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Unintentional vs. intentional impacts

Unintentional vs. intentional impacts. No impact strategy. Attacker’s strategy maximizing the expected damage. Basic Definitions. lowest-level part of system, which is characterized by its inherent value, availability and performance distribution. ELEMENT.

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Unintentional vs. intentional impacts

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  1. Unintentional vs. intentional impacts No impact strategy Attacker’s strategy maximizing the expected damage

  2. Basic Definitions lowest-level part of system, which is characterized by its inherent value, availability and performance distribution ELEMENT quantitative measure of task performing intensity of element or system (capacity, productivity, processing speed, task completion time etc.) PERFORMANCE COMPONENT collection of elements with the same functionality connected in parallel in reliability logic-diagram sense

  3. Basic Definitions technical or organizational measure aimed at reduction of destruction probability of a group of system elements in the case of attack PROTECTION action aimed at preventing simultaneous destruction of several elements in the case of single attack (can be performed by spatial dispersion, by encapsulating different elements into different protective casings, by using different power sources etc.) SEPARATION group of system elements separated from other elements (and possibly protected) so that a single external impact destroying elements belonging to a certain group cannot destroy elements from other groups PROTECTION GROUP object that imitates protected group of system elements, but does not contain any element (the total damage caused by the destruction of any false target is much lower than the damage caused by the destruction of any protection group) FALSE TARGET

  4. Defense strategy Separation Damage g Destruction probability Protection v False targets Impact probability p Disinformation

  5. Defense Strategy b g F dF Protection cost for each PG False targets deployment Element distribution among PG Destruction Probability Attack Probability Damage Defense Strategy Cost

  6. Expected damage model Protection vulnerability Attack probability p v g Equipment losses Cumulative performance of the group Expected damage System performance reduction Failures Functional losses

  7. Expected Damage Cost Performance Distribution Functional losses Unsupplied demand Loss of demand

  8. Expected Damage Cost Protections and infrastructure Destruction of false targets Functional losses Elements System destruction Optimal defense strategy Limited defense budget Unlimited defense budget

  9. Single attack strategy p=1/N p p Perfect knowledge about the system p=1 No knowledge about the system Imperfect knowledge about the system p Spi=1

  10. Multiple attack strategy p=1 p=1 p p Unlimited resource Limited resource + perfect knowledge about the system Limited resource + imperfect knowledge about the system p Spi>1

  11. Attacker’s Strategy Single Attack Multiple Attacks Perfect attacker’s knowledge about the system

  12. Attacker’s Strategy Single Attack Multiple Attacks No knowledge about the system Unlimited resource Limited resource (E attacks) Imperfect knowledge about the system

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