Spacepower’s Role in Addressing Earthly Security Challenges Pete Hays, SAIC

1. Spacepower’s Role in Addressing Earthly Security Challenges Pete Hays, SAIC The Future of Space Exploration: Solutions to Earthly Problems? Boston University 12-14 April 2007

2. National Defense University Spacepower Theory Study • Originated during 2005 QDR • Feb 06 OSD Letter with TOR to NDU • Study Design • Yearlong effort: due Summer 07 • Seminars, Workshops, Conferences • Product: Two Books • Volume I: Concise Spacepower Theory • Volume II: Comprehensive Spacepower Theory

3. Edited Volume: Comprehensive Spacepower Theory VOLUME II CHAPTERS AND AUTHORS Foreword: Implications of Spacepower for Geopolitics and Grand Strategy Section I: Introduction to Spacepower Theory Chapter 1: On the Nature of Theory: Harold R. Winton Chapter 2: International Relations Theory and Spacepower: Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. Chapter 3: Landpower, Seapower, and Spacepower: Jon T. Sumida Chapter 4: Airpower, Cyberpower, and Spacepower: Benjamin S. Lambeth Section II: Spacepower and Geopolitics Chapter 5: Orbital Terrain and Space Physics: Martin E.B. France & Jerry Jon Sellers Chapter 6: Space Law and Governance Structures: Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz Chapter 7: Building on Previous Spacepower Theory: Colin S. Gray & John B. Sheldon Section III: Commercial Space Perspectives Chapter 8: History of Commercial Space Activity and Spacepower: Henry R. Hertzfeld Chapter 9: Commercial Space Industry and Markets: Joseph Fuller, Jr. Chapter 10: Merchants and Guardians: Scott Pace Chapter 11: Innovative Approaches to Commercial Space: Ivan Bekey Section IV: Civil Space Perspectives Chapter 12: History of Civil Space Activity and Spacepower: Roger D. Launius Chapter 13: Affordable and Responsive Space Systems: Sir Martin Sweeting Chapter 14: Space and Environmental Issues: Eligar Sadeh Chapter 15: Competing Visions for Exploration: Klaus P. Heiss & Dennis R. Wingo; Robert Zubrin

4. Edited Volume (cont.) Section V: Security Space Perspectives Chapter 16: History of Security Space Activity and Spacepower: James Lewis Chapter 17: Increasing the Military Uses of Space: Henry F. Cooper, Jr. & Everett C. Dolman Chapter 18: Preserving Freedom of Action in Space: Michael Krepon, Theresa Hitchens & Michael Katz-Hyman Chapter 19: Balancing Security Interests: Michael E. O’Hanlon Section VI: International Perspectives Chapter 20: Russia: James E. Oberg Chapter 21: China: Dean Cheng Chapter 22: Europe: Xavier Pasco Chapter 23: Emerging Actors: Randall R. Correll Section VII: Evolving Futures for Spacepower Chapter 24: Evolving U.S. Structures: John M. Logsdon Chapter 25: Organizational Drivers for Spacepower: John M. Collins Chapter 26: Technological Drivers for Spacepower: Taylor Dinerman Chapter 27: Building Human Capital for Spacepower: S. Peter Worden Afterword: The Future of Spacepower: Appendixes Space Law: Outer Space Treaty, Registration Convention, Rescue and Return Agreement, Liability Convention, Moon Treaty, PAROS Proposals, IADC Orbits and Orbital Mechanics Basics of Space System Design Possibly Bibliographic Essay, Annotated Bibliography (assembled from COP), and Comprehensive Bibliography

5. Requirements for Concise Spacepower Theory Account for the structure of the field: • the divergent world views of each sector and • the dynamics of their interactions Define the boundary conditions of the theory: • Cis-Lunar space as opposed to all of space • International perceptions of spacepower and their effect on US policy Ask the key, fundamental questions regarding the uses and purposes of space to extract underlying principles. • Question hypotheses and present conditions. • Test counterfactuals Construct a framework that integrates divergent points of view and takes into account potential future scenarios. Roles of Theory: Define – Construct – Explain – Connect – Anticipate

