Implementing SACPA: Orange County’s Experience

1. Implementing SACPA:Orange County’s Experience October 16, 2008ACJR Semi-annual ConferenceChristie Gardiner, Ph.D.California State University, Fullertoncgardiner@fullerton.edu This research was partially funded by National Institute of Justice Dissertation Research Grant, 2007-IJ-CX-0031

2. How did SACPA affect drug offenders and the criminal justice system in Orange County? • Mixed Methods Research • Interviews, Observations, Time Series Analysis • Semi-structured interviews • 60+ practitioners from 14 agencies • Grounded theory approach

3. Ready… Set … Implement! • Pilot Study began March 2001 • Dedicated “Prop36” Court model • Navigated confidentiality & personality issues • Implementation Hurdles • Previous collaborations were a huge benefit

4. Unintended Consequences and Frustration lead Law Enforcement Officers to adopt strategies that circumvent the law • Patrol Officers • Changes in arresting behavior • Narcotics Units • More time spent on surveillance, working other crimes

5. Quantitative data support and refute law enforcement officer’s testimony

6. SACPA changed sentences for O. C. offenders convicted of drug possession offenses

7. Estimated Number of O.C. Drug Possession Offenders Sentenced 2001-2005*, with and without Prop36 as Law * Excluding 2004, due to data issues at the state level

8. Orange County Jail • More arrests  more bookings • Prop36 offenders: More violations, new crimes • CDCR overcrowding affects OCJ • “No noticeable impact.” • -- How can that be?

9. O.C. Superior Court • More pleas at earlier stages • Most cases “re-handled” multiple times • Judges use discretion to order offenders to court • City Attorney’s Office adopted “letter of the law” stance • Public Defender absorbed additional work

10. Probation Department was overwhelmed • 45% of all new cases were Prop. 36’ers • On average, 325 new Prop. 36’ers each month • Staff strain (1:100 caseloads became 1:250)

11. Probation Dept. had to innovate in order to cope • “Co-locate” strategy • Department re-organization • Many offenders “banked” • Petitioned Court to “relieve supervision” responsibility upon completion of treatment • Created “dual diagnosis” caseloads • Assigned misdemeanor cases to HCA

12. Parole Agents navigate the system to achieve their desired outcomes • Agents encourage parolees to waive their rights to Prop36 • Decision to violate or “COP” is complex • Based on expected action by Board • Different funding streams complicates treatment options

13. Summary… Impacts on O.C. offenders • ≈3,400 O.C. drug offenders are diverted from incarceration and receive treatment annually • Unintended Consequences • Net widening effect on arrests • More offenders convicted of misdemeanor drug offenses after being arrested for felony drug crimes

14. Summary: Impacts on O.C. practitioners • Street-level bureaucrats found ways to circumvent law to achieve goals • Intended and Unintended Consequences • Frustrated many practitioners • Changed the makeup & success of drug courts • Spurred major innovation at some agencies • Inadequate funds • Expanded collaborations b/t CJS and Healthcare

15. Lessons from O.C. • Prop36 is not working as intended • Two issues at the heart of the matter • a mismatch between offenders’ treatment needs and the treatment provided by Proposition 36 funds • balancing failure as a part of addiction with the incentives and sanctions that are necessary components of behavior modification programs

16. Suggested improvements • Additional discretion regarding participation • Graduated sanctions • Strengthen treatment component • Additional resources required • Improve communication b/t practitioners at various agencies