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Game Theoretic Model of Censorship Resistance

Game Theoretic Model of Censorship Resistance. Andrei Serjantov University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory. Scenario. P2P censorship resistant network Traditional model: secure or insecure Does not explain the fact that holiday photos are not “censored”

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Game Theoretic Model of Censorship Resistance

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  1. Game Theoretic Model of Censorship Resistance Andrei Serjantov University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory

  2. Scenario • P2P censorship resistant network • Traditional model: secure or insecure • Does not explain the fact that holiday photos are not “censored” • Hence, build an economic model: Attacker derives utility from censoring, publisher derives utility from the fact that his document is available • The conflict between the publisher and the cesnsor

  3. Model • Network of size n • Publisher publishes to number of nodes d, at a cost c(d) • Attacker attacks x nodes, at a cost c(x) • If no copies are available, attacker get U • If one or more copies is available, publisher gets U’

  4. Results • If attacker’s cost is linear, no Nash Equilibria in pure strategies. • If the cost is c(x) = xα , then there are Nash equilibria at d<α • Meaning: publisher publishes to some nodes, some nodes get attacked. • This challenges the traditional model of insecure

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