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The Problem of Abortion: Essentially Contested Concepts and Moral Autonomy

The Problem of Abortion: Essentially Contested Concepts and Moral Autonomy. Susanne Gibson. Traditional Abortion Argument. The traditional abortion argument has three main positions: the conservative, the liberal and the moderate.

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The Problem of Abortion: Essentially Contested Concepts and Moral Autonomy

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  1. The Problem of Abortion: Essentially Contested Concepts and Moral Autonomy Susanne Gibson

  2. Traditional Abortion Argument • The traditional abortion argument has three main positions: the conservative, the liberal and the moderate. • The Conservative position argues that the fetus has a right to life from the moment of conception or shortly there after. • The Liberal position argues that the fetus has no right to life until sometime after it is born. • The Moderate position argues that the fetus has a right to life at sometime between conception and birth.

  3. Traditional Non-Feminist Debate • Gibson argues that the traditional debate over the morality of abortion is irresolvable. • This means that there will never be a clear winner and that one side will never be able to persuade the other side. • The reason for this gridlock on the issue is that there are certain conceptual disagreement that are also irresolvable and on which the outcome of the debate depends. • Gibson refers to these concepts as “essentially contested concepts.”

  4. Irresolvable • All of the arguments in the traditional debate rely on the notion of the right to life of the fetus. • The right to life of the fetus depends on the moral status of the fetus, and this depends on how we define the concept of person: What is a person? • Gibson argues that the concept of personhood is an essentially contested concept, and this means that there is no agreement or consensus on its meaning. • Moreover, as long as there is no agreement about the concept of personhood, there will not be a solution to the abortion debate.

  5. Gibson • “The abortion debate, then, becomes a debate not so much over woman’s rights but over foetal moral status, and for this reason, I suggest, it is interminable. Just as foetal rights are grounded on foetal moral status, this status in turn rests on the concept of ‘personhood,’ and this I will show, is an example of what W.B. Gallie terms an ‘essentially contested concept.’”

  6. Essentially Contested Concepts • A term is an essentially contested concept if has more than one use and there is disagreement about its proper use, and there is no one clear definable use. • In addition, it is not enough to define the various uses, because the participants in the dispute do not agree on the various uses either. • The participants disagree about the use of the term and they each have coherent and convincing arguments that support their use of the term. • Therefore while the dispute is irresolvable it is also a genuine dispute.

  7. Essentially Contested Concepts • Irresolvable • Genuine • Conditions (I) –(III) state that the concept must be appraisive, signifying a valued achievement of internally complex character. • Condition (IV) states that the achievement in question remains open to modifications in the light of changing circumstances, • Condition (V) states that the contest over the use of the concept is recognized by all parties to the dispute. • Condition (VI) states that there must be an exemplar that the concept refers to and that all disputants embrace as the exemplar (i.e., a well-functioning human adult). • Condition (VII) states that the competition over the use of the concept sustains and develops the achievement of the exemplar.

  8. Personhood • Gibson argues that the concept of personhood within the traditional abortion debate fulfills these conditions, and therefore, is an essentially contested concept. • She concludes, “If the concept of personhood is an essentially contested concept, and it is fundamental to the abortion debate, then that debate is and will remain irresolvable. At the same time, it remains a genuine debate and one with which there is reason to engage. Further, the claim that it is irresolvable does not imply that we cannot reach a conclusion over whether or not women have a right to choose abortion, or over what this right consist in, Indeed, it is my argument that women have the right to choose abortion just because of the essentially contested nature of the concept of personhood.”

  9. Feminist vs. Nonfeminist • The non-feminist perspective of the abortion debate is the traditional one, which focuses on the fetus, its moral status, and its rights. • The feminist perspective of the abortion debate is one that broadens the scope and includes the pregnant woman’s conditions and circumstances as vital to the resolution of the moral issue of abortion.

  10. Feminist Perspective • The feminist perspective puts the woman at the center of the abortion issue. • It also considers the political, social, historical and economic circumstances; it considers the larger context in which a woman finds herself in when she gets pregnant. • For instance, Gibson notes, “In societies in which women are oppressed, and in which women’s options are limited by the structures of patriarchy, abortion becomes a means of responding to the consequences of male domination as well as a means of breaking free from it.”

  11. Feminist vs. Non-feminist • The feminist approach, by putting the woman at the center of the discussion, contextualizes the debate to the particular circumstances of that woman. • This approach resists general abstract thinking to guide the moral decision as it does in the non-feminist approaches. • The unique circumstances of each woman should be taken into account and should have substantial weight in determining the ethical decision on abortion.

  12. Relational account • The feminist approach does not exclude the fetus and its moral status; instead, it intends to provide a relational account, one between the woman and the fetus. • “…the focus is on the relationship between the fetus and the woman. … The ontological and moral status of the fetus is unique in that a fetus exists only in relationship with a particular other on whom it is entirely dependent on for support. It is because of this relationship that the fetus is morally significant, since it is out of this relationship that our moral obligations arise.”

  13. Feminist Account • Feminist, too, can enter into the irresolvable debate. • Remember that even though the concept of personhood is an essentially contested concept, it is also a genuinely disputed concept, and therefore, it is worth our time to continue to attempt to define the concept. • Feminists, therefore, have a definition and meaning for the concept of personhood.

  14. Relational Value: The Fetus is not a Person • Persons are fundamentally relational beings. Personhood should be understood in terms of social relations. • A fetus's relationship with a woman is strictly biological and not social. • Fetuses cannot engage in any form of social relations • Therefore, fetuses are not persons. • Gibson argues that a fetuses do not have absolute value because they have no existence outside of the relationship with the woman

  15. Particularism vs. Relativism • Gibson makes clear that just because every situation is different and the context plays an essential role in making moral decisions, this does not mean that all decisions are correct or free from external evaluation. • She admits to the concept of “moral mistakes” and denies that morality is a private matter. • “The concept of moral mistake implies a set of standards against which the judgment can be assessed external to the woman herself, even if it is the same woman who later comes to think that it is she who has made a mistake. In this respect, it might be said that there is no such thing as a private morality.”

  16. Evaluating vs. Overruling • Gibson also notes that while all moral decisions are open for evaluation, this does not mean that they can be overruled. • Therefore, we can evaluate whether a particular woman has acted morally or not in having an abortion; however, if we decide that she is acting immorally, this does not mean that we have the right to interfere in her having the abortion.

  17. Moral Decisions are not Subjective • There are 2 important issues in understanding Gibson’s notion of morality: (1) Morality is objective, so that when I make a moral decision, I am suggesting that this is not only right for me but also right for others who are in my particular circumstances. (2) Morality and autonomy (freedom) is always and fundamentally relational. This means that as persons we exist essentially in a network of moral relationships and these relationships determine our autonomy, self-worth, self-respect, and our moral responsibility. We are accountable to others.

  18. Liberal vs. Feminist • The liberal understands a woman’s right to an abortion as the right to bodily self-determination. • The feminist understand a woman’s right to an abortion as her right to make a moral decision regarding the continuation of a particular relationship.

  19. Feminist • Feminist conclude that a fetus is not a person based on the fetus’s lack of capabilities for having and sustaining social relations. • “… the feminist account of abortion is reintegrated with the nonfeminist account: the defense of abortion remains an important part of the defense of a particular conception of personhood, and therefore, the feminist and non-feminist theorists are necessarily engaged in the same dispute, broadly speaking.”

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