Intrusion Detection Systems By Ali Hushyar
What is an intrusion? • Intrusion: “any action or set of actions that attempt to compromise the integrity, confidentiality or availability of a resource” Heady et al.[Ku95] • Intrusion types • External penetrations • Internal penetrations • Misfeasance
Preventing Intrusion • Authentication • Access Control • Firewalls • Vulnerability Patching • Restricting physical access • Intrusion Detection Systems
Principles • Assumptions about computer systems [D86] • Actions of processes follow specifications describing what the processes are allowed to do • Actions of users and processes have statistically predictable patterns • Actions of users and processes do not have command sequences aimed at compromising system security policies • Exploiting vulnerabilities requires an abnormal use of normal commands or instructions.
Principles • Intrusion detection: determine whether a user has gained or is trying to gain unauthorized access to the system by looking for abnormalities in the system. • IDS Analysis Approaches • Anomaly detection • Distinguish anomalous behavior from normal behavior • Misuse detection • Detect intrusions based on well-known techniques
Static Anomaly Detection • File integrity checkers • Part of system is to remain constant (e.g. system code and data) • Detect anomaly by comparing current system state to original system state • Representation of system state • Actual bit strings • Signatures of bit strings (hash functions) • Meta-data “selection masks” on file or inode fields such as size, access permissions, modification timestamp, access timestamp, user id, group id, etc…
Tripwire
Static Anomaly Detection • Virus checkers • Look for virus signatures in system files or memory • Actual virus bit strings are stored in database • Self-Nonself • Like Tripwire, part of system is static • Like virus checkers, it is necessary to maintain set of unwanted signatures • Human immune system
Static Anomaly Detection • Create Self (example from [F84]) • Represent system state as single static string 00101000100100000100001010010011 • Split string into substrings of size k 0010 1000 1001 0000 0100 0010 1001 0011 • Create Nonself • Generate random substrings of size k 0111 1000 0101 1001 • Censor by comparing substrings to those in Self 0111 0101
Static Anomaly Detection • Size of Nonself affects probability of detecting anomalies and computational load • Probability of detection can be configured • Generating Nonself is expensive but monitoring system is cheaper • Tripwire comparisons • Does not depend on meta-data • Will not detect deletion of files
Dynamic Anomaly Detection • Real world examples (logins, credit-card use) • System behavior defined as sequences of events that are recorded by OS logs and audit records, application logs, network monitors and other probes • Base profiles are created for each entity to be monitored that characterize normal behavior for that entity • Current profiles are built by monitoring system events and deviations from base profile are measured
Statistical Models • Each profile consists of set of measures • Measures depict activity intensity, audit record distribution, categorical, and ordinal measures • Measures can be seen as random variables • Profiles do evolve over time so aging of measures or changing statistical rules take this into consideration
Statistical Models • Operational/Threshold Model • Measure is deemed abnormal if it surpasses fixed limits imposed on the measure • Mean and Standard Deviation Model • Mean and standard deviation of previous n values are known. A confidence value for the new measure can be determined. • Multivariate Model • Better conclusions can be made by taking into consideration correlations of related measures.
Statistical Models • Clustering Model is an example of a nonparametric statistical technique • Data is grouped into clusters • Example from [B03]
Statistical Models • Combining individual measurement values to determine overall abnormality value for the current profile • Let Si be the recorded values of each measure Mi. Then combining function [KU95] can be weighted sum of squares:
Statistical Models • If individual measures Mi are not mutually independent then more complex combining functions will be needed Bayesian Statistics • Ai is 0 or 1 depending on whether Mi normal or anomalous respectively [KU95]
Models based on Sequences of Events • Markov Process Model • Given the present state, past states of a system have no influence on future states • Next state relies only on present state • Non-deterministic systems mean that there are transition probabilities for each state • Given an initial state, an event that transitions system to a state of low probability is taken to be anomalous
Time-based Inductive Learning • Sequence of events: abcdedeabcabc • Predict the events: R1: ab c (1) R2: c d (0.5) R3: c a (0.5) R4: d e (1) R5: e a (0.5) R6: e d (0.5) • Single out rules that are good indicators of behavior: R1 and R4
UNM Pattern Matching • System behavior defined as sequence of OS routine calls • Entities monitored consist of those processes that run with elevated privileges • Profile consists of legitimate traces which are sequences of OS calls of length k
UNM Pattern Matching • Example from [J00] open read write open mmap write fchmod close • Profile traces with max length 4 open read write open write fchmod close open mmap write fchmod mmap write fchmod close read write open mmap fchmod close write open mmap write close • Later sequence of calls recorded open read read open mmap write fchmod close
Neural Networks • Information processing model based on biological nervous systems like the brain • Different than expert systems in that they have ability to learn • Given a data vector they can either apply what they have learned to determine an output or “recognize” similarity between input data vector and other inputs to determine outputs
Neural Networks (http://www.doc.ic.ac.uk)
Neural Network Intrusion Detector • Identify legitimate user on system • Obtain logs indicating how often a user executed a specific command on a system during different time intervals over a period of several days • Each command is a vector of frequencies • 100 commands = 100 dimensional input vector of command vectors • Train the neural net to recognize specific user
Misuse Detection • Anomaly detectors can be trained not to detect intrusive behavior and often vulnerabilities exploited by known attacks are not patched. • Detecting intrusions based on known techniques or sequences of actions • Intrusion scenario or signature must be formally defined
Rule-based Misuse Systems • Intrusion scenarios are defined as a set of rules • System maintains rule base of intrusion scenarios and fact base of event sequences from audit logs • When fact pattern matches antecedent of rule then a rule binding is established and rest of rule is evaluated
Rule-based Misuse Systems • MIDAS rule example [J00] (defrule illegal_privileged_account states if there exists a failed_login_item such that name is (“root”) and time is ?time_stamp and channel is ?channel then (print “Alert: Attempted login to root”) and remember a breakin_attempt with certainty *high* such that attack_time is ?time_stamp and login_channel is ?channel)
State-based Misuse Detection • Intrusion scenarios are modeled as a number of different states and the transitions between them • Actions of would-be intruders lead to compromised state • Two subclasses: state transition and Petri net • State transition • States form a simple chain traversed from beginning to end • Table for each possible intrusion in progress • For each event processed, if event causes transition then row with next state is added to table • Event that causes a transition to a final state indicates intrusion
Petri Networks • Intrusion states form a Petri net that follow a more general tree structure • Many branches may exist denoting initial states of the intrusion • Unix version 7 mkdir command [B03] mknod(“xxx”, directory) chown(“xxx”, user, group)
Petri Networks mknod(“xxx”, directory) chown(“xxx”, user, group) this[uid] == 0 && File1==true_name(this[obj]) mknod S4 S5 F S6 unlink link chown this[uid] == 0 && File2 == this[obj] S1 S2 S3 this[uid] != 0 && File1 == this[obj] true_name(this[obj]) == true_name(“/etc/passwd”) && File2 = this[obj]
Other Misuse Techniques • Simple string matching (KMP) • Protocol Analysis • Detect attack signatures by taking advantage of structure of network data packets. • Identifying packets by protocol and thus interpreting payload data • Fragmented packets can be reassembled before intrusion analysis
References • [B03] Bishop, M. (2003). Computer Security: Art and Science. • [Kr03]Krishna, S. (2003). Intrusion Detection Techniques: Pattern Matching and Protocol Analysis. • [J00]Jones, A. (2000). Computer System Intrusion Detection: A Survey. • [Ku95]Kumar, S. (1995). Classification and Detection of Computer Intrusions. • [F94]Forrest, S. (1994). Self-Nonself Discrimination in a Computer. • [D86] Denning, D. (1986). An Intrusion Detection Model.