introduction overview of seveso directive and safety report requirements n.
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  1. This project is funded by the European Union Projekat finansira Evropska Unija INTRODUCTIONOverview of SEVESO DIRECTIVE and SAFETY REPORT REQUIREMENTS Ike van der Putte PhD Toxicology – EUROTOX registered MSc Environmental Sciences Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Projekatrealizuje Human Dynamics Konzorcijum


  3. Part I HISTORY and BACKGROUND • Flixborough (UK), 1974 • Seveso (IT), 1976 • Bhopal (India), 1984 • Basel (Sandoz), Switzerland, 1986 • Mexico City, Mexico, 1986 • Aznallcollar (ES), 1998 • Baia Mare (RO), 2000 • Toulouse (FR), 2001 • Texas City (USA), 2005 • Buncefield (UK), 2006

  4. Seveso, Italy, 1976 -Manufacture of a bactericide - runaway reaction -emission of TCDD with dioxin -no fatalities, 447 burns, 737 long term evacuations Severe environmental damage Lack of information, no proper emergency plan Flixborough Accident, 1974 Release of 40 tonnes of cyclohexane massive vapour cloud explosion; 28 people killed (all on site). Basic cause was management failure

  5. Bhopal UC plant, 1984 Pesticide (carbaryl) production. Water entered a tank containing 42 tons of MIC. The resultingexothermicreactionincreased the temperatureinside the tank to over 200 °C andraised the pressure. The tank vented releasing toxicgasesinto the Atmosphere. Estimatesvary on the immediatedeathtoll (3000-15000) Sandoz Warehouse on the Rhine, 1986 A major environmentaldisastercausedby a fire anditssubsequentextinguishing at an agrochemicalstorehouse, whichreleased toxicagrochemicalsinto the air andresulted in tons of pollutants entering the Rhineriver. The chemicalscaused a massivemortality of wildlife downstream,

  6. Aznallcollar dam break, 1998 a holding dam burst at the Los Frailes mine, releasing 4–5 million cubic metres of mine tailings. The acidic tailings with high levels of heavy metals, reached the River Guadiana, whichis the main water source for the Deanna National Park, one of the largest national parks in Europe. The cleanup operation: 3 years Estimated cost of €240 million. Baia Mare dam break, 2000 resulted in the river Danube becoming polluted. Waste from gold mining ran into the river all the way to the Black Sea and affected drinking water

  7. EnschedeFirework Explosion, 2000 was the biggest accident seen in Europe in decades. The fireworks factory was based in the middle of the town. It killed more than 20 and injured over 300 people.

  8. Toulouse accident, 2001 An explosion of 300 tons of ammonium nitrate at a fertilizer plant killed 29 people, Texas City accident, 2005 A fire and explosion occurred at in an isomerization unit at the refinery killing 15 workers and injuring more than 170 others

  9. Buncefield accident, 2006 Evidence shows that the mainexplosionprobablyresultedfrom the ignition of a vapourcloudemanatingfrom Tank 912 in Bund A in the Hertfordshire Oil Storage A large fireensuedthatengulfed 21 of the tanks on site.

  10. DATABASE ON MAJOR ACCIDENTS(1984 - 2007) • 603 accidents and near misses reported • ~ 66% due to management failure • ~10% caused environmental damage • ~66 % caused injuries or fatalities eMARS - Major Accident Reporting System Database of "major accidents" reportedunderSeveso, OECD and UN-ECE Managedby the Major Accident Hazards Bureau (MAHB)

  11. DATABASE ON MAJOR ACCIDENTSLESSONS LEARNT • Main cause - inadequate management • Inadequate design and maintenance • Inadequate decisions • Inability to take decisions • Cover-up of safety breaches and “Blame game” approach • Lack of safety culture – “Macho culture”, “Do-it-fast” • Inadequate assessment of the existing hazards and the associated risks

  12. DATABASE ON MAJOR ACCIDENTSLESSONS LEARNT • Main accident risks • Abnormal Operations • Maintenance operations • Start-up or shutdown procedures • Unforeseen weather conditions • Loading/unloading operations • Nightshifts • Inadequate Design & Maintenance Decisions • Bad Installations Design • Inadequate Maintenance & Operation procedures • Inadequate Design of Safety Equipment

  13. Seveso Directive – development related to major accidents ... 1974: Flixborough, United Kingdom 1976: Seveso, Italy 1982: Original « Seveso Directive » adopted (82/501/EEC) 1984: Bhopal, India 1986: Basel, Switzerland 9 Dec 1996: « Seveso II Directive » adopted (96/82/EC) 3 Feb 1999: « Seveso II » must be applied in the Member States of the European Union 30 Jan 2000: Baia Mare, Romania 15 May 2000: Enschede, Netherlands 21 Sep 2001: Toulouse, France 16 Dec 2003: Amendment 2003/105/EC