6. Upcoming Conference Capstone Symposium: 25-26 April 07, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. Initial presentation of Concise Spacepower Theory For more info or to sign up: www.ndu.edu; haysp@ndu.edu Community of Practice Website: http://groups-beta.google.com/group/spacepower-theory

7. Soviet Space Systems and Co-Orbital ASAT RORSAT Co-Orbital ASAT EORSAT Energia carrying Skif DM (Polus) prototype “battle station” DS-P1-M Target Satellite

8. Soviet Space Systems and Co-Orbital ASAT • Many details about this system remain classified or are lost to history. The system used two types of satellites: co-orbital active killers (Istrebitel or killer) and passive targets • The first tests, Polyot-1 and Polyot-2, were conducted in 1963 and 1964. There were subsequently 19 target satellite tests and 22 killer satellite tests. The system reached full operational capability in 1972. The last test was on 18 Jun 1982 • Killer satellites tested in the 1970s were ready for launch within 90 minutes (using a Tsiklon booster) and could close within less than one kilometer of target satellites within 40-50 minutes • On 23 Mar 1983 Yuri Andropov announced a moratorium on design, construction, and testing of the system; the moratorium ended in Sep 1986 • In May 1987 Michael Gorbachev visited Baikonur and saw the co-orbital killer satellite and the prototype of the anti-satellite and anti-missile platform called Narvad (Guard). General Zavalishin, who escorted Gorbachev, used the opportunity to advocate resumption of testing. Zavalishin pointed at similar developments in the US and promised to cover up ASAT launches so no one would suspect tests were taking place. As Zavalishin recalls, “...Gorbachev issued incoherent and wordy explanations, which concluded with a polite, but resolute refusal.” • Ironically, only few days after this conversation, on 15 May 1987, the first heavy-lift Energia rocket blasted off from Baikonur, carrying Skif DM (Polus) spacecraft, which was later described as a prototype “battle station” in space. Due to a software glitch, the 90-ton-class spacecraft never made it into orbit

9. US ASAT Systems and Residual Capabilities

10. US ASAT Testing and Systems • Bold Orion air-launched, nuclear-tipped ASAT tested in late 1950s; world’s first known test 19 Oct 1959 • Programs 505 and 437 ground-launched, nuclear-tipped ASATs operationally deployed 1963-70 • NSDM 345 in Jan 77 called for development of air-launched KEW ASAT • MHV ASAT successfully tested on 13 Sep 1985; Congressional restrictions led to cancellation in 1989; KEASAT was follow-on system • MIRACL tests in Oct 1997; highlighted satellite vulnerability to DEW • ASAT potential of BMD systems: BP and ABL

11. ASAT Arms Control Efforts • Development and testing of ASAT capabilities not covered by OST or other space agreements • Two-Track Diplomacy with three rounds of US-USSR ASAT negotiations 1978-79 • USSR testing moratorium 1982-86; Congressional restrictions on MHV ASAT testing • DST was only “bucket” of AC that did not lead to agreements during 1980s-90s • PAROS efforts at CD and UNGA Resolutions

13. Growth in SATCOM Demand

14. Military Satellite Communications Grids

17. Major Military Space Program Investments(Millions of 2006 dollars)

18. Gain or Maintain Space Control Provide Freedom of Action in Space for Friendly Forces Deny Freedom of Action in Space to Enemy Forces PROTECTION Employ active and Passive defensive measures to ensure US and friendly space systems operate as Planned SURVEILLANCE Detect, identify, assess, and track space objects and events PREVENTION Employ measures to prevent adversary use of data or services from US and friendly space systems for purposes hostile to the US NEGATION Disrupt, deny, degrade, deceive, or destroy adversary space capabilities

