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ECO 436

ECO 436. Telecommunications Auctions. Why are Auctions Superior?. Auctions maximize benefits to consumers by assigning licenses to the parties that value them most highly and fostering efficient spectrum use Auctions minimize wasteful private expenditures in obtaining licenses.

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ECO 436

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  1. ECO 436 Telecommunications Auctions

  2. Why are Auctions Superior? • Auctions maximize benefits to consumers by assigning licenses to the parties that value them most highly and fostering efficient spectrum use • Auctions minimize wasteful private expenditures in obtaining licenses

  3. Why are Auctions Superior? • Auctions increase competition with existing services • Auctions are fair, objective, open and transparent processes. • Auctions of spectrum licenses can raise substantial revenue for the public.

  4. Misconceptions • Auctions will raise the price of telecommunications services • Auctions will reduce the investment in telecommunications services • Auctions will lead to the monopolization of the spectrum. • Small businesses will be unable to compete in an auction • Auctions undermine the public trustee concept of spectrum management

  5. 700 MHz Band Auction • 698-806 MHz band • 1,099 total licenses • Scheduled to commence on January 16, 2008

  6. Auction Details • Anonymous Bidding • intended to reduce the potential for anticompetitive bidding behavior • Package Bidding for C Block Licenses But Not for A, B, D, and E Block Licenses.

  7. Activity-Based Formula to Determine Minimum Acceptable Bids • Ai = (C * Bi) + ((1-C) * Ai-1)Ii+1 = smaller of ((1 + Ai) * N) and MXi+1 = Ii+1 * Yi • whereAi = activity index for the current round (round i)C = activity weight factorBi = number of bidders submitting bids on the licenses in the current round (round i)Ai-1 = activity index from previous round (round i-1), A0 is 0Ii+1 = additional percentage for the next round (round i+1)N = minimum additional percentage or floorM = maximum additional percentage or ceilingXi+1= additional dollar amountYi = current price estimate (CPE) for the license from the current round(The CPE for a license is the provisionally winning bid, unless there is aprovisionally winning package bid covering the license. See Attachment C for more information on CPEs.)

  8. Example • C = 0.5, N = 0.1, M = 0.2 • Round 1 (1 bidder submitting bids, CPE = $1,000,000) • 1. Calculation of additional percentage for round 2: • A1 = (0.5 * 1) + (0.5 * 0) = 0.5 • I2 = The smaller of [((1 + 0.5) * 0.1) = 0.15] and 0.2 (the maximum additional percentage) • = 0.15 • 2. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the additional percentage for round 2 (using I2 • from above): • X2 = 0.15 * $1,000,000 = $150,000 • 3. Minimum acceptable bid amount for round 2 = $1,150,000

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