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What, me worry? Perceptions of risk and preparedness. Amy K. Donahue (PI) (funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland under Award Number: 2008-ST-061-ND 0001) University of Connecticut Department of Public Policy. Problem.
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What, me worry?Perceptions of risk and preparedness Amy K. Donahue (PI) (funded by the U.S. Department of Homeland under Award Number: 2008-ST-061-ND 0001) University of Connecticut Department of Public Policy
Problem • A primary responsibility of government is to ensure the safety and security of citizens. • Citizens share responsibility for their own protection. • When citizen preparation and government efforts are synchronized, communities are more resilient to hazards. When citizens and governments are not aligned, dealing with disaster is slower and more costly. • People do not understand the risks they face, and are not prepared enough for major disasters.
Approach • Research Questions • What do citizens think and do about risks and preparedness? • How do people’s risk perceptions affect their willingness to pay? • Do public officials understand what citizens think and do about risks and preparedness? • How do people respond to inducements to prepare? • Hypotheses • Public officials differ from citizens in their assessments of risk and preparedness. • Public officials misjudge why citizens act as they do. • Preparedness programs are not aligned with citizen preferences. • Implication • A disconnect could help explain why preparedness programs seem to have been ineffective at improving preparedness.
Problem and Conceptualization • Preparedness decision-making is a function of risk perception: • Risk Portfolio (What is at risk?) • Risk Exposure (How much risk to my portfolio is there?) • Risk Tolerance (How much risk will I accept?) • Risk Orientation (How do I behave in the face of risk?) • Risk Mitigation (What actions do I take? What actions do I want government to take?)
Research Design: National Surveys • Fall, 2009 • National stratified random sample of 1210 U.S. adult household decision-makers • 25 minute telephone survey • Targets: risk perceptions; preparedness priorities; expectations of government; reasons for preparing (or not); scenario-based actions and attitudes; willingness to pay • Fall, 2010 • National stratified random sample of 816 local government officials • 17 minute telephone survey • Targets: personal risk preferences; perception of citizen attitudes and behavior; municipal preparedness levels and priorities • Fall, 2011 • National random sample of ≈1200 U.S. adult household decision-makers • Experimental design with 1 control and 3 treatment groups • 25 minute telephone survey • Targets: risk preferences, preparedness behavior, response to incentives to prepare
Research Design: Case Studies • Cases • Two small communities (population < 20,000) • In the same state (same policy and resource environment) • One town located on the Gulf Coast with hurricane experience • One town located inland without substantial disaster experience • Participants • 253 household decision makers and 44 local officials • Participants were paid $20 to complete the same survey instrument used in the national citizen survey • Participants completed a 2-hour decision-making exercise incentivized by the opportunity to earn cash • Average earnings were $80 for the 2.5 hour study
Analytic Strategy • Part1: Determine whether public officials and citizens appear to agree about individual preparedness • Determine whether officials and citizens concur about the risks they face • Determine whether officials and citizens concur about how prepared people are • Determine whether officials correctly understand how citizens will act and why • Part 2: Rule out competing explanations for apparent differences between public officials and citizens in attitudes about preparedness • Differences reflect biases related to differences in demographic characteristics • Differences reflect biases related to differences in preferences about risks and benefits • Differences reflect biases related to differences in prior experience with disasters • Part 3: Determine what preparedness program designs can be effective • Assess how well local official’s policy choices fit citizen preferences • Assess citizen willingness to pay for public preparedness • Measure citizen responsiveness to alternative inducements to prepare • Assess variation across disaster domains
Conclusions so far • In part, public officials appear aligned with public perceptions. • Identify similar risks, though officials are more concerned about natural disasters. • Similar views of the public’s expectations about the level of support that will be forthcoming from state and federal agencies and nonprofit organizations. • Similar views of the prospects for successful recovery. • In part, public officials see citizens differently than citizens see themselves. • Public officials think people are less well-informed, less likely to take direction, less likely to be self-sufficient, less well prepared overall than people think they are. • Public officials also tend to attribute lack of preparedness to procrastination, denial, or stinginess. • Citizens feel like they don’t have the information they need and are uncomfortable focusing on the possibility of disaster.
Conclusions so far • Even in instances where individual and public officials have similar views, they may have different foundations. • E.g., a top reason people give for not preparing is that they don’t think it will happen to them. A state of denial or a rational assessment? • The fact that public officials are incorrect about what citizens think does not mean that they are incorrect about citizens. • People tend to over-estimate how prepared they are. • This disconnect could help explain why preparedness programs seem to have been ineffective at improving preparedness. • People act based on their perceptions. • Public policies must account for what people think and feel if they are to influence behavior. • Some evidence that policy-makers may make preferred policy choices despite misunderstanding citizen preferences.
Next survey • Objectives • Assess responsiveness to three financial incentives: Cash; A matching grant; A rebate • Assess responsiveness to three distinct inducements: Social pressure; Information; A relevant reward • Repeat core questions from the 2009 survey • Design • 20-25 minute survey • 1200 randomly selected adult household decision-makers nationwide • Quasi-experimental design with three treatment groups and a control group • Response measured by whether respondents will: provide an email address, log on to a web site, follow links to other web sites
Other results in case anyone is interested…. • The following slides show findings about • Why people DO prepare • What they protect • Geographic variation • Attitudes across different disaster scenarios • Willingness to pay • Predicting willingness to pay
Willingness to Pay • The MOST a respondent would be willing to pay per month to improve their community’s ability to respond to major disasters. This might be for things like emergency planning, training, or police and fire equipment.