  14. Seveso I - Objectives Prevention of major accident hazards of certain industrial activities and isolated storage Protection of the public and the environment Provision of information to Authorities Information to the public on risk Collection of major-accident data (No MAPP + SMS explicitly required; focus on info to CA) Lessons learned from major-accidents and the experience from Seveso I was incorporated into the Seveso II Regulations Seveso II

  15. Objectives of Seveso II Control of Major-Accident Hazards (COMAH) involving dangerous substances Improved risk and accident management Land-use planning controls Catch all establishments with sufficient inventory Lays down principles for safety management

  16. Objectives of Seveso II (Continued) Revised Safety Report Domino effects to be considered Public access to information Emergency plans to be revised and tested as necessary Inspection of plants across the EU Member states to provide information to the Commission 2003 – Amendment of Seveso II Broader Scope – Tailing Ponds/explosives/ammonium nitrate Extended requirements for Risk Assessment 2015 – Seveso III

  17. Lower tier plants: 59 installations Accident prevention policy Notification Safety report Accidents protection plan PRELIMINARY LIST OF SEVESO PLANTS SERBIA In totalapprox. 105 installations Upper tier plants: 46 installations Ref. LjiljanaStanojevic 2012

  18. Sevesoplants in Republic of Serbia Upper tier installations Lower tier installations

  19. SEVESO Establishments in the EU a Total number of Seveso establishments in the whole EU in the years 2009 to 2011 (Report from the Commission Brussels, 28.6.2013 C(2013) 4035 final )

  20. Commission Report – SEVESO Establishments (2009 – 2011) Among the 49 activities used to categorize the Seveso establishments, seven activities contribute to 50% of establishments: – Fuel storage (including heating, retail sale, etc.); – Wholesale and retail storage and distribution (excluding LPG); – LPG storage; – General chemicalsmanufacture; – Production of basic organic chemicals; – Power generation, supply and distribution; – LPG production, bottling and bulk distribution.

  21. Number of reported Major Accidents Commission Report 2009 - 20011

  22. Fatalities, injuries and type of major accidents • There is a general reducing trend in the number of fatalities and of injuries reported over the last decade. The total number of fatalities went down from 27 in 2000 to 9 in 2010. In particular there has been no fatality off-site since 2006. The total number of injuries went down from 126 in 2000 to 23 in 2010. • Among the hazardous phenomena involved in the accidents reported in eMARS, toxic release appears to be the most frequent, for every year except 2002, 2003 and 2010, in which explosions and fires occurred more frequently. The main substance categories involved are: • – Toxic: 91 major accidents; • – Extremely flammable: 80 major accidents; • – Very toxic: 53 major accidents.

  23. Seveso III 2012/18/EU • First reading agreement on 27 March 2012 • Adopted 4th July 2012 • Published 24th July (OJ L 197/1) • Entry into force 13th August 2012 • National transposition 31rd May 2015 • Implementation 1st June 2015

  24. Seveso III Main purpose – align scope to new international chemicals classification (CLP Regulation transposing GHS classification) Clarify/improve • Inspections • Information to the public • Public participation • Access to justice Main philosophy Seveso II remains

  25. Why do we need GHS? Substance - oral toxicity LD50 = 257 mg/kg GHS Danger (Skull & Cross Bones) Transport liquid: slightly toxic; solid: not classified EU Harmful (St Andrew’s Cross) US Toxic CAN Toxic Australia Harmful India Non-toxic Japan Toxic Malaysia Harmful Thailand Harmful New Zealand Hazardous China Not Dangerous Korea Toxic

  26. Safe Technology Emergency Planning Safe Management Information to the Public Land-Use Planning Demonstrate safety in the Safety Report Philosophy Seveso I N S P E C T I O N S Accident Reporting and Lessons Learnt

  27. Inspections– Art 20 Inspection plan (National, Regional or Local) covering all Seveso establishments, to include • generalsafety assessment • info on domino-effects • info on particularexternalrisks/hazards • procedures for routine/non-routine inspections • cooperation betweeninspectionauthorities Based on this, competent authority to establish programmes for routine inspections including frequency of site visits

  28. Information – Art 14, Annex V All establishments (also LT) - Annex V information permanentlyavailableelectronically (info to the public) dangerous substances • appropriate behaviour in case of an accident • last site visit (inspection) or electronic reference indication where more info can be obtained upon request UT - inform on main accident scenarios measures UT - appropriate info from external emergency plans UT - inform if establishment close to other Member State

  29. Article 14- Information to the Public:  active provision of information – not just on request! For upper-tier establishments, Member States shall also ensure that: all persons likely to be affected by a major accident receive regularly and in the most appropriate form, without having to request it, clear and intelligible information on safety measures and requisite behaviour in the event of a major accident; Information shall include at least ANNEX V info and supplied to all Buildings and areas of public use (schools, hospitals, neighbouring Establishments)

