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Health Risks in Bangladesh: Can Microinsurance Prevent Vulnerability to Poverty

5/29/2012. 2. Outline. IntroductionHealth Risks

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Health Risks in Bangladesh: Can Microinsurance Prevent Vulnerability to Poverty

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    1. 5/30/2012 1 Health Risks in Bangladesh: Can Microinsurance Prevent Vulnerability to Poverty? Syed M. Ahsan Concordia University, CESifo and the Institute of Microfinance & Shubhasish Barua Institute of Microfinance May 2009 Syed.ahsan@concordia.ca

    2. 5/30/2012 2 Outline Introduction Health Risks & Vulnerability Bangladesh Health Background Overview of PKSF-MES Panel Data Preliminary Analysis The Role of MHI in Mitigating Risk & Vulnerability Major Challenges Closing Remarks

    3. 5/30/2012 3 1. Introduction Health is a critical factor in determining long-term living standards by maintaining and augmenting labour productivity, and thus the economic cost of illness is two-fold: the cost of medical care and the loss in income associated with reduced labour supply and productivity. In the absence of significant savings or public pension schemes, the poor are often forced into deeper poverty by their limited ability to cope with such events. Short-run self insurance mechanisms (e.g. depletion of savings, selling of assets, loan from money lenders etc) may allow them to ride out smaller events, but not health events that compromise the capacity to perform activities of daily living (ADL) - leaving them fully vulnerable. The provision of meaningful health coverage would thus be seen as an important risk-mitigation force in the lives of the poor.

    4. 5/30/2012 4 Introduction The goal of the paper is to offer a preliminary analysis of the health environment faced by the rural poor, their principal illness episodes, their capacity and willingness to pay for health services, and to deliberate if a suitable package of health insurance would be a feasible alternative that may lessen the risk of vulnerability to poverty on account of health events. Micro health insurance (MHI): is a risk management tool that can reduce economic losses of low income or poor households, which may arise out of adverse health events. However, insurance would be presumed to be of value to the target group only if it lessens the risk of vulnerability to poverty. Specialized insurance companies, health sector NGOs, as well as Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) are all involved in the provision of microinsurance services (often in collaboration with each other) The MHI market in Bangladesh has evolved in a manner parallel to its precursor, microcredit, namely as a home-grown experimentation. Consequently, many NGO/MFIs have been offering a variety of MHI products in Bangladesh since as early as late 1970s (but no registered insurers yet).

    5. 5/30/2012 5 2. Health Risks & Vulnerability Concave preferences would suggest that households value consumption smoothing over time, and hence dealing with the high stake events of low probability is very important to optimizing agents. Duflo (2005) defines the probability or risk of falling into poverty or (deeper poverty) at least once in the near future is defined as vulnerability, which emerges whenever there are inadequate (formal and informal) means of smoothing consumption in the face of various shocks. Morduch (1999) has argued that poverty and vulnerability reinforces each other in the absence of efficient coping mechanisms. There are ex-ante (e.g., adoption of less risky alternatives) and ex-post (e.g., credit and insurance) mechanisms to deal with shocks. In designing policies, it ought to be kept in mind that in a developing country context, moral hazard gets exacerbated due to difficulties of verification and the inadequacy of the formal legal framework (Ray, 1998). Further, preponderance of agricultural and self employment activities among the poor are often pointed out as a roadblocks to implementing good adverse selection strategies. Developing countries typically offer an inadequate public safety net (including public health services); moreover weak administrative capacity compromises even more the quality of these benefits (Morduch, 1999).

    6. 5/30/2012 6 3. The Bangladesh Health Background Based on the Household Income & Expenditure Survey (HIES) of 2005 [2007: 10,000 households proportionately drawn from rural & urban areas], the latest available, rheumatic fever and respiratory illness appear to be the two more common types of disease in Bangladesh (where rheumatism appears to afflict women more than men (12.3 vs. 8.5%). The most common practice of medical intervention for the rural population is to seek advice from the sales staff of pharmacies (41.3%), while a mere 18% visit a doctor. In terms of financing health expenses, the most frequent answer was that they manage it out of household savings (i.e., 15% of rural and 10% of urban population), while a small fraction (typically in rural areas) resort to selling and mortgaging assets or borrowing from money lenders. Of those not opting for treatment, 28.3% of rural households reported high expenditure as the main reason for non-treatment. Thus many poor households are left vulnerable by using up regular income, savings or other assets in financing health expenditures.

