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Novel Information Attacks

Novel Information Attacks. From “Carpet Bombings” to “Smart Bombs ”. Motivation. Traditional malware: Developed to create massive computer epidemics At the early stages of epidemics provides plenty of information for attack mitigation Modern anti-virus products:

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Novel Information Attacks

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  1. Novel Information Attacks From “Carpet Bombings” to “Smart Bombs”

  2. Motivation • Traditional malware: • Developed to create massive computer epidemics • At the early stages of epidemics provides plenty of information for attack mitigation • Modern anti-virus products: • Developed for massive attacks leading to epidemics, rather than targeted attacks  • Mainly employ binary signatures to detect malware (viruses, network worms etc.). • The database of binary signatures is ever increasing due to new attacks and mutating malware • Novel malware such as StuxNet worm: • Developed to create single attacks against high value target(industrial and government facilities) • Does not create epidemics thus do not provide data for attack mitigation: the first instance of attack could also be the last instance • The malware is highly specialized for particular environment of the target

  3. Traditional attack Novel targeted attack Attacker Attacker Information for malware analysis and attack mitigation High value target Information for malware analysis and attack mitigation comes too late for the high value target

  4. What do we know about the StuxNet: • Internationally: • Majority of attacks happened in Iran [”W32.Stuxnet Dossier” Symantec Corporation, October 2010] • On July 7 2010, StuxNet might have shut down an Indian satellite that was operated by vulnerable remote terminal units [Jeffery Carr, “Did The Stuxnet Worm Kill India’s INSAT-4B Satellite?”, Forbes.com, September, 2010] • Generally, a targeted attack, such as StuxNet worm represents a threat of a great importance: • The mass utilization of remote and automatic control systems at strategic objects as nuclear power plants, gas and oil production and transportation...  • Such control systems incorporate a large number of interconnected industrial controllers and operator stations…  • Systems that are particularly vulnerable to targeted attacks such as StuxNet worm

  5. D e p l o y m e n t Control electronics (PLC) Process control computer Propagation Activation, execution Erroneous control decisions Actuators Control valves Destructive control actions What do we know about the StuxNet: INTERNET

  6. Our Current Work • Problem : • A new trend in computer attacks is a stealthy targeted attack • These attacks are aimed at high value targets within the national infrastructure that is much more dangerous and much more difficult to mitigate than traditional computer epidemics   • Existing computer security products, by design, fail to prevent targeted, industry oriented attacks.  • The proposed solution: • We propose a new cyber-security technology that detects attacks by identifying and classifying goals of an attacker (malware). • Our technology does not rely on large signature data base that minimizes the use of computer resources and associated costs.   • Our technology addresses both traditional massive attacks and low and slow targeted attacks on industrial and government facilities   

  7. Attacker Detecting potential goals of the attack Observing malicious behaviors Specifying malicious functionalities Specifying malicious functionalities Immunizing high value targets High value target Preventing the attack spread Developing functionality recognition technology Utilizing functionality recognition technology What is done What we want to do Attacker

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