  30. Public participation – Art 15 Article 15 – sets/refers to detailed procedural rules in relation to participation in land use planning • specific individual projects (rules set) • general plans and programmes (reference to Directive 2003/35/EC) = inform public, duly take into account comments and motivate final decision Article 12(5) - public concerned must be given early opportunity to give its opinion on external emergencyplans

  31. Access to justice - Art 23 Administrative AND judicial review of acts/omissions in relation to requests for any information held under the directive At least judicial review of acts/omissions in relation to cases of public participation on specific individual projects No access to justice in relation to public participation on general plans and programmes/external emergency plans, unless otherwise provided under nationallaw

  32. PART II SCOPE OF THE DIRECTIVE ALL ESTABLISHMENTS WHICH STORE DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES ABOVE SPECIFIC THRESHOLDS Exclusions: • Hazards from ionizing radiation • Transport outside the establishment • Landfills, quarries and mines • Offshore exploration • Military installations

  33. DEFINITIONS A MAJOR ACCIDENT is a major emission, fire or explosion*, leading to serious danger to human health and/or the environment, immediate or delayed, inside or outside an establishment, involving one or more dangerous substances *Resulting from uncontrolled developments in the course of operation of the establishement

  34. DEFINITIONS AN ESTABLISHMENT is the whole area under the control of the operator AN INSTALLATION is a technical unit within an establishment

  35. DEFINITIONS HAZARD is an intrinsic property of a dangerous substance, with a potential for harm RISK Is the likelihood of a specific effect occurring

  36. DANGEROUS SUBSTANCES DEFINITIONS Named Substances e.g. Sulphur trioxide or Substances with certain generic hazardous properties e.g. Flammability The Classification is done according the EU Directives on Classification, Packaging and Labeling (67/548/EEC and 99/45/EC) Now new CLP Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008

  37. THRESHOLDS • Annex I • Two categories based on quantities stored • Lower Tier • Upper Tier • Upper Tier has more responsibilities

  38. REQUIREMENTSLOWER TIER • General Obligations • Notification • Major Accident Prevention Policy • Modifications • Accident Reports • Cooperation with Authorities

  39. OBLIGATIONSUPPER TIER • Lower Tier Obligations and • Safety Report • Internal Emergency Plans • Information to Public

  40. GENERAL OBLIGATIONSOF AN OPERATOR To take all measures necessary to prevent major accidents and to limit their consequences The operator must be able to “demonstrate” that the hazards are identified and all necessary measures are taken

  41. ROLE OF THE COMPETENT AUTHORITIES • Administrative, executive and enforcement responsibilities • Review of Documentation • Inspection • Prohibition of Activity if • Serious deficiencies are present • Documentation inadequate • Preparation and Testing of External Emergency Plans • Identification of possible Domino effects • Implementation of Land-use Policies

  42. DOMINO EFFECTAn accident on one Seveso site could affect neighboring Seveso sites Based on info (notification/SR) or requested by the CA the operators must exchange information and cooperate in the area of risk management, emergency response and public information

  43. MAPPMajor Accident Prevention Policy Designed to guarantee a high level of protection for Man and the Environment by appropriate Means, Structures and Safety Management Systems MAPP consists of • Policy Statement • Safety Management System

  44. MAPPTHE SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM • Organisation and Personnel • Identification and Evaluation of Hazards • Operational Control • Management of change • Emergency Planning • Performance Monitoring • Audit and Review Lower Tier - MAPP is a separate document Upper Tier - MAPP is part of Safety Report

  45. SAFETY REPORTmust contain • Major Accident Prevention Policy • Safety Management System • Identification of Hazards • Analysis and Assessment of Risk • Adequate Prevention/Limitation Measures • Internal Emergency Plans • Information for Land-use Planning Applies to Upper Tier Sites

  46. INTERNAL EMERGENCY PLANOBJECTIVES • Controlling incidents to minimise effects • Implementing protection measures • Communicating information to the Public and the Authorities • Providing for clean-up and restoration of the environment

  47. EXTERNAL EMERGENCY PLAN • To be prepared by the Local or National Designated Authority • The Operator must provide relevant information requested by the Authority • Details of the Plan to be communicated by the Authority to the Operator in order to ensure Compatibility of Internal & External EP

  48. PUBLIC INFORMATION • Information must be made available to the Public to include • The Safety Report • An explanation of site activities • Nature and quantity of dangerous substances • Nature of hazard posed • How the population will be alerted to an accident Applies to Upper Tier Sites

  49. IF A MAJOR ACCIDENT OCCURS • Circumstances of the accident • Dangerous substances involved • Data available for assessing the effects of the accident • Emergency actions undertaken The CA must be informed of

  50. LEARNING FROM EXPERIENCE The Directive requires that Member States and the Commission will exchange information and experience such as - Analysing the causes of accidents - Lessons learned - Measures necessary to prevent recurrence Member States must report data on major accidents to the Commission