1 / 32

GSE Reform Made simple: (cash-out) refiNANCES vs. homeownership lending

GSE Reform Made simple: (cash-out) refiNANCES vs. homeownership lending . November 13,2013 Joel S Singer, CEO California Association of Realtors . The Premise : Should Refinances Be Equivalently Guaranteed and Priced To Homeownership Lending ?.

pavel
Download Presentation

GSE Reform Made simple: (cash-out) refiNANCES vs. homeownership lending

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. GSE Reform Made simple: (cash-out) refiNANCES vs. homeownership lending November 13,2013 Joel S Singer, CEO California Association of Realtors

  2. The Premise : Should Refinances Be Equivalently Guaranteed and Priced To Homeownership Lending? From the twin standpoints of risk and privatization, GSE reform should begin here…

  3. GSE Mission Statements &Government commitment to Homeownership

  4. Fannie Mae & Freddie Mac:Stewards of Homeownership Chartered by Congress to provide liquidity, stability, and affordability to the U.S. housing and mortgage markets Fannie Mae: Our mission is to tear down barriers, lower costs, and increase the opportunities for home ownership and affordable rental housing for all Americans. Because having a safe place to call home strengthens families, communities, and our nation as a whole. Freddie Mac: Freddie Mac was chartered by Congress in 1970 with a public mission to stabilize the nation's residential mortgage markets and expand opportunities for homeownership and affordable rental housing. Our statutory mission is to provide liquidity, stability and affordability to the U.S. housing market.

  5. The Risk Aspect: Causes of the financial crisis

  6. Caveats: Yes, There Were A Myriad Causes Underlying the Financial Crisis • Extremely low interest rates • High-yield MBS’s looking increasingly attractive • Credit rating agencies gave AAA to junk • Derivatives – complex & unregulated • 1998: Glass-Steagall repealed • Lend to sell to “securitizers” model meant no one was focused on credit quality • Proliferation of “innovative” mortgages with much higher default rates than 30 Yr FRM

  7. The Reality: An Epidemic of “cash-out” refi’s

  8. What led to the Refinancing Boom? • Three trends in the U.S. housing market • Rising home prices • Falling interest rates • More “efficient” refinancing • Reduced Documentation • Inflated on no appraisals • Marketing

  9. Mortgage Rates Dropped Significantly in Early 2000’s SERIES: 30Yr FRM, 1Yr ARM, Federal Funds SOURCE: Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation

  10. Median Home Prices Surged in the Mid 2000’s • 1970-2012 SERIES: Median Price of Existing Single Family Homes SOURCE: CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS® SOURCE: CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®

  11. Refi and Cash-Out • Between 2006-2008 3.5 million homeowners refinanced at least twice • In 2006 – 86% of borrowers who refinanced took out cash. $320 B

  12. Mortgage Originations: 1990-2013 REFINANCE/PURCHASE SHARE SERIES: Mortgage Originations SOURCE: Mortgage Bankers Association of America

  13. Home Purchase Loans vs. Refinance Loans

  14. Cash-Out Refinance Peaked in 2006Q2 at $84 billion

  15. 89% Took “Cash-Out” At Refinance in Q3 2006

  16. Rates of Seriously Delinquent Cash-Outs Higher

  17. What did this look like IN REAL LIFE?

  18. 1872 W. Admiral, Anaheim CA 92801 3 bd, 2.5 ba, built in 1982 Sept 2005: Purchased for $594,000 with 30% downpayment April 2006: Added a second for $57,000 October 2006: Refinanced the second into a new second for $100,000 2010: Default October 2010 value: $364,000

  19. 1572 W. Orangewood, Anaheim, CA 92802 3 bd, 2 ba, 2,016 sq ft built in 1977 June 2003: Purchased for $455,000 with 30% down March 2004: Added a second for $75,000, a third for $90,500 and a fourth for $80,000 Within one year of purchase the property had $565,000 in debt on it! 2010: Default October 2010 value = $442,000

  20. 8871 RegalAnaheim, CA 92804 3 bd, 2 ba, 1,314 sq ft built in 1956 2005: Sold for $568,000 2007: Purchased as REO for $417,000, zero downpayment 2010: Default October 2010 value = $367,500

  21. 2414 E. UnderhillAnaheim, CA 92806 3 bd, 2 ba, 1,459 sq ft built in 1957 2006 Purchased for $640,000with piggyback financing: $500,000 first and $140,000 second, i.e. zero down 2010: Default October 2010 value = $387,000

  22. What MIGHT this look like IN THE AGGREGATE?

  23. NBER Simulation: Without Cash-Out Refi, Outstanding Mortgages Totaled over $4 billion by December 2008 … No Cash-Out Refinancing $10,154 $4,105 Source: National Bureau of Economic Research – NBER Working Paper Series: Systemic Risk and The Refinancing Ratchet Effect (Sept 2009)

  24. NBER Simulation: With Cash-Out Refi, Outstanding Mortgages Tripled… Cash-Out Refinancing $16,570 $12,018 Source: National Bureau of Economic Research – NBER Working Paper Series: Systemic Risk and The Refinancing Ratchet Effect (Sept 2009)

  25. Cash-Out Refinancing Increases the Number of “Underwater” Homeowners Note: The data in the above table reflects figures as of December 2008. Source: National Bureau of Economic Research – NBER Working Paper Series: Systemic Risk and The Refinancing Ratchet Effect (Sept 2009)

  26. A note AbouT Texas

  27. Texas Model • In Texas, cash out and home equity loans cannot exceed 80% of the home’s appraised value • Result: significantly lower delinquency and foreclosure rates

  28. Subprime Delinquency Rises More Slowly in Texas Note: Serious delinquencies are mortgages more than 60 days past due or in foreclosure Sources: Mortgage Bankers Association; Federal Housing Finance Agency; Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

  29. Differences between Texas and U.S. in Mortgage Characteristics 87 80 65 55 45 42 11 1 Sources: First American Loan Performance data from Federal Reserve Bank of New York (August 2008); Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

  30. Where do we go from here?

  31. A FAR More Targeted AND Rational Approach to Downsizing the GSE’s Differentially Price Refi’s Differentially Guarantee Refi’s

  32. Thank You! www.car.org/marketdatajoels@car.org

More Related