    7. 5/30/2012 7 Bangladesh Health Background. Aggregate Health Outcome: In spite of the handicap, Bangladesh has made significant progress toward reaching the health related MDGs. Over the past decade: Life expectancy has increased by about 9% (to 65.4); Total fertility has declined by 22% (to 2.41 per woman); Infant mortality has fallen by 32% and 22% in rural and urban areas respectively (to 47 & 38, respectively); Unfortunately rural maternal mortality has not budged at all (3.8). What may be the key reasons behind the outcome? NGO activity (e.g., BRAC) which makes better utilization of donor and other charitable trust funds may have played an important role. In spite of the progress, there is still a long way to go. Current figures are much higher than those observed in middle income countries such as Lebanon and Tunisia.

    8. 5/30/2012 8 4. Overview of PKSF Data A survey was carried out by the Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS) as part of an examination of the Monitoring and Evaluation System (MES) of Palli Karma Sahayak Foundations (PKSF) in 4 waves over 1998 and 2005. The survey covered about 3,000 rural households many of whom had access to microcredit. Four repeat surveys were conducted on the matched sample during 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2004-5 Though the focus of the survey was to learn of the broader impact of microcredit, there were important and detailed questions related to health related events which are relied upon here to draw inferences on the latent demand for health services and the willingness to pay for such services and thus indirectly on the demand for insurance among the rural poor. Below we report some preliminary patterns obtained from the last survey, 2004-5.

    9. 5/30/2012 9 PKSF Data. What is the probability that a household will face some form of risk? We measured this probability by obtaining the number of households who didnt face any crisis over the last five years. It is observed that 54% of total households were exposed to some form of risk (i.e. death of the main earner, crop damage, large expenditure due to illness, etc). Thus about 11% faced some risk on an annual basis; though 5 years is too short to make claim of this type. Among the common sources of vulnerability, (i) 22% reported crop damage while (ii) close to 19% of the incidents involved large expenditure due to illness. About 6% cases related to each (iii) flood losses and (iv) death of cattle, while (v) lost wages due to illness affected another 4.4 %.

    10. 5/30/2012 10 PKSF Data. In terms of the magnitude of average financial loss, and focusing on insurable events, the first few were: (1) death of the main earner ($325 annually?) but low probability of 1.4% over 5 yrs, (2) illness expenditure ($160), (3) crop damage ($155), (4) cattle loss ($140), (5) wage loss due to illness ($121) and (6) flood loss ($93). Other than flood, most of these shocks are idiosyncratic in nature thereby opening a scope for insurance. Coping Mechanism of Illness Expenditure (a) In the sample of 2858 households, though 530 (i.e., 19%) reported large expenditure due to illness, detailed data is available only for 493. About 47% of these latter households (actually 242) had to spent their entire (liquid) savings, and 4% took loan with high interest in response to the crisis. (b) A combined group of 7.3% of these households also sold or mortgaged land or sold cattle, each of which has significant implications on their income earning abilities in subsequent periods. In the PAL survey (Udaipur, Rajasthan: 1023 hh, 2519 individuals), 13% had sold assets to meet large health expenses.

    11. 5/30/2012 11 PKSF Data. Pattern of Expenditure by hh:Figure below reflects that 10% of households account for 88% of total health expenditure and 46% of households account for nearly all the health expenditure.

    12. 5/30/2012 12 PKSF Data. The propensity to spend on health is equally concentrated in the Udaipur sample: there 10% of individuals accounted for 80% of all health expenditure in the sample. If we think of insuring the top spenders, 10% of the sample over 5 years, the numbers do not look that formidable! Disease Probability Profile:

    13. 5/30/2012 13 PKSF Data. Medical Expenditure Profile: (a) Doctors Fees (b) Drugs & Tests (c) Hospitalization:

    14. 5/30/2012 14 6. Role of MHI Commercial sustainability acts as a major deterrent for insurers. Absence of adequate health related data for actuarial calculations, moral hazard and adverse selection and difficulty of controlling fraudulent activities have restrained them from penetrating this market on a commercial basis. There are many pilot type micro health insurance schemes in operation all around the world, yet a review of the existing systems suggests a low uptake of health insurance by the poor. The biggest criticism being that the products are ill designed to be of appeal to the public. In Bangladesh, Grameen Kalyan has launched micro health insurance since the late 1990s and presently covers about half a million people, making it the largest program in the country. Its premium is between BDT 200 (Grameen members) and 300 (non-members) per year and it operates 39 clinics in ten districts in Bangladesh. It uses a strategy of serving the community at large and of charging higher rates to the less poor (i.e., non-borrowers of GB).

