POSC 2200 – Modern Conflict

1. POSC 2200 – Modern Conflict Russell Alan Williams Department of Political Science

2. Unit Five: Modern Conflict Required Reading: • Globalization of World Politics, Chapters 13, 14 and 22. • Joseph Jockel & Joel Sokolsky, “Canada and the war in Afghanistan: NATO's odd man out steps forward, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 6:1, (2008), Pp. 100-115. Outline: • Introduction • What is “War”? • What Causes War? • Traditional Approaches to National Security • New Problems

3. 1) Introduction: Unit Analytical Questions: 1) Is conventional war becoming obsolete? • Number of “wars” declining since 1991 • Number of deaths declining =The “obsolescence of war” theses . . . . Explanations? • “Democratic peace” has spread • “Globalization” has made interstate war to costly to pursue, or to tolerate • Changes in the “balance of power” • Role of Nuclear Weapons? • Role of the “Revolution in Military Affairs”

4. 1) Introduction: Unit Analytical Questions: 2) Why is modern war a mainly “southern” phenomenon? • Material or ideological factors? • Power?

5. 2) What is “War”? A murky concept? Should be easy to judge when wars occur, but “War” is a more problematic concept than we think . . . . We don’t even know how to count them(!) • “War” = “An act of force intended to compel our opponents to fulfill our will”(Von Clausewitz) • War is an extension of normal politics amongst states – Clausewitz lived in a “Westphalian” world = only interstate war.

6. “War” = “Organized violence among political units”(Contemporary definition) • Includes interstate war, civil war, asymmetrical civil wars and maybe terrorism. • Organized violence must be large scale = at least 1,000 deaths

7. 3) What Causes “War”? =Most important concern in IR  Practical? Decisions by one or more states (or groups) to use violence as a political strategy • Caused by underlying conflicts over resources, lands and ideas . . . .  Theoretical? Many different answers, but all theories only explain some wars and not others • Need to think about all three “levels of analysis” • E.g. Kenneth Waltz “Man, State and War”

8. “Individual Level” - factors that make war & conflict more likely • Character of individual leaders • E.g. Realist view of human nature • Many examples . . . . However, aggressive behavior may be “natural” and yet not all leaders decide to go to war . . . hard to generalize • Misperception • E.g. Suddam Hussein and the invasion of Kuwait (1991) • Thought US would let him do it(?) • Thought UN was ineffective(?)

9. “State Level” - factors that make war & conflict more likely • Political, social and economic factors internal to states a) Ethnicity: Multination states = more civil war b) Political Structure: Democracies more peaceful to one another E.g. Liberal Democratic Peace Theory

10. c) Political Structure – Governments lacking legitimacy more likely to engage in war • E.g. “Diversionary War”: Theory that leaders start war to divert attention from domestic problems • E.g. National unity in event of international conflict • Britain (Falklands War 1982) • Pakistan (Wars with India)

11. d) Economic Structure – Capitalist states more . . .? • Radicals = Capitalism makes states violent • Liberals = Capitalism makes states peaceful

12. “International System Level” - factors that make war & conflict more likely • “Neorealism” – focus on anarchy =Makes disputes over practical concerns more likely to lead to war • No authority to resolve practical problems E.g. “Power Transition Theory”: War occurs when challenger states acquire more capabilities relative to existing powers • Many interstate wars caused by this dimension? • E.g. Japan’s wars in Asia • Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) • First and Second Sino-Japanese Wars (1895 & 1931 & 1937-1945

13. E.g. “Security Dilemma”: Realist focus on the relative distribution of power. • Rationality suggests others must respond by acquiring new capabilities • Leads to a spiral of insecurity • E.g. Arms races which ultimately may cause a war

14. “Security Dilemma”: British-German Naval Race 1906 – 1914! • 1906: Great Britain builds first “Dreadnaught” • Makes existing navies obsolete • Creates opportunity for Germany to challenge British naval dominance

15. “Security Dilemma”: British-German Naval Race 1906 – 1914! • By 1914: • Great Britain had 38 dreadnoughts • Germany had 24 dreadnoughts • Implications: • Britain less secure then before HMS Dreadnaught (!) • British state and public become increasingly anti-German – contributed to WWI?

16. No explanation works in all cases . . . . • Most wars caused by variety of factors • WWI not caused by “Security Dilemma” alone . . . • However . . . . • Theoretical perspectives do help explain why some states choose war and others do not . . . • Theoretical perspectives have influenced national security strategies(!)

17. 4) Traditional Approaches to National Security: • Realist analysis: 1)States may miscalculate, but a rational, or wise state focuses on the relative “balance of power”. 2) Acquire offensive military capabilities • E.g. “structure” matters - In practical terms this leads to very specific policies • E.g. Mearsheimer and the end of the Cold War - Predicted new threats would arise as states returned to more predatory “balance of power” behavior = re-arm! There is no “peace dividend”

18. Liberal Approaches: • Emphasize “Regimes” • E.g. “Collective Security” • E.g. “Disarmament” and “Arms Control” • Critical Approaches: • Reject realism – “Militarism” is the real problem • E.g. States acquire military capabilities to control their own people as much as to pursue national security • E.g. Security is an individual human characteristic – not something belonging to the state.

19. Ideas influence choices in military “capabilities” Why do states acquire military capabilities? • Deterrence and/or Compellence (???) • Non military functions: • Peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, criminal surveillance, snow removal • Controlling domestic dissent Each state/group must weigh the importance of these functions in choosing military capabilities • Some capabilities not useful for some tasks • E.g. Nuclear weapons will not help you maintain domestic political control . . . . • Some states have different values (?)

20. A) Traditional Types of Capabilities: 1) “Conventional Armies” = Infantry soldiers, artillery and landmines . . . . • Strengths? • Defense of territory • Maintain order - “boots on the ground” • Drawbacks? • Expensive – effective infantries require exhaustive training • People aren’t normally willing to fight and die . . . • Deterrence, but less effective at compellence • Domestic problems? Political influence of large army!

21. 2) Power Projection Capabilities: Necessary to use military force beyond national borders – closely associated with the“Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)” =Navies, air forces, modern missiles, logistics, surveillance • Strengths: • Compellence = “Gunboat Diplomacy” • Lower casualties! • Drawbacks: =Extremely expensive $$$$$$ • Technology has widened gap between most armies and those with power projection capabilities • Communications technology, precession targeting/stand-off weaponry and stealth

22. The “Revolution in Military Affairs” . . . (A.K.A “Transformation”) • Based on the lessons of the 1991 Gulf War – the UN’s “bloodless” victory • Iraq had been perceived as a major military power with a large, well equipped army . . . (!) • Technology seemed to have tipped the balance of power decisively in favor of the US . . . at least in the formal phase of combat. =New form of military intervention requiring few soldiers  Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Libya 2011 =New types of defense spending(?)

23. Defense Spending & the RMA – Who can keep us with the US???

24. Defense Spending & the RMA – Who can keep us with the US???

25. Is the RMA & Power Projection “Worth It”? • Good for limited, international interventions, but less effective for maintaining control and order over territory? US mission to Vietnam (1968) 800,000 + Soldiers US mission to Iraq (1990-1991) 600,000 + Soldiers US mission to Iraq (2003) 130,000 + Soldiers • US investment in RMA equals insufficient resources to wage conventional war and control territory????? • Implications? Only fight wars with limited objectives?

26. 2) Power Projection Capabilities: Necessary to use military force beyond national borders – closely associated with the“Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)” =Navies, air forces, modern missiles, logistics • Strengths: • Compellence – other states avoid conflict(!) • Lower casualties! • Drawbacks: =Extremely expensive $$$$$$ • Technology has widened gap between most armies and those with power projection capabilities • Communications technology, precession targeting/stand-off weaponry and stealth • Problem: Can “middle” or “small” powers afford these weapons over the long term

27. B) Alternative capabilities – “war on the cheap” 1) “Asymmetric warfare”: War between parties of unequal strength in which weaker party avoids major confrontations • More common given imbalance in modern forces? • Techniques: • “Guerrilla warfare”: Approach to war favored by “irregular” militaries = “Hit and run” tactics - relies on concealment among civilian population • Increase occupation costs for conventional armies • Now common (Vietnam Iraq Afghanistan)

28. Asymmetric warfare – Strengths • Low cost . . . • Asymmetric warfare – Weaknesses • High risk for supporters??? • Effectiveness??? -Improved “counterinsurgency” techniques (COIN) reduce effectiveness of these strategies

29. Case Study: Canadian Choices in Capabilities and National Security? Jockel and Sokolsky: “Canada and the War in Afghanistan: NATO’s Odd Man Out Steps Forward” – Assesses the impact of Canada’s “unexpected war” • What is Canada’s strategy? • Before Afghanistan? • After Afghanistan?

30. Case Study: Canadian Choices in Capabilities and National Security? Jockel and Sokolsky: “Canada and the War in Afghanistan: NATO’s Odd Man Out Steps Forward”– Assesses the impact of Canada’s unexpected war • What is Canada’s strategy? • Before Afghanistan? • After Afghanistan? = heavy emphasis on transformation/RMA

31. 5) New Problems: E.g. US Homeland Security costs: The RMA responds to changing ideas about the “Battlespace” (?) • Traditional Security problems  “Terrorism” “Cyberwarfare” suggest the environment is more complex and requires different responses.

32. Meeting the challenge of “Terrorism”: “Terrorism”: Use of “illegitimate” violence by sub-state groups to inspire fear • Tactic: -Attack civilians/non-combatants • Goals: -Raise awareness of grievances -Provoke counterproductive responses from authorities • Types: • Ideological Terrorism • Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism • Religious or Sacred Terrorism

33. “Terrorism” has a long history but many argue “globalization” has increased the risks (?) • Globalization may cause increased terrorism • E.g. Religious or sacred terrorists are often responding to some form of secular, cultural imperialism • E.g. Economic inequalities highlighted by globalization may increase peoples’ willingness to use the tactic • Globalization likely facilitates terrorism, or at least our awareness of it • E.g. New opportunities for mobility or lethality  “Skyjackings” have been common since the 1960s • E.g. Increased media awareness? • However, most important change is the rise of “State-Sponsored Terrorism” – a new tactic in asymmetric warfare?

34. “Terrorism” is particularly difficult to combat . . . . • It is an “easy” low cost tactic • It imposes significant public costs, challenging the principles of liberal democratic societies • Is it effective?

35. “Terrorism” is particularly difficult to combat . . . . • It is an “easy” low cost tactic • It imposes significant public costs, challenging the principles of liberal democratic societies • Is it effective? • Like warfare generally . . . violence often “works” – it is a major source of political change.

36. Is it “legitimate”? • Argument: The ends justify the means . . . Terrorism is no worse than more formal types of military aggression! • It is a “logical” response to the RMA • What difference does it make if the aggressors are non-state actors? • Context matters – “freedom fighters” versus “terrorists” • Argument: Terrorism is worse! • Often lacks broad legitimacy even in the community it claims to support • It usually involves the deliberate targeting of non-combatants • The means are not proportionate to the threats they respond to(?) • Only effective in very limited long term instances – In the interim the human cost is high

37. 5) For Next Time . . . Unit Five: Modern Conflict “Managing Insecurity, The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD’s)” • Required Reading: • Globalization of World Politics, Chapter 23. • John Mueller. “The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World,”International Security, Vol. 13(2), (Fall 1988), Pp. 55-79. (Available from e-journals, or as an excerpt, from the instructor).