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NS4053 PowerPoint Presentation

NS4053

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NS4053

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  1. NS4053 Week 3

  2. Concepts • Commons • Globalization • International Institutions • Two level games

  3. Tragedy of the Commons • Definition of commons: resource ownedand available to whole community. • Global commons: atmosphere, high seas, space, Antarctica, fresh water … • Tragedy of commons: • Individual incentive to extract the maximum benefit from commons. • Aggregate result is overuse and degradation of commons. • Suboptimal outcome where individuals pursuing self-interest = lower overall availability of resources.

  4. Commons and Energy • Energy use largely determinedby market forces. • Are long-term externalitiesfully priced in? Or are the ignored because they are absorbed in global commons? • Implication of private benefits vs. public costs.

  5. Solutions • Traditional: • Government • Private ownership • Alternative governance (Dietz et al) • Work best when: • Resources and use can be easily monitored • Slow rate of change • Dense social networks among users • New users can be easily excluded • Institutional arrangements are perceived as legitimate.

  6. Globalization is: • “ … is the closer integration of the countries and peoples of the world ... brought about by the enormous reduction of costs of transportation and communication, and the breaking down of artificial barriers to the flows of goods, services, capital, knowledge, and people across borders.” • Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents, 2002.

  7. Cerny on evolution of state • Czerny framework combines: • Logic of collective action: public and private goods (Olson) • Theory of firm: specific and non-specific assets (Williamson) • Argues that modern states designed to solve certain categories of problems (public and specific). • Until 20th century, societal development increases demand for specific assets and public goods. • From the first (market) to the second (hierarchical) industrial revolution states.

  8. Crisis of the hierarchical state • Competition between specific asset and non-specific asset producers within states produces political conflict. • Tension of military and economic competition between states mitigated by hegemons (UK before WWI, then US after WWII), leading to internationalization of economic activity. • Growth in information and communications technology, flexible and networked organizations, globalization undermine the need for hierarchy and states.

  9. Globalization and state • Traditional 20th c. states characterized by: • Regulation • Production (commanding heights) • (re)Distribution • Globalization challenges all three: • Regulation: go elsewhere • Production: delegitimized • Distribution: inefficient

  10. Results? • Competition state? • Attract internationalized actors and economic activity. • Residual state? • Managing the few national-scale structuresleft? • Weak states and ungoverned spaces? • Neo-medievalism? • Increasingly, private and non-state actors performing governance in complex and overlapping jurisdictions. • Implications: • How do you solve collective action problems associated with energy security without states to make binding commitments?

  11. International Institutions • Growing realization in 1970s of transnational problem sets that needed institutional solutions. • Even hegemons cannot afford the cost of continual arm twisting • Success indicated by proliferation since 20th c.: UN, IEA, IMF, World Bank, etc. • Keohane argument: • Institutions reduce transaction costs, encourage reciprocity and transparency, provide venue for reputation effects and development of norms, provide predictability.

  12. Critiques • Hegemon pays most of costs. • Most member of international institutions are free riders. • Counter: value of legitimacy in reducing costs. • Concern for relative gains. • More so in bilateral than multilateral settings. • End of Cold War increases multilateralism. • Conflict and bargaining impede institution creation. • It depends (see two-level games)

  13. International bargaining and Two-level games • Traditional explanations too state-centered • Putnam sees a two way street: • International negotiations constrained by domestic interest groups • Domestic interest groups use international negotiations for political advantage over their adversaries.

  14. Two-level games • Domestic and international chessboards • “Staggering complexity” • Available moves on one level are constrained by reactions on the other level. • Really clever leaders can spot moves that provide leverage on both level. • Win-sets: all possible level I (int’l) agreements that will win level II (domestic) ratification

  15. Win-sets • Larger win-sets make agreement more likely. • Importance of iteration for reputational effects. • Calculations about ‘delivery ability’ and involuntary defection • Larger win-sets make it easier to get pushed around at level I. • But if win-sets are too small, no agreement possible.

  16. “Size of win-set depends on distribution of power, preferences and possible coalitions among level II constituents.” - US level II energy politics: heterogenous or homogenous? Who participates? Possibilities for synergistic linkages?

  17. “Size of the win-set depends on the level II political institutions.” • Democracies more constrained than authoritarian regimes? • US level II: how independent is government from constituents? What kinds of institutions matter (Senate)?

  18. “Size of win-set depends on strategies of level I negotiators.” • Role of side payments in achieving ratification. • Role of domestic standing and political strength in achieving level II ratification. • Want to preserve the popularity of your counterpart in negotiations to increase the size of their win-set.

  19. Additional considerations • Strategic use of uncertainty about level II win-set. • Reverberation: trying to strategically affect level II of counterparts. • Role of chief negotiator. • Other interests such as personal power, domestic political advantage, beliefs, etc.

  20. Conclusions • Energy is a transnational phenomenon that depends on and affects the commons. • Governance solutions for commons are understood (Dietz et al), but frequently confounded by international system characterized by • Anarchy • Globalization • Decline of states and rise of other actors

  21. Conclusions • Limits of international institutions to address governance of global commons. • In globalized world, two level games or multi level games? • What kinds of solutions for energysecurity emerge inthis context?

  22. Backup

  23. Dietz et al, Science 302, 2003, p. 1910

  24. Teams