The Next 50 Years: Space Activities Opportunities and Challenges

1. The Next 50 Years: Space Activities Opportunities and Challenges Ray A. Williamson Executive Director Secure World Foundation Presentation to the World Academy of Arts and Sciences 26 February 2008

2. Our Dependence on Space Applications Much of humanity now depends to some extent on space applications, e.g., Operation of cell phones (precise timing) Position, navigation (GPS) Banking Financial transactions Credit card gasoline purchases Natural resources management Weather, climate predictions E.g., reduced costs for electricity generation Disaster mitigation and response

3. The Space Activities Opportunity Private spaceflight and tourism are in development, e.g., Virgin Galactic, Bigelow Aerospace, EADS Astrium Science research and exploration from space Advances in weather and climate prediction Advances in space weather prediction (effects of the sun on technological systems) Advances in knowledge of the universe

4. BUT…. Outer space is a harsh, unforgiving environment Objects in orbit tend to stay in orbit (Newton’s Laws) Orbital speeds are very high (~7 km/sec in low Earth orbit) Space weather (X-rays, high speed solar particles) can interrupt satellite operations

5. The Space Security Challenge Increasing crowding in some key orbits Increasing amounts of orbital debris Space weather effects Use of space weapons threaten space environment

6. Orbital Crowding • Evolving orbital space activities are leading to crowding in some key orbits: • Polar orbits (Earth observation satellites) • Geosynchronous orbits (communications satellites)

8. Orbital Debris • Increasing amounts of debris in Earth orbit are becoming significant safety hazards to spacecraft • The Chinese Anti-satellite test in January 2007 added about 2500 pieces of “trackable debris” (>10 cm) • Today, some 18,000 objects > 10 cm orbit Earth (including operational satellites) • Even tiny pieces of debris can cause significant damage to a working spacecraft because impact velocities can exceed 10 km/sec.

9. Debris Cloud Evolution Cloud of debris of size greater than 10 cm after 15 minutes Debris cloud after 10 days

10. Working Satellites (Green) and Chinese Asat debris cloud (red)

11. The Way Forward • Limiting creation of new debris • UN Copuos resolution to limit debris adopted by General Assembly, October 2007 • But voluntary only • Additional controls on creation of debris needed • Mandatory within States? • Research needed on methods to clean up existing debris

12. The Way Forward • Develop an international cooperative approach to “Space Situational Awareness,” the ability to know where working spacecraft and major debris are at all times • Currently, only the United States has a well-developed SSA capability; many of those data are classified • Steps by Europe, Russia, and China to develop SSA systems may stimulate U.S. interest in a cooperative approach

13. The Way Forward • Develop a Space Traffic Management (STM) system—to prevent satellite-satellite and satellite-debris collisions • STM should be established and operated according to internationally-agreed upon policies, regulations, and rules • Could be a well-defined code of conduct • One possible model as a starting point is the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

14. TRAFFIC

15. Potential Policy Issues • Legitimacy of STM organizational body to implement and enforce rules • Limitations on freedom of action by all actors • Reluctance to share data because of privacy and competitive concerns • Arenas for arbitration and legal recourse

16. Space Weapons—the Ultimate Concern Development and use of space weapons, including anti-satellite devices, threaten current and future space activities

17. What is a space weapon? • “A space weapon is an “object“ that is designed, tested or used to destroy or disrupt other objects in space or on Earth“

18. Potential Space Weapons • Space-to-Space (S2S) Systems • Maneuvrable „Kill Vehicle“ • MicroSats and co-orbital ASATs • Laser and Microwaves • Space-to-Earth (S2E) Systems • Metal Rods and Maneuvrable Reentry vehicles • Earth-to-Space (E2S) Systems • BMD- Kill Vehicle and • HE-Laser • Nuclearexplosion at high altitude • Transatmospheric air/space planes

19. Old Space ‘Weapons‘ US and USSR U.S.: Air Launched Miniature Vehicle (ALMV) USSR:Hunting Satellites (“Killer Sat.”– Istrebitelny Sputnik [IS] Target of IS (DS-P1-M, armoured) F-15-Asat‘ Source:www.fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/almv.htm Early version of IS Source: www.russianspaceweb.com/is.htm

20. Trajectory of the ASAT Interception First stage trajectory G. Forden http:// web.mit.edu/stgs

21. Chinese ASATTest • The Chinese FY-IC SAT (880kg) was hit by a kill vehicle at 856 km with v=7.42 km/s • This was the first ASAT test in 20+ years • The head on collision is comparable to the US MD Kill vehicle • After 2 weeks the US SSN observed ~500 fragments >10 cm; So far ~2500 pieces have been tracked, but there are ~2000 larger pieces, which might stay several decades in space • This is an increase of space debris in 850 km alt. of 28% • The test has increased the chances of an equatorial SAT being hit by 50 % • A “chain reaction “ at 900 km might be possible in the future

22. U.S. A-Sat Test • National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO) satellite: USA-193 (NROL-21) – failed to reach its proper orbit and was falling out of orbit • U.S. used modified Raytheon-built RIM-161 Standard Missile used for antiballistic missile tests to destroy it • “President Bush ordered the action to prevent any possible contamination from the hazardous rocket fuel on board”, NYTimes, Feb 15, 2008

23. A-Sat Test—Debris Issues • USA-193 strike took place Feb. 22 when satellite was about 210 km high; models estimate that: • 50% of debris washed out immediately (estimated) • 99% within 1 week • Fits UN guidelines on space debris (Dec. 2007) • Nevertheless, the test provided considerable technical information that will be of enormous interest to the U.S. ballistic missile engineers • Negative reaction from many U.S. analysts and some countries • Concern that this is a covert A-Sat test • Upset space stability and the long term space sustainability

24. U.S. Asat Simulation

25. What might be done? • Military Solutions: • Passive defense: hardening, maneuvring • Active defense: Defensive SATS, deny access to space • Diplomatic solutions: • Strengthening existing treaties (OST) • Additional protocol • OST Review Conference • “Codes of conduct”/ Confidence Building Measures • Comprehensive ban on ASAT or SWs

26. Thanks http://www.secureworldfoundation.org