perspectives - cannot allow Taiwan to ‘slip away’ US presidential changes (US-China tension?)

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