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Unmanned Aircraft in the National Airspace System

Unmanned Aircraft in the National Airspace System. The Certification Path. EASA UAS Workshop. Doug Davis, Manager, UAPO. Topics. Do No Harm Access Today Access Tomorrow. Do No Harm. UAS Must not degrade the current level of safety UAS must be treated like aircraft, that’s what they are

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Unmanned Aircraft in the National Airspace System

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  1. Unmanned Aircraft in the National Airspace System The Certification Path EASA UAS Workshop Doug Davis, Manager, UAPO

  2. Topics • Do No Harm • Access Today • Access Tomorrow

  3. Do No Harm • UAS Must not degrade the current level of safety • UAS must be treated like aircraft, that’s what they are • Collision between Manned/Unmanned must be avoided

  4. Access Today – Non-Segregated Airspace • Certificates of Authorization/Waiver • State or Public Aircraft only • Over 100 issued annually • Experimental Airworthiness Certificates • Over 17 Issued • 8 in the queue • Draft Experimental Policy being finalized • FAA/DoD Memorandum of Agreement • Allows access 20 lbs and under in Class G • Over DoD owned/leased property

  5. New Mexico State Univ Cooperative Research and Development Agreement • Creates the first UAS Flight Test Center • Why NMSU? • Experience with UAS • Foundational SOP’s in place and exercised • Ability to collect and process significant data • Solid and credible safety record • Over 8 years operational experience • Experienced UAS personnel • Location – • “It’s not the end of the world, but you can see it from there…..” • Very sparsely populated • Low density Air Traffic • Climate is favorable • In coordination, expect to be finalized any day • FAA gets data, data, data

  6. Southwest New Mexico Airspace NMSU/PSL COA >12,000 sq mi Significant airspace access Adjacent to WSMR Call Up Areas * Stallion AAF Call Up Areas WSMR * Holloman AFB NMSU/PSL COA Condron AAF * * Las Cruces Airport McGregor Range * Biggs AAF

  7. FAA/DoD Joint UAS Lab • FAA Technical Center engaged • Establishing a Joint UAS lab at the FAA Tech Center • Funding initially from DoD & ATO • Proposed modeling and simulation • Involving ATO/JPDO/NGATS • FAA soliciting industry for potential partnerships • Opportunity to share technical development information

  8. Access Tomorrow • Small UAS Rulemaking • Pursuing a small UAS Rule (SFAR) • Creating an Advisory Rulemaking Committee • Completing a safety analysis on potential: • Size • Speed • Location • Will probably start out very conservative • Potentially Nontraditional Certification Approach • Web-based, self-certification • Frequency Spectrum Issues in densely populated areas at low altitudes are a BIG concern • Applicants required to submit operational data routinely

  9. Access Tomorrow • Restricted Category Guidance • Clearly recognize unique applications • No Type Certifications applicants seen for some time • Proposals Include: • Pipeline survey • Crop survey • Aerial photography • Geographical survey • Working with an applicant

  10. The Future for Rules • Part 23, 25 or what? • Too soon to tell • Leaning toward new part • Build it by SFAR’s and the restricted applications • Data, data, data

  11. Safety Target • Lack of defined and experiential data cannot support a Safety Objective of 23.1309 • The FAA Small Airplane Directorate developed AC 23-1309 after reviewing years of manned airplane accidents, operational data and based on a need to improve safety in aircraft certified before the requirements of 1309. • Another assumption used in developing AC23.1309-1C was that for small airplanes the number and complexity of the systems where minimal. Reliance on the systems for safe flight was also minimal. • This allowed for a reduction in the quantitative safety objective numbers required by 1309 that resulted in an overall safety improvement. • These assumptions are not valid for used by UAS since the unmanned aircraft is highly reliant on systems for safe flight and operational aspects of UAS differ significantly from manned aircraft. • Complex systems demand 25.1309

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