Why do parties matter?

1. Why do parties matter? • They help politicians act collectively in government to produce legislation. • They help mobilize people into politics, especially people who might otherwise not participate. • They help voters resolve uncertainty about electoral options.

2. Why do parties matter? • They aggregate diverse interests and identities into a single, cohesive political front. • They help voters hold politicians accountable for their behavior in government. • They improve the quality of leaders.

3. Explaining the number of parties • Explanation One: Society. Societies that are more diverse and have more cleavages are likely to have more parties. • Why? • People in the same group have common interests and vote in a similar fashion. • Parties play to divisions that have social meaning.

4. Explaining the number of parties • BUT: In most countries, there are far more divisions in society than there are parties. Not all divisions get translated into the party system. • Our explanation for party systems therefore must go beyond social diversity.

5. Explaining the number of parties • Explanation Two: Institutions. The rules of the electoral system profoundly shape party systems. • Electoral system has two parts: electoral formula and district size.

6. Explaining the number of parties • Electoral formula: how votes get translated into seats. • Majoritarian: the party winning the majority of votes wins all the seats. • Plurality: the party winning the most votes wins all the seats. • Proportional representation: seats are allocated according to the percentage of votes won.

7. Explaining the number of parties • District magnitude: the number of seats up for grabs. • Single member districts: one seat up for grabs. • Multi-member districts: multiple seats up for grabs.

8. Explaining the number of parties • Most countries have one of two combinations: • Plurality rule plus single member districts, or SMP. • PR plus multi-member districts. • Voting in SMP systems is candidate based. • Voting PR systems is party based. Voters vote for party lists, not individuals.

9. Explaining the number of parties • Duverger’s Law: SMP systems tend to produce two parties, PR systems tend to produce more than two parties. • The generalization of DL is Cox’s M+1 Rule: the number of parties in a district will be bounded by the number of seats up for grabs in that district. • Empirically speaking, Duverger’s Law is well established. So what’s behind it?

10. Explaining the number of parties • Two components: one mechanical, one psychological. • The mechanical component: SMP rules are tough on small parties. A party can win lots of votes yet fail to win seats if its votes are not concentrated.

11. Explaining the number of parties • Hypothetical example: A country with three parties (X,Y,Z) and 3 districts. • District 1: X wins 60%, Y wins 10%, Z wins 30%. X WINS SEAT. • District 2: X wins 10%, Y wins 60%, Z wins 30%. Y WINS SEAT. • District 3: X wins 51%, Y wins 1%, Z wins 48%. X WINS SEAT. • Overall, Z wins NO SEATS, even though it won at least 30% of the vote. OUCH!

12. Explaining the number of parties • Psychological effect: • The psychological effect exacerbates the mechanical effect of SMP rules. It kicks in when voters abandon parties they think will be disadvantaged. • This implies strategic voting (voting for your favorite from amongst the set you think has a chance of winning) versus sincere voting (voting for your absolute favorite).

13. Explaining the number of parties • An example: There are 3 candidates (X,Y,Z) running for a single seat. Your preference ordering is: Z>X>Y. But you believe that Z has no chance of winning the election. The real race is between X and Y. What do you do? • Sincere voter: you vote for Z anyway. • Strategic voter: you vote for X, because it is the lesser of two evils.

14. Explaining the number of parties • Thus, SMP rules tend to produce 2 parties. • In contrast, PR allows a large number of parties to win seats. Consequently, voters are less concerned about wasting votes. PR systems are therefore associated with a proliferation of parties.

15. So what? • More parties => fragmentation. • In parliamentary systems, this forces coalitions or minority governments. Good because inclusive, bad because unstable. • In presidential systems, this can created severe divided government and deadlock, which can be bad. • More parties => More choice, “better” representation.

16. So what? • Two parties => moderation, less polarization. • Polarization: divergence between parties. • Too much polarization: winning or losing elections assumes a “life or death” significance. This can be destabilizing because people will do anything do avoid losing.

17. So what? • The Median Voter Theorem: In a two party system, both parties have strong incentives to compete for the median voter. Thus, political competition produces moderation, even if the electorate itself is polarized. • In contrast, there are no such incentives in multiparty systems. Any polarization in the electorate gets translated into the party system.

18. So what? • So, the number of parties influences fractionalization, representation, and polarization. All of these things in turn may relate to stability. Hence, electoral rules, through their effect on the number of parties, can have a potent impact on democracy.

19. Critiques • The same rules can produce very different outcomes! Example: the Netherlands and Israel. Very similar rules, both have large party systems, but Israel’s is about twice the size of the Netherlands. • Other aspects of the party system (distribution of support, volatility of voting) might matter at least as much or more.

20. Critiques • How much do the rules explain about voting in South Africa? • Electoral system: national list PR. Very proportional. Could support a huge number of parties, so why are there only 7? • Why does the ANC always win 2/3’s of the vote? Why so skewed? Why so stable? Not a function of the electoral rules. • To understand these outcomes, probably also need to look at society, in particular, significance of race to voting.

21. Conclusion • It is the interaction between institutions and social cleavages that ultimately shapes outcomes. We need to understand both.

22. Overview: Explaining Democratic Instability • Cultural Explanations • Liberalism • Civic Culture • More generally, a wide-spread acceptance of democracy as the “real” rules of the political game. • Institutional Explanations • Pres/Parl debate • Party systems • Economic Explanations • Modernization theory • Economic Crisis

23. Explaining the Collapse of Weimar • Weimar Republic: 1919-1933. • Germany was economically developed and had a thriving “civic culture.” So how do we explain the collapse of democracy?

24. General Background: 1919-1933 • Weimar was born in 1919, following the defeat of Germany in WWI. • At the time, Germany was relatively economically developed. • 19th Century: rapid industrialization • Urban, educated population

25. General Background: 1919-1933 • However, Germany never-the-less faced large challenges . . . • Economic challenges: • Reparation payments strained the economy • Inflation raged: In 1923, it reached 26 billion percent (!?)

26. General Background: 1919-1933 • Social/cultural challenges: • People were not convinced of democracy’s value. Liberal norms were not fully established in the population. • Public opinion was polarized between the extreme right and the extreme left. • Add to this: institutional (state level) challenges.

27. General Background: 1919-1933 • System was neither presidential nor parliamentary, but an awkward combination of both. • Both president and parliament (Reichstag) were elected by popular election. • President selected cabinet, which came from parliament and was headed by PM (Chancellor). • Both parliament and president could dismiss Cabinet. President could dismiss Parliament. • Chronic and intense conflict between branches. Unstable cabinets. Frequent elections.

28. General Background: 1919-1933 • The party system was based on PR rules and was highly fragmented. • Coalition governments were the norm. They were highly unstable. • The power of small parties was magnified. • No incentive to compete for the median voter, so the party system reflected the underlying polarization of preferences in society.

29. General Background: 1919-1933 • Given economic, socio-cultural, and institutional factors, it is not surprising that politics were highly conflictual. • November 1923: Hitler’s Beer Hall Putsch. Easily contained, but speaks to general instability.

30. General Background: 1919-1933 • Beginning around 1925, Weimar stabilized. “Golden era.” • Economy improved • Political tensions eased • Institutional instability persisted, but it was less threatening.

31. General Background: 1919-1933 • Late 1920s: economic crisis returns. • 1929: Wall Street crashes. • German unemployment escalates: terrifies German middles class, who fear the rise of Communism.

32. General Background: 1919-1933 • The rise of Hitler and the Nazis • Ideological appeals: Hitler portrayed himself as the one who could stop Germany’s economic and political decline. • Nazis were incredibly organized on the ground. • Nazis: 2% of the vote in 1928, 18% of the vote in 1930. 18% of the vote was enough to be a power broker in fractionalized party system.

33. General Background: 1919-1933 • Institutional problems came into full flower: • No stable coalition in parliament. Open conflict between executive and legislature. President began issuing laws “over the head” of the Reichstag. • In 1932, Paul Von Hindenberg beats Hitler and wins re-election to presidency. To stave off conflict, he appoints Hitler as chancellor in January 1933. Once in power, Hitler moves to shut down democracy.

34. The Rise of the Nazis in Northeim • The Nazis exploited class tensions. Democracy resulted in the rise of the Social Democratic Party, which the middle class hated. The Nazis portrayed themselves as the opposition to the SPD. • The middle class had luke warm feelings about democracy to begin with. • The Nazis were extremely organized on the grass-roots level.

35. The Rise of the Nazis in Northeim • Class tensions and organizations were not alone sufficient: up until 1929, the Nazis were very small. • What pushed the middle class into the arms of the Nazis? Economic crisis. By 1932, the party had a majority in Northeim.

36. The Rise of the Nazis in Northeim • NOT a lack of social capital or civic culture • 161 clubs in Northeim, 1 for every 60 people. • Highly participatory population: turnout rates in elections ranged from 94 to 97 percent.

37. Implications for theories? • Cultural factors • Putnam’s social capital argument is challenged. Not only did social capital not prevent the rise of Hitler, it may have actually facilitated it. • Perhaps it’s not the level of social capital, but the type. Bridging social capital may be key. • Liberal norms were not fully entrenched in the population – this may also have been important.

38. Implications for theories? • Political factors • Entrepreneurial skills of the Nazis, the charisma of Hitler => probably important. • Weimar’s institutions amplified and exacerbated social tensions, rather than helping to manage them.

39. Implications for theories? • Economic factors • When the economy was good, Weimar functioned in spite of its tensions. • When the economy was bad (Great Depression), the tensions proved impossible to manage. • So, not economic development in this case, but economic crisis very important.