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Biosecurity in the International Futures Programme of the OECD www.biosecuritycodes.org. David B. Sawaya OECD International Futures Program Matrahaza, Hungary May 13, 2006. A Global Outreach. OECD Member Countries. Countries/Economies Engaged in Working Relationships with the OECD.
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Biosecurity in the International Futures Programme of the OECDwww.biosecuritycodes.org David B. Sawaya OECD International Futures Program Matrahaza, Hungary May 13, 2006
A Global Outreach OECD Member Countries Countries/Economies Engaged in Working Relationships with the OECD
What is the International Futures Programme? • Established in 1990 • Provides the OECD with early warning of emerging issues, pinpoints major developments, and analyses key long-term concerns to help governments map strategy
A number of forces are modifying the risk landscape Driving forces • Demography • population growth, ageing, migration, urbanization • The Environment • climate change and its impact on natural disasters and infectious diseases • Technology • connectedness, technological change • Socio-economic Developments • concentration, income disparities, shifts in regulation capacities
Major Recommendations Research has led to a number of recommendations for action: Adopt a new policy approach to risk management. Develop synergies between the public and the private sectors. Inform and involve stakeholders and the general public. Strengthen international co-operation. Make better use of technological potential and enhance research efforts.
Trends in Bioagent cases (20th century) Source: W. Seth Carus, “Working Paper: Bioterrorism and Biocrimes” (Center for Counter-proliferation Research, National Defense University, Feb 2001 Revision of 1999)
Risk Issues For Biotechnologies- Dual Use Technologies - • How do we maintain an open democratic society and maintain security at the same time? • How do we maintain scientific openness? • Can we even effectively control dual-use equipment, materials, and information? • What measures need to be taken to assure the public that the desired level of security has been achieved?
Conference on Responsible Stewardship of the Life Sciences • Meeting in Frascati, Italy in September of 2004 • 55 participants from government, academia, industry, public research organizations, scientific societies, and the science publishing field • Discussion of how to achieve a balance between scientific freedom and security concerns
What behaviour patterns for what tools? • A spectrum of individual behaviour is the object of oversight tools: • Psychopathic, sociopathic, criminal (national laws, treaties) • Negligent or thoughtless (laws, guidelines, principles) • Right-minded professionals with a narrow view of the consequences of their work (voluntary codes)
Creating Tools for Managing Oversight • Formal treaties, agreements or arms control conventions among governments • ex: Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention • Consensus pacts among voluntary partners to the agreement • ex: Australia Group export control program (non-binding)
Tools for managing oversight • National Legislation • ex: Japan’s Infectious Disease Law (2003), US Patriot Act (2001), Singapore’s Biological Agents and Toxin Bill (2005) • Informal agreements among individuals or non-state actors • ex: Codes of Ethics, Codes of Conduct, Guidelines, Principles
Codes of Conduct • Target Audience: scientific communities, research funding agencies • Mechanism: raise awareness of problem, provide guidance on professional best practice • Utility: one tool among others to address the issue of dual-use
Why use Codes? • To raise individual scientists’ awareness of their personal responsibilities • To ensure funding agencies and administrative oversight bodies of common approaches to potential problems • To reassure the public
What are the problems with Codes? • A sense of ownership by individuals (who drafted the Code?) • What measures of enforcement do Codes have? If none, how useful are they? • What sanctions are foreseen if code is not followed?
What should a Code look like? • Avoid national, regional or cultural preoccupations • It should be drafted with specific communities in mind • It should provide both professional standards and an means to empower teams to act to enforce the Code
Frascati Conclusions • The impact of existing security systems on delivering the twin goals of protecting science and the public in an age of terrorism need to be further evaluated. • There is a need for a more transparent and better informed debate to consolidate existing activities, including through the provision of a more comprehensive information resource. • Existing regulatory frameworks need to be bolstered with self-regulation measures .
Biosafety vs. Biosecurity • Need to establish a common international understanding of key terminology • In English the difference is often poorly understood and the term biosecurity is used in a number of different ways: • for protection against non-native species in Oceania • as protection of livestock from infections in rural communities • the protection against the malicious misuse of pathogens in the security community)
Biosafety vs. Biosecurity • Problem in translating the terms into other languages: • In many languages the distinction between safety and security does not exist. • This clearly represents a problem when translating biosecurity and biosafety, and may pose a serious problem when attempting to compare legislation across borders. • OECD’s network and non-member connections to survey the ways in which the two terms are translated into other languages (inter alia – French, Italian, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, German)
Open Question:Are Codes Effective? • There is very little no consensus as to the efficacy of codes because evidence is scattered and poor • Post studies on the effectiveness of self regulatory mechanisms, in the life sciences and other domains, at curbing intentional and unintentional misuse of resources. • A new web forum allowing users to discuss experiences in implementing and using codes of conduct and other voluntary regulatory agreements in the life sciences and other areas.
