When foul play seems fair meritocratic un fairness and dis honesty
Download
1 / 27

When Foul Play Seems Fair: Meritocratic (Un)Fairness and ( Dis )Honesty - PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • 72 Views
  • Uploaded on

When Foul Play Seems Fair: Meritocratic (Un)Fairness and ( Dis )Honesty. Fabio Galeotti (University of East Anglia) Reuben Kline (Stony Brook University) Raimondello Orsini (University of Bologna). Lorentz Center, NorMAS Workshop 2013. Belief in a Just World and Redistribution.

loader
I am the owner, or an agent authorized to act on behalf of the owner, of the copyrighted work described.
capcha
Download Presentation

PowerPoint Slideshow about 'When Foul Play Seems Fair: Meritocratic (Un)Fairness and ( Dis )Honesty' - piper


An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation

Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author.While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server.


- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - E N D - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Presentation Transcript
When foul play seems fair meritocratic un fairness and dis honesty

When Foul Play Seems Fair: Meritocratic (Un)Fairness and (Dis)Honesty

Fabio Galeotti (University of East Anglia)

Reuben Kline (Stony Brook University)

Raimondello Orsini (University of Bologna)

Lorentz Center, NorMAS Workshop 2013


Belief in a just world and redistribution
Belief in a Just World and Redistribution

  • Belief in a Just World (BJW) is the belief that deserving people are rewarded and undeserving people are punished. Under BJW, salient injustice causes a type of cognitive dissonance which one resolves through rationalization or action.

  • BJW (partly) explains cross-national (US vs. West Europe) variation in degrees of re-distribution: those who are more likely to believe that income is a result of “luck and connections” are more likely to support redistribution (Alesina & Angeletos, 2005).

  • Early adolescents begin to develop a sense of fair inequality; younger children tend to be strict egalitarians (Almas et al., 2010)


Inequality inequity and dishonesty
Inequality, Inequity and Dishonesty

  • Inequality in many cases is often confounded by inequity (unfairness). Inequality can in principle be fair or unfair.

    Under BJW, unfairness might trigger a redistributive reaction.

  • Our argument is that if the income distribution is considered to be unfair, citizens are more likely to view circumvention of the “rules of the game” – that is dishonesty and corruption - as justified.

    Meritocratic fairness  honesty

    Meritocratic unfairness  dishonesty


Related literature
Related Literature

  • In Hoffman et al. (1994), subjects earn right (quiz performance) to be proposer in ultimatum game.

  • Zizzo (2003) “Inequality and procedural fairness in a money burning and stealing experiment”.

  • Almas et al. (2010) modified dictator game in which endowment is earned through an effort task

  • Rustrom & Williams (2000), investigate preferences for redistribution after earning money in a “Tower of Hanoi task” (meant to differentiate effort and productivity)

  • Konow et al. (1996, 2000, 2005 etc) origin of endowment and PGG contribution, “accountability principle

  • Ruffle (1997): exogenous (coin flip) vs. endogenous (skill-testing contest) endowments in dictator and ultimatum games


Experimental details
Experimental Details

  • Experimental sessions:

    • University of Bologna, Forlí Campus (June, 2011 and February 2013): 164 subjects

    • Stony Brook University, NY (April and November, 2012): 144 subjects

  • Average payments: about €11.50 at Forlí and about $17 at SBU

  • Computerized experiment (z-Tree)

  • Duration: 30-40 minutes


Experimental design
Experimental Design

  • Three stages:

    • Stage 1: Real-effort task to measure performance/effort and assign initial endowments

    • Stage 2: Dishonesty stage (in pairs)

    • Stage 3: Real-effort task as in Stage 1

  • Between-subjects manipulation of initial endowments’ allocation and pairing:


Stage 1 real effort task
Stage 1: Real-effort task

  • Real-effort task: counting the occurrences of letters “e” and “c” in each line of a text in German

  • A tedious task intended to elicit a sense of “property rights” over performance


Stage 1 effort and payoff
Stage 1: effort and payoff

  • Subjects were instructed that:

    • At the end of the task, they will be divided into two groups, high performers and low performers, based on median performance;

    • their performance on the quiz will determine their initial endowment:

      • 3 out of 4 scenarios: Endowment (high performer) ≥ Endowment (low performer)

      • 1 out of 4 scenarios: Endowment (low performer) ≥ Endowment (high performer)


Treatment ee equal equitable
Treatment EE: Equal & Equitable

  • Equal: Both high and low performers get the same payment

  • Equitable: In the following stage, subjects will be paired high-high and low-low (randomly)

  • Thus, the income distribution is both equal and equitable because all subjects are compensated equally and performed the same

  • Control for income effects: two sub-treatments:

    • EE high:

      • High performers receive $10 (€7) and low performers receive $10 (€7)

    • EE low:

      • High performers receive $3 (€2) and low performers receive $3 (€2)


Treatment ei equal inequitable
Treatment EI: Equal & Inequitable

  • Equal: Both high and low performers get the same payment

  • Inequitable: In the following stage, subjects are paired high-low (randomly)

  • Thus, the income distribution, while equal, is arguably inequitable because the high performers receive compensation equivalent to the low performers, despite they know that their performance was higher

  • Control for income effects: two sub-treatments:

    • EI high:

      • high performers receive $10(€7) and low performers receive $10(€7)

    • EI low:

      • high performers receive $3(€2) and low performers receive $3(€2)


Treatment ui unequal inequitable
Treatment UI: Unequal & Inequitable

  • High performers receive $3 (€2) and low performers receive $10 (€7)

  • Subjects are paired high-low (randomly)

    • Thus, the income distribution is both unequal and inequitable


Treatment ue unequal equitable
Treatment UE: Unequal & Equitable

  • High performers receive $10 (€7) and low performers receive $3 (€2)

  • Subjects are paired high-low (randomly)

    • Thus, the income distribution, while unequal, is arguably equitable because the high performers receive greater compensation for their performance


Stage 2 dishonesty stage
Stage 2: Dishonesty stage

  • Additional payment. Within each pair:

  • Participant A:

    • Owner of “escrow” account of $15 (€10)

  • Participant B:

    • Custodian of the account


Stage 2 private signals and misrepresentation
Stage 2: Private Signals and Misrepresentation

  • The custodian receives a series of 25 binary signals

  • The signals are generated from a (symmetric) binomial distribution

  • Each signal is either red or green, but known only privately to each custodian

  • Each signal is meant to direct the custodian as to whether to transfer an amount, $0.60 (0.40€) to herself (green) or leave it for the owner of the account (red)

  • It is the recording of the signal that affects payoffs, not the signal itself - therefore the custodian can potentially misrepresent the signal

  • Practice rounds with forced input to learn the rules



Behavioural hypotheses
Behavioural hypotheses

  • Procedural unfairness induces more dishonesty: UI > UE

    2) Stronger effect in USA than in Italy, since American subjects should be more sensitive to meritocracy (WVS)

  • Dishonesty in US: UI ≥ EI > EE ≈ UE

  • Dishonesty in Italy: UI > EI ≈ EE ≈ UE


Results rate of honesty
Results: rate of honesty

(No difference between EE high (EI high) and EE low (EI low)  we pool the data)

  • In aggregate, American subjects were more honest than Italian (Mann-Whitney p = 0.026)  mainly driven by EE and UE treatments


Two types of misrepresentation
Two Types of Misrepresentation

  • negative dishonesty: reporting a signal as green when it is in fact red

  • positive dishonesty: reporting a signal as red when it is in fact green

  • as expected, we find much more negative dishonesty than positive dishonesty


Results negative dishonesty
Results: negative dishonesty

  • In aggregate, no difference between Italy and US


Results positive dishonesty
Results: positive dishonesty

  • In aggregate, US > Italy (p = 0.027)


Results custodian s earnings
Results: custodian’s earnings

  • Italy: no difference across treatments


Random effects logit italy and us
Random Effects Logit (Italy and US)

  • Dependent variable: public signal (1 = red, 0 = green)


To sum up
To sum up

  • We observe statistically significant differences between the Italian and the American sample

  • In the US, dishonesty is triggered mainly by perceived inequity/unfairness

  • In Italy dishonesty is higher on average, but is almost unrelated to equity/fairness


Meritocracy and honesty survey evidence
Meritocracy and honesty: Survey Evidence

  • Data used from the World Values Survey across three waves

  • Dependent variable(s): on a scale of 1-10, how justifiable is:

    • cheating on one’s taxes if you have the chance

    • accepting a bribe in the course of your duties

  • Chief explanatory variable is, on scale of 1-10:

    • 1: “In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life.”

    • 10: “Hard work does not generally bring success – it is more a matter of luck and connections.”


Multi level model results
Multi-level model: results

  • Greater degrees of (perceived) inequity and inequality (at the national level) are associated with a greater willingness to circumvent micro-level rules (accept bribes, cheat on taxes), even when controlling for income and corruption at the national level

  • This observational study shows that these factors are associated with one another

  • Our experimental results show that in the lab (and especially in the US) the inequity of the income distribution is associated with a greater degree of dishonesty, even when holding constant the inequality of the distribution.


Random effects logit all
Random Effects Logit (All)

  • Dependent variable: public signal (1 = red, 0 = green)