23. Attributes of Military Space Doctrines Primary Value and Space System Conflict Missions Appropriate Functions of Military Characteristics and of Space Forces Military Space Forces Employment Strategies Organization for Operations and Advocacy Sanctuary · · · NRO Limited Numbers Limited Enhance Strategic Stability · Fragile Systems · Facilitate Arms · Vulnerable Orbits Control · Optimize for NTMV Survivability Above functions plus: · Force Major Command or · Terrestrial Backups · Distributed · Force Enhancement Unified Command Architectures Enhancement · Degrade · Autonomous Control Gracefully · Hardening Control · Control Space · · Control Space Unified Command Redundancy · Significant Force · Significant Force or Space Force · On - Orbit Spares Enhancement Enhancement · Crosslinks · Surveillance, · Maneuver Offensive, and · Less Vulnerable Orbits Defensive Counterspace · Stealth High Ground Above functions plus: Above functions plus: Space Force · Attack Warning Sensors · Decisive Space - · Decisive Impact on · 5 Ds: Deception, to - Space and Terrestrial Conflict Disruption, Denial, Space - to - Earth · BMD Degradation, Force Destruction Application · Reconstitution · BMD Capability · Defense · Convoy

35. Backup Slides

36. Missile Defense Share of Total DoD Budget and R&D Budget

37. Three Major Objectives of Current U.S. Missile Defense Program 1) “Maintain and sustain an initial capability to defend the U.S., allies, and our deployed forces against rogue attacks.” MDA plans by 2013 to: Complete fielding of Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) in Alaska and California Enhance Early Warning Radars in Alaska, California, and United Kingdom Field Sea-Based X-Band Radar in the Pacific Field a forward-transportable radar in Japan Expand command and control, battle management, and communications capabilities Augment GBI midcourse defense capability by deploying Aegis BMD interceptors and engagement ships 2) “close the gaps and improve this initial capability;” MDA plans by 2013 to: Add more Aegis BMD sea-based interceptors Field four transportable Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) units Introduce land and sea variants of the Multiple Kill Vehicle program Upgrade the early warning radar in Greenland Establish a GBI site and corresponding radar capability in Europe 3) “develop options for the future;” MDA plans to: Continue development of the Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) Maintain two programs, the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) and the Airborne Laser (ABL), one of which is to be selected as the boost-phase missile defense element by 2010 Develop a Space Test Bed to examine space-based options for expanding the coverage and effectiveness for future BMD systems

38. U.S. Missile DefenseProgrammatic Issues and Challenges European third site for GBI and associated radar $206M requested for FY08 but Congress cut funding last year; political issues in host nations; objections raised by Russians Airborne Laser Fully funded at $632M in FY07; FY08 request is $549M. Initial airborne attempt to intercept boosting missile pushed back to last quarter of FY09 Kinetic Energy Interceptor Congress cut FY07 request of $406M by $48M; program restructured and scheduled for FY08 flight test but may not offer a significant new capability such as boost phase intercept capability or a mobile launcher Multiple Kill Vehicle FY07 funding request of $165M was cut by $20M; $271M requested for FY08; program refocused on developing two separate payload configurations Testing $597M appropriated in FY07 and $586M requested for FY08 but concerns remain about breadth and scope of testing Space Request for Space Test Bed for FY08 is $10M and is projected to grow to $15M for FY09

39. Balancing Issues and Challengesfor Space and Missile Defense Desire for constantly deployed, global boost phase missile intercept capabilities via space basing of kinetic and/or directed energy weapons versus concerns over “weaponization of space” Desire for robust global capability to dissuade, deter, and defend against rogue actors versus concerns with undercutting strategic stability with Russia and China Desire to test base-based missile defense components versus concerns with “weaponization of space” and space debris Development of non-space based boost phase missile intercept capabilities (e.g. ground-based interceptors, ground-based lasers, and Airborne Laser) versus their significant anti-satellite capabilities