US Military Transformation

1. US Military Transformation Andrew F. Krepinevich Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 22 April 2003

2. Presentation Overview • How did we get here? • What is transformation? • Why transform the world’s best military? • How do militaries transform? • What are the critical barriers to change?

3. Background • Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy (1988) • The RMA Assessments (1992-93) • The National Defense Panel (1997) • The Citadel Speech (1999) • The Quadrennial Defense Review (2001) Fleet Problems XII (1932) and XIX (1938)

4. What is Transformation? Why Transform? Transformation can be thought of as innovation on a grand scale undertaken by a military that believes major changes are occurring in the character of conflict that will produce a dramatic boost in military capabilities within a relatively short period of time. These changes can either be in the form of newly emerging challenges—or prospective major opportunities—in the ways that military operations are conducted. Thus . . . Transformation can be viewed as a process by which a military organization exploits a military revolution, either out of opportunity or necessity

6. Principal Geopolitical “Drivers” of the FSE • The Rise of Great Regional Powers • Shift from Europe to Asia • Impact of transition to the information age • Growth in relative importance of non-state actors

7. Principal Military-Technical “Drivers” of the FSE • Major discontinuity in military competitions • Characterized by the emergence of new forms of competition (e.g., LRPS, Space Control, Information Warfare), the transformation of existing forms of competition (e.g., power projection, air superiority, strategic strike), and the empowerment of small groups • Major change in the metrics of military effectiveness • Coming Age of Limited War? Ambiguous Aggression? • Heightened uncertainty--increased potential for miscalculation and surprise

8. Elements of Transformation • Vision linked to new warfighting concepts at the operational level • New performance metrics • Institutionalization • Experimentation—especially field exercises at the operational level • Modernization strategy

9. The Vision Thing “The goal of modern strategy will be to achieve a decision with highly mobile, highly capable forces, before the masses have begun to move.” General Hans von Seeckt “A small, high-speed carrier alone can destroy or disable a battleship alone . . . . [A] fleet whose carriers give it command of the air over the enemy fleet can defeat the latter. [Consequently], the fast carrier is the capital ship of the future.” Admiral William Sims “[I] don’t think it is even faintly realized– the immense impending revolution which the submarines will effect as offensive weapons of war. . . . The oil engine will govern all sea-fighting, and all sea-fighting is going to be governed by the submarine.” Admiral Jackie Fisher

10. The Challenge The German Army Restoring operational mobility to the battlefield The U.S. Navy Extended-range operations without forward bases The Royal Navy Littoral sea control v. subs, mines and torpedoes Fleet action against long-range torpedoes Commerce defense against critical mobile targets

11. Key Emerging Challenges • Power projection in an anti-access environment • Littoral sea control in an area-denial environment • Urban control and eviction • Nuclear state failure • New forms of maritime blockade

12. Key Emerging Challenges • The “death of distance” and homeland defense • Space control • Information warfare at the strategic and operational level as an independent form of warfare • The “nuclear shadow” • ?

13. U.S. Military Opportunities • Highly distributed, highly networked operations • Multidimensional, extended-range precision strike • Multidimensional strategic strike • Information warfare at the operational level of war • Ability to pursue multiple warfighting options (complexity and diversity) • Potential to compete based on time • ?

14. Relative Decrease Deterrence Containment Relative Increase Damage Limitation Active Defense Pre-Emption Preventive Attack Dissuasion Shift in U.S. Defense Posture

15. Performance Metrics “The desideratum of all . . . is Speed! Your fools don’t see it--they are always running about to see where they can put on a little more armour! to make it safer! You don’t go into Battle to be safe! No, you go into the Battle to hit the other fellow in the eye first so that he can’t see you. Yes! you hit him first, you hit him hard and you keep on hitting. That’s your safety!” Admiral Jackie Fisher “[I]t takes 108 planes to carry as many large torpedoes as one squadron of destroyers an 1,200 to carry as many large bombs or large projectiles as one battleship.” US Naval War College Manual, 1940

16. Institutionalization • The problem of brief tenure • Attracting a critical mass of senior leaders • Clearing a path for the next generation “I have in my drawer letters from 24 Captains and Commanders, the very pick of the service, in favor of the scheme. I prefer these 24 opinions of the coming admirals, who are going to command our fleets and administer the Admiralty, to any 24 admirals now existing but who are passing away.” Admiral Sir John (“Jackie”) Fisher First Sea Lord, Royal Navy

17. Institutionalization • Finding an institutional home “For the sake of the USN and the US [of] America--let’s get a Bureau of Aeronautics--as p.d.q. as possible . . . If we don’t get that bureau next session, Gen’l Mitchell and a whole horde of politicians will get an ‘Air Ministry’ established and the US Navy will find itself lying in the street . . . and the procession marching over it . . .” Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske

18. Field Exercises and Experimentation • Narrowing the range of uncertainty • Buying/creating “options” • Complicating the planning of potential competitors “The one all pervading, absorbing thought is to get in first with motor ships before the Germans! Owing to our apathy during the last two years they are ahead with internal combustion engines! They have killed 15 men in experiments with oil engines and we have not killed one! And a d--d fool of an English politician told me the other day that he thinks this creditable to us.” Admiral Jackie Fisher

19. Field Exercises and Experimentation • Generating and sustaining momentum for transformation • Identifying and solving “practical” problems • Identifying intra-regime shifts “I believe that when we learn more of the possibilities of the carrier we will come to an acceptance of . . . [the] plan which provides for a very powerful and mobile force . . . the nucleus of which is the carrier.” Vice Admiral William V. Pratt Fleet Problem IX

20. Modernization Strategy • Avoid system “lock in”—if you can • “Price Club” approach to modernization • “False Starts” • “Dead Ends” • Promote “Wildcatting” • Keep apace of technological change • Hedge against uncertainty “The first essential is to divest our minds totally of the idea that a single ship type as now built is necessary.” Admiral Jackie Fisher

21. Transformation and Allies • We will almost certainly need them more • The matter of durability and reliability • We will probably want them for different reasons • There needs to be a new division of labor established—more of a layered approach than a niche approach • We need to decide how best to boost ally military capability

22. Some Transformation Myths • It’s the technology, stupid • The 10 percent solution • Once ahead, always ahead • One size fits all • Losers do it best • It always costs more • Evolution, not revolution

23. Some Barriers to Transformation • Success • Low feedback rate • Short tenure of senior leaders • Reliance on old performance metrics • Outdated analytic tools • “Losers” see more clearly than “winners” • Displacement of dominant cultures • Existing capital stock, and “Buy in Bulk” modernization strategies • Defense funding • Societal norms • Uncertainty “It is a love of comfort, not to say sluggishness, that characterizes those who protest against revolutionary innovations that happen to demand fresh efforts in the way of intellect, physical striving and resolution.” General Heinz Guderian, 1937

24. Conclusion • Transformation can be viewed as a process by which a military organization exploits a military revolution, either out of opportunity or necessity • Considerable verbal support exists for transforming the U.S. military -- much of which has yet to be translated into action • Militaries engaged in successful transformation typically approach field experimentation and modernization quite differently than we have in the past—or than we are doing now • There is likely to be more than one transformation path for the United States military -- and for other militaries as well • The United States will need to coordinate its transformation efforts with key allies • Transformations take awhile to play out--often a decade or more; hence the need to act over the near-term, while the opportunity to effect change is likely at its greatest