eecs 228a review n.
Download
Skip this Video
Loading SlideShow in 5 Seconds..
EECS 228a – Review PowerPoint Presentation
Download Presentation
EECS 228a – Review

Loading in 2 Seconds...

play fullscreen
1 / 17

EECS 228a – Review - PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • 66 Views
  • Uploaded on

EECS 228a – Review. Jean Walrand www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~wlr. Fall 2002. Topics. Overview Economics of Networks Games Mechanism Design Routing Congestion Control Traffic Models. Overview. Big Picture:. Peering. Core Backbone. Users. Access Regional Metro. Enterprise

loader
I am the owner, or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner, of the copyrighted work described.
capcha
Download Presentation

PowerPoint Slideshow about 'EECS 228a – Review' - ranee


An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript
eecs 228a review

EECS 228a – Review

Jean Walrand

www.eecs.berkeley.edu/~wlr

Fall 2002

topics
Topics
  • Overview
  • Economics of Networks
    • Games
    • Mechanism Design
  • Routing
  • Congestion Control
  • Traffic Models
overview
Overview
  • Big Picture:

Peering

Core

Backbone

Users

Access

Regional

Metro

Enterprise

Campus

overview1
Overview
  • Routing:
    • Slow convergence of BGP after failure
    • No load awareness of OSPF and BGP
    • No QoS
    • Peer-to-peer and other new applications
  • Congestion Control:
    • TCP is poor for large bandwidth-delay product
    • Large queues and retransmissions
    • Poor for wireless
    • Unfair, large jitter, …
overview cont
Overview (cont)
  • Economics:
    • How to make money with this technology?
    • Market and service differentiation?
    • Pricing links, services
  • Traffic Models:
    • LRD – Does it matter?
economics
Economics

Games

Analysis

Design

VCG

Non-cooperative

Cooperative

Nash Bargaining Eq.

Shapley Value

Static

Stackelberg

Repeated

  • Nash Equilibrium
  • Existence
  • Uniqueness
  • Convergence
  • Calculation

Folk Theorem

Prisoners’ Dilemma

Matching Pennies

Cournot

economics papers
Economics Papers
  • R.B. Rosen. “Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Points for Concave N-Person Games.” Econometrica, vol. 33, 1965.

Convex games  Existence of Nash Equilibrium Suff. Condition for uniqueness (SDD)Technique: KT conditions

2. Orda, R. Rom, and N. Shimkin. “Competitive Routing in Multiuser Communication Networks,” IEEE/ACM Trans on Networking, Vol. 1, pp. 510-521, October 1993.

Users choose among parallel links

  • Existence, uniqueness, properties of Nash Equilibrium

3. Y. A. Korilis, A. Lazar, and A. Orda. “Achieving Network Optima Using Stackelberg Routing Strategies,” IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, Vol. 5, No. 1, February 1997, pp. 161-173.

Network manager controls some of the flow and drives the Nash equilibrium to a socially efficient equilibrium

economics papers1
Economics Papers

4. S. Shenker. "Making Greedy Work in Networks: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Switch Service Disciplines," IEEE/ACM Trans on Networking, vol. 3, No. 6, Dec. 1995.

Exponential server shared by different queues. Explores impact of service discipline on equilibrium point (users adjust their rate).

 FCFS is not efficient; Fair share is.

5. Z. Dziong and L.G. Mason. “Fair–Efficient Call Admission Control Policies for Broadband Networks – a Game Theoretic Framework,” IEEE/ACM Trans. On Networking, vol.4, Feb. 1996.

Admission control as a cooperative game. Compare different notions of cooperative equilibrium.

  • Trunk reservation and dynamic reservations approach optimal.
economics papers2
Economics Papers

6. Allan Gibbard, “Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result.” Econometrica, 41(4):587-601, Jul. 1973.

Any nondictatorial voting scheme with at least three possible outcomes is subject to individual manipulation. (One voter getting a preferable outcome to the honest one by misrepresenting his preferences.)

7. Roger Myerson, “Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem.” Econometrica, 47:61-73, 1979

Study of set of feasible expected utility allocations under incentive-compatible mechanisms.

  • Set is compact and convex and includes those achievable by other mechanisms.

8.Roger Myerson, “Optimal Auction Design.” Mathematics of Operations Research, 6:58-73, 1981

  • Revelation Principle
  • Revenue Equivalence Theorem
economics papers3
Economics Papers

9. Wiliam Vickery, “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders,” Journal of Finance, 16(1):8-37, Mar.1961

 (Highest bidder; 2nd highest price) is incentive-compatible

routing
Routing
  • Abhay Parekh
congestion control
Congestion Control
  • Objectives:
    • Efficiency
    • Fairness
  • Key observations:
    • Fairness is in the eye of the users
    • Delay x Gain < K for stability
    • Clever trick: virtual queue
congestion control1
Congestion Control
  • Primal/Dual:
    • Max. sum of utilities s.t. capacity constraints
    • Minimize sum of max. profits
  • Implementation:
    • Variation on Vegas
  • Note: Simple TCP models
congestion control papers
Congestion Control - Papers
  • V. Misra, W. Gong and D. Towsley. Stochastic Differential Equation Modeling and Analysis of TCP Window Size Behavior, Proceedings of Performance'99, October 1999.

Loss rate = f(packet rate); Packet rate = f(loss rate)

  • Solve fixed point

2. G. de Veciana, T.-J. Lee and T. Konstantopoulos.Stability and Performance of Networks Supporting Rate Control. Could the Internet be Unstable?In Proc. IEEE INFOCOM , 1999.

Network load increases -> service rate decreases

  • Stability conditions

3. Chiu and R. Jain, Analysis of the Increase and Decrease Algorithms for Congestion Avoidance in Computer Networks, Journal of Computer Networks and ISDN, Vol. 17, No. 1, June 1989, pp. 1-14.

AIMD should converge to fair efficient equilibrium

4. Frank Kelly, A.K. Maulloo and D.K.H. Tan, Rate control in communication networks: shadow prices, proportional fairness and stability, Journal of the Operational Research Society 49 (1998), 237-252.

Primal/Dual; Implementation of dual with router indications (WPF)

congestion control papers1
Congestion Control - Papers

5. S. Low and D. Lapsley. Optimization Flow Control, I: Basic Algorithm and Convergence, IEEE/ACM Trans on Networking, December 1999.

Generalize Primal/Dual; Study of stability with delays.

6. S. Kunniyur and R. Srikant.End-to-end congestion control: utility functions, random losses and ECN marks, Infocom 2000.

Virtual queue for AQM; Adjust rate of VQ to increase utilization.

7. J. Mo and J. Walrand, Fair End-to-End Window-based Congestion Control, September 1998.

  • max-min is a form of WPF
  • Variation on Vegas solves dual

8. C. Hollot, V. Misra, D. Towsley and W. Gong. A Control Theoretic Analysis of RED, INFOCOMM 2001

Linearize RED dynamics. Show stability if gain x delay < K.

traffic models
Traffic Models
  • Markov  Exp. Tails
  • LRD
  • Important fact: Close loop systemThus model should be - User Activity Behavior - File Size Distribution
current research in our group
Current Research in our Group
  • Smart Networks:
    • Real-time Network management
    • Wireless Ad Hoc
    • E2E CAC
    • Routing
  • Games:
    • P2P
    • Access Price
    • Adjustment of SLAs