    15. 5/30/2012 15 8. MHI Challenges & Solutions (a) Awareness & Demand: The necessity of having to pay a premium even if no illness had occurred is difficult to communicate to the poor Low renewal rates in Bangladesh may reflect: Unhappiness with the service, inappropriate and non-cost effective design and financial hardship on the part of the insured. Liquidity constraints: Short term solution: To add the health premium to the loan amount offered by the MFI in question (i.e., if the potential insured are also recipients of microcredit programs) Timing of payment (premium paid at the start of contract-- benefit claim upon occurrence of eligible illness) Short term solution: To offer a physical examination at the very start of insurance coverage. This ensures members realize benefits to the program, and also serves as an early detection & hence an effective preventive device. To offer MHI on a group basis such that even if the program is compulsory for all villagers, the benefit claims are rationed on a group-basis.

    16. 5/30/2012 16 Challenges & Solutions (b) The Scale Issue: Difficulty in pooling risks effectively unless the coverage is very broad (15-20k?). (c) Delivery Channel: Most common in Bangladesh is the full service model, aka the provider model, where the health care provider is also the risk carrier Difficulties arise due to limitations in financial and logistical resources to offer suitable coverage to a large number of the insured in order to pool risks effectively, and set up proper health centers wherever coverage is in effect. As a result, smaller programs are unlikely to be cost-effective Due to the network of offices, human resources and by virtue of their past activities, NGOs/MFIs have gained trust of the villagers, borrowers and non-borrowers alike- a necessity when it comes to part with money in advance from the poor households perspective. It should be noted however that modality and experience required for successful microcredit operation need not be sufficient to run a cost- effective MHI product.

    17. 5/30/2012 17 Challenges & Solutions D) Selling Insurance: Many organizations employ local volunteers to sell insurance, which are advantageous in terms of trust and familiarity in the community. However, when it comes to explaining the underlying rationale, a valuable role can be played by outside professionals. E) Adverse Selection: None of the Bangladesh schemes appear to incorporate any deliberate attempt to guard against adverse selection. Problematic is that non-members of the credit program subscribe on a voluntary basis, thus allowing free reign to adverse selection. F) Co-payment and Moral Hazard: In Bangladesh, the co-payment structure seems very high (often 50 to 70%), defeating the purpose of insurance (namely to limit the co-payment, and shift the bulk of it to the risk carrier.

    18. 5/30/2012 18 Challenges & Solutions (g) Claim Management: The determination of an insured event & settlement of the claim ought to be transparent and fast. H) Premium and Cost Structures: No formal actuarial/statistical exercises are undertaken in determining the rate structure and the premium design does not include the administrative and office overhead costs. Accordingly, many MHI programs in Bangladesh experience substantial operating loss. [E.g., For 2004, premium revenue covered a mere 36, 22 and 4 % of total expenses for GK, BRAC & SSS, Ahmed et al. 2005] I) Role of Subsidy and Endowment Fund: Most subsidy programs seen in the Bangladesh context to date have been limited duration events, typically by external donors. GK example. J) Covariant Risk & Reinsurance: None of the existing MHI plans in the country allow for a contingency arrangement to deal with covariant risks. Extraordinarily large claim scenarios are however precluded by the design of the policy by limiting the coinsurance contribution in case of hospitalizations, which is contrary to the very essence of insurance.

    19. 5/30/2012 19 Challenges & Solutions K) Gender Dimension: Empowering women If the female is the primary insured, the rest of the family is covered through her membership- enhancing female empowerment among the poor L) Staff Knowledge: Most programs appear to be run on a trial-and-error basis; managers are not particularly trained as insurance industry experts and they did not engage insurance/actuary professionals in the design of their programs MIS and performance monitoring chores remain underdeveloped M) Regulatory Issues: Bangladeshs regulatory framework standardizing operational procedures and quality assurance has largely been rudimentary The new Insurance Regulatory Authority (IRA) Act of 2008 is in its formative stage, and effective regulation would appear to be some distance away.

    20. 5/30/2012 20 9. Closing Remarks Modalities have to be found to implement well designed (based on actuarial and statistical models) and meaningful coverage that reflect the core principles of insurance, namely to limit the risk exposure of the insured while allowing for the remainder of the risk to be carried by a more competent authority, namely the insurer, and the reinsurer. Financial subsidy regimes ought to be fully integrated in the insurance design so that long-run sustainability can be ensured. While large MFIs may serve as the insurer themselves, it would be more efficient for smaller MFIs to offer programs in collaboration either with a large MFI or dedicated risk carriers (i.e., commercial insurers).

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