Saburo Onodera Flight Crew Training Dept ., Japan Airlines

1. Prevention of Volcanic Ash Encountersin the Proximity Area BetweenActive Volcanoes and Heavy Air Traffic Routes Saburo Onodera Flight Crew Training Dept., Japan Airlines

2. Contents 1． Miyakejima Ash Encounter (Aug.18th,2000) 2． Indirect Factors of Encounter 3． Lessons Learned and Proposal

3. Miyakejima Ash Encounter(Aug.18th, 2000)

6. Cloud Top at FL 460 Explosive Eruption on Aug.18th，2000

7. Miyakejima Volcanic Events • 0802z Explosive Eruption begins. • 0930zB747 encounters VA at FL340 • 0932zB737 encounters VA at FL360

9. Significant Damage Found on B747 ① 3 engines were seriously damagedand replaced at Narita. ②The remaining engine was also damaged and replaced at the next scheduled check. ③The windshield was damaged and replaced.

10. Why Aircraft VA Encounter Could Not be Prevented ？The Need to Review the Respective Actions / Information at the Actual Time of Encounter

11. Actions - Pilot - ATC (Air Traffic Control) Controller Available Information - VA Transport and Dispersion Forecast - SIGMET,VAA, etc.,

12. Pilot Action (B747 Case) 　① Requests ATC to deviate VA area. 　② Inadvertently encounters VA at FL340. ★ St.Elmo’s Fire. ★ Cockpit Smoke ★ VHF Noise 　③ Immediately reduces engine power. 　④ Descends to FL310 to escape VA. 　⑤ Lands safely at Narita Airport.

13. MAIN POINT WHY did the pilot encounters VA despite ATC instructions?

14. ATC Controller ActionATC Instructions ATC vectored pilots to the furthest easterly route, believing it was the safest course of action. However, the route gradually became invaded with volcanic ash, and ATC could not provide effective radar vectoring.

15. WHY ?

16. - Congested Route Area - Limited Options - Timely Information

19. ③ Available Information (1)VA Transport and Dispersion Forecast (2)SIGMET, VAA

20. (1)VA Transport and Dispersion Forecast Forecasts were issued and updated fre- quently well before the eruption began. However, the forecast was not accurate enough to satisfy the needs for the area, where options for route selection were very limited.

21. VA Forecast Transport and Dispersion Model 1000UTC 0900UTC ★ EncounterPoint (by Tokyo VAAC) by Tokyo VAAC

23. (2) SIGMET and VAA (An extract) 0802zExplosive Eruption begins. (live broadcast) 0812z VA report“VA at or above 5000m,・・” 0818zVAA No1“Plume Top FL190” 0825zSIGMET 1“Top FL190 MOV UNKNOWN” 0840zSIGMET 2“Top more than FL400 Drifting to E – SE, INTSF”(Pirep) 0925zVAA No3“Top FL460. Outlook・・”　（Sat Pic) 0930z B747 encounters VA at FL340 0932z B737 encounters VA at FL360

24. (2)SIGMET, VAA Reports • Timing of issue ・・・・・・・・・・swift and quick ( issued more than 1 hour before encounter) • Contents of Information・・・good as a whole altitude of VA・・・・・ ・・・・・included moving direction of VA ・・included moving speed of VA・・・・ not included at first area of contamination・・・ not included at first

25. Why was the VA Moving Speedand Areaof Contamination Missing inSIGMET ? Satellite imagery was not made immediately available after observations.It takes time before the satellite data can be distributed to respective users. Lack of timely critical information had a great impact on ATC’s decision making process.

26. Similar Volcanic Ash Encounter Cases The Izu-Oshima Volcanic Encounter on 21st November,1986

27. Izu-Oshima Volcano Eruption at 0723z(Left)and0743z(Right) on 21st Nov. 1986. (Photo by H. Kamata)

33. VA Encounter Could Not be Prevented (1)Even with much more available information than 14 years ago. (2)Even with substantial lead time before the encounter.

34. 2. Indirect Factors of Encounter

36. Indirect Factors of VA Encounter at Miyakejima Volcano Eruption ① Difficulty of Predicting Explosive Eruptions. ② Long Lasting Nature of Volcanic Activity leads to ⇒Decreased Sense of Danger ③ Complacency

37. 3. Lessons Learned and Proposal

38. “Whythe Encounters Could Not Be Prevented?” Direct Causes ① Lack of Timely Critical Information. e.g. The Moving Speed / Contaminated Area. Accurate VA Forecast. ② Delay of Positive Decision Making at ATC. e.g. Airspace was closed after encounter.

39. “Whythe Encounters Could Not Be Prevented?” Indirect Factors ① Difficulty of predicting explosive eruptions. ② Long Lasting Nature of Volcanic Activity. ③ Complacency.

40. Lessons Learned • Accurate and timely informationon the area of volcanic ashis critical. • In an area where Air Traffic is congested near Active Volcanoes,ATC decision making on “Volcanic Ash Avoidance” is crucial . • We do have lead time before Encounter.

41. Proposed items to be studied (a) More ATC Initiatives and Reliable Forecast (b) Education and Training (ⅰ) Basic Knowledge of VA Encounters (ⅱ) Practical Knowledge on VA Avoidance (c) Simulated Volcanic Eruption drills

42. I would like to conclude my talk by thanking thosepeople who are contributingto the prevention of volcanic ash encounter.Thank You.

45. Miyakejima Volcanic Eruptions in 2000 08 JUL. (by NHK TV) 14 JUL. (by S. Nakada.)

46. Miyakejima Volcanic Eruptions in 2000 10 AUG. ( by S. Nakada.) 14 AUG. ( by S. Nakada.)

47. The Major Eruptions on 18 AUG., 2000 (by Yomiuri Newspaper.) (by Nikkei Newspaper.) (by Asahi Newspaper.)

48. The Major Eruptions on 29 AUG., 2000 ( by T. Shimano.)( by T. Shimano.)

49. Eruptions on 09 and 10 SEP., 2000 09 SEP. ( by O. Oshima.) 10 SEP. ( by S. Nakada.)

50. Volcanic Activities After One Year(2001) 09 JUL. 2001 ( by M. Tsukui.) 09 JUL. 2001 ( by M. Tsukui.)