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This document outlines the latest updates to the Lemonade drafts for IETF 66, detailing significant adjustments such as changing time intervals from hours to minutes, removing compression and encryption, and updating to the latest METADATA draft. Key changes include mandatory support for dynamic attributes, hidden Vfolders from legacy clients, and the propagation of ACLs from underlying mailboxes. The notification protocol is also revised to cater to challenged TCP environments and offers new headers for enhanced security and compliance.
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Updates on Some Lemonade drafts for IETF 66 Stéphane H. Maes, stephane.maes@oracle.com Ray Cromwell, ray.cromwell@oracle.com
WITHIN • Time interval changed from hours to minutes per consensus
CONVERT • Remove compression and encryption • Updated to use latest METADATA draft • Added IANA registration templates for entries and parameters used by convert
VFOLDER • Most options removed • Dynamic attribute support mandatory • Vfolders hidden from legacy clients mandatory • LISTEXT mandatory • APPEND support mandatory • ACLs propagated from underlying mailbox • VFOLDER created on VFOLDER defined to be AND of search criteria
Notifications • Examples now use latest METADATA draft • CLEARIDLE replaced in favor of IMAP-EVENTS • XEMN notification format extended with event name and view name attributes • View filter revised to state high level requirements as several draft proposals are vying to satisfy notifications (VFOLDER, CONTEXT, SIEVE notifications)
Notification Protocol • Abstract protocol for notifications based on Parlay X (2.0) multimedia messaging
TCP Challenged Environments • Focus on environments with poor or no TCP (set-top, J2ME, satellite) • Added examples of challenged environments • Discussion of possible IMAPURL usage for delay tolerant satellite networks • New X-HTTP-Binding header to facilitate enterprise/administrative domain policy enfrocement
XENCRYPTED • Rewritten as informative to describe security problem of operator proxies • Suggested ways of limiting exposure reusing existing end-to-end encryption (S/MIME, OpenPGP